On the Sources of Private Information in FX Markets

We investigate the source of information advantage in inter-dealer FX trading using data on trades and counterparty identities. In liquid dollar exchange rates, information is concentrated among dealers that trade most frequently and specialize their activity in a particular rate. In cross-rates, traders that engage in triangular arbitrage are best informed. Better-informed traders are also located on larger trading floors. In cross-rates, the ability to forecast flows explains all of the advantage of the triangular arbitrageurs. In liquid dollar rates, specialist traders can forecast both order flow and the component of exchange rate changes that is uncorrelated with flow.

The rate of return on equity across industrial sectors on the British stock market, 1825-70

This article assesses the contribution of the various industrial sectors to the growth of the British equity market in the 1825–70 period. It also provides estimates of the rates of return on these industrial sectors in this period. The article then proceeds to examine whether differences in rates of return across the various sectors can be explained by risk or other financial factors. One of the main findings is that the relatively high rates of return in the banking, insurance, and miscellaneous sectors appear to be in some measure explained by the presence of extended liability and uncalled capital.

How the ship of fools was ship-wrecked - The Irish crisis and response

For a decade and half the Irish economy was the poster-boy of Europe. With substantial growth rates, an open economy, flexible labour markets and low levels of taxation, Ireland was seen as evidence of the success of neoliberal policies. Yet in the matter of a few short years Ireland has turned into a one of the peripheral black-holes (along with Greece and Portugal) that are threatening to bring down the whole Eurozone project. Given this context the paper will address two key questions. Firstly how did the much eulogised Celtic Tiger fall so far and so fast? And, secondly, what has been the government’s response to the fall and crash of the Irish economy? These two questions will be addressed through both a general historical analysis of the developments of Irish society up to the crash in 2008 and then the responses to it. Secondly by an analysis of two specific elements of that development; namely the much discussed low corporation tax rate and the failure of social housing to deliver decent affordable homes for those at the bottom of society. The third element is a review of the banking and sovereign debt crisis that led to the IMF/EU deal in November 2010 and a brief outlining of its implications for public finances, especially the question of default. The paper concludes by placing the Irish crisis in a global context.

After the Party the Hangover?: An Analysis of ‘Post-Celtic Tiger’ Ireland in the Light of the February 2011 elections’

The election of February 2011 was dominated by the International Monetary Fund/European Central Bank bailout of November 2010, the state of the public finances, the ongoing Irish banking crisis, and the disastrous state of the economy with rising unemployment, emigration and collapsing international competiveness. After years of phenomenal economic growth (at least as measured by orthodox economic measurements such as gross domestic product (GDP) and foreign direct investment), known as the 'Celtic Tiger‘, during which a bloated construction industry accounted for a quarter of GDP and Irish banks sank nearly a third of their lending in construction projects, Ireland has entered a 'post-Celtic Tiger‘ era. This article offers a critical analysis outlining some political, economic and cultural issues of this election as heralding a decisive stage in the 'post-Celtic Tiger' development of the Republic of Ireland, and suggests that what is required at this present historical moment is that a different development model be articulated by the Irish state and wider society.

Regulatory regime change in Turkish banks:Reactive or proactive?

This paper examines the positive contributions made toward restructuring the regulatory framework of Turkey's banking and financial sectors prior to and post the 2000–2001 financial crisis. Drawing on a framework initially developed by Onis and Senses, 2007 and Onis and Senses, 2009 and further referred to by Onis, 2009 and Onis, 2010 it argues that financial reforms undertaken by the Turkish government would not have been successful without the strong support of domestic coalitions. While the external pressures put on the Turkish government from the International Monetary Fund, The World Bank and the European Union for financial reforms were necessary to kick start the reforms as a reactive process, these pressures on their own may have served only the interests of financial business elites at the expense of the broader stakeholders. Empirical data for the study was collected from documentary analysis of key financial institutions and interviews with twenty major Turkish regulatory agents and other stakeholders. The paper then discusses how the perceptions of these stakeholders are embodied into, and have influenced, regulatory regime change in Turkey from a reactive state to a more proactive one.

Order Flow and the Monetary Model of Exchange Rates: Evidence from a Novel Data Set

We propose an exchange rate model that is a hybrid of the conventional specification with monetary fundamentals and the Evans–Lyons microstructure approach. We estimate a model augmented with order flow variables, using a unique data set: almost 100 monthly observations on interdealer order flow on dollar/euro and dollar/yen. The augmented macroeconomic, or “hybrid,” model exhibits greater in-sample stability and out of sample forecasting improvement vis-à-vis the basic macroeconomic and random walk specifications.