998 resultados para 175-1084B
Resumo:
Since the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the position of Slovakia’s left-wing government towards Russia has been ambiguous. Bratislava has accepted the EU sanctions targeting Russia and the plan for strengthening NATO’s eastern flank. At the same time, however, Prime Minister Robert Fico’s government has maintained close political relations with the Kremlin. It has called for the intensification of Slovak-Russian economic relations and has repeatedly criticised the sanctions, speaking in tandem with Russian propaganda in so doing. Slovakia’s Prime Minister is hoping that by playing the role of one of the leaders in the EU and NATO who are most willing to cooperate with Russia, he will gain economic benefits and win votes in next spring’s upcoming parliamentary elections. Despite numerous pro-Russian gestures, Slovakia has been limiting the number of areas in which Moscow could exert pressure on Bratislava. As it strives to become independent of Russia, Slovakia has ensured possible alternative fuel supplies for itself. Moreover, it has been gradually replacing Russian-made military equipment with equipment made in the West. The Slovak government does intend to develop the country’s cooperation with Russia, including in strategic areas involving supplies and transit of oil and gas, as well as supplies of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, it has been making efforts to gain easy access to an alternative source of supplies in each of these areas. Beset by crises, Russia has ever fewer economic cooperation opportunities to offer Slovakia, and Slovak businesses operating on the Russian market have to take into account the growing risk of insolvency of local contractors. To a great extent, therefore, Slovak-Russian relations have been reduced to rhetorical statements confirming the desire for closer cooperation, and to visions of joint projects accompanied by an ever shorter list of feasible cooperation initiatives.
Resumo:
The present-day condition of bipolar glaciation characterized by rapid and large climate fluctuations began at the end of the Pliocene with the intensification of the Northern Hemisphere continental glaciations. The global cooling steps of the late Pliocene have been documented in numerous studies of Ocean Drilling Program (ODP) sites from the Northern Hemisphere. However, the interactions between oceans and between land and ocean during these cooling steps are poorly known. In particular, data from the Southern Hemisphere are lacking. Therefore I investigated the pollen of ODP Site 1082 in the southeast Atlantic Ocean in order to obtain a high-resolution record of vegetation change in Namibia between 3.4 and 1.8 Ma. Four phases of vegetation development are inferred that are connected to global climate change. (1) Before 3 Ma, extensive, rather open grass-rich savannahs with mopane trees existed in Namibia, but the extension of desert and semidesert vegetation was still restricted. (2) Increase of winter rainfall dependent Renosterveld-like vegetation occurred between 3.1 and 2.2 Ma connected to strong advection of polar waters along the Namibian coast and a northward shift of the Polar Front Zone in the Southern Ocean. (3) Climatically induced fluctuations became stronger between 2.7 and 2.2 Ma and semiarid areas extended during glacial periods probably as the result of an increased pole-equator thermal gradient and consequently globally enhanced atmospheric circulation. (4) Aridification and climatic variability further increased after 2.2 Ma, when the Polar Front Zone migrated southward and the influence of Atlantic moisture brought by the westerlies to southern Africa declined. It is concluded that the positions of the frontal systems in the Southern Ocean which determine the locations of the high-pressure cells over the South Atlantic and the southern Indian Ocean have a strong influence on the climate of southern Africa in contrast to the climate of northwest and central Africa, which is dominated by the Saharan low-pressure cell.
