965 resultados para public relationships
Resumo:
Aquest estudi presenta la situació actual dels horts urbans (i periurbans) a la ciutat de Barcelona, els quals s'han classificat segons el tipus d'organització desenvolupada a cada projecte. Així, podem trobar horts de gestió: a) individual i autogestionada; b) comunitària i autogestionada; c) individual i supervisada, i d) comunitària i supervisada. Els horts urbans es presenten, en general, com una eina interessant en la millora de la sostenibilitat urbana. A més de tenir una clara funció d'entreteniment, són propostes que consideren la internalització a les ciutats de la producció de part dels aliments que s'hi consumeixen i alhora aprofiten part dels residus que s'hi produeixen. En particular, els horts urbans comunitaris i autogestionats – el centre d'aquest estudi – es plantegen com espais de participació i autogestió d'acord a la complexitat del context local, d'integració social a través de noves formes de relació i de creació, d'educació ambiental i de transmissió i intercanvi de coneixements inter-generacional. A més, es presenten com una alternativa d'organització realment participativa del territori urbà. Finalment, i d'acord amb l'anterior, es destaquen un conjunt de característiques dels projectes d'horts urbans comunitaris, que juguen un rol fonamental en la capacitat d'aquests per intervenir en aspectes socials i ambientals de la ciutat; característiques que s'haurien de tenir en compte a l'hora de promocionar i implementar projectes d'horts urbans de qualsevol tipus.
Resumo:
In recent years, the strategy for the control of schistosomiasis has placed increased emphasis on the role of health education, public information, and communication. This should, not only bring about specific changes in behavior aiming at disease prevention, but also stimulate participation of the community in health programs. Beyond this, it is desirable that both community members and researchers should seek better life conditions through a transformative social action. The present paper addresses these concerns; first, by critically reviewing some health education programs that were developed in Brazil, and, secondly, by analyzing and suggesting ways to improve this area.
Resumo:
OBJECTIVES: This action-research study conducted in a Swiss male post-trial detention centre (120 detainees and 120 staff) explored the attitudes of detainees and staff towards tobacco smoking. Tackling public health matters through research involving stakeholders in prisons implies benefits and risks that need exploration. STUDY DESIGN: The observational study involved multiple strands (quantitative and qualitative components, and air quality measurements). This article presents qualitative data on participants' attitudes and expectations about research in a prison setting. METHODS: Semi-structured interviews were used to explore the attitudes of detainees and staff towards smoking before and after a smoke-free regulation change in the prison in 2009. Specific coding and thematic content analysis for research were performed with the support of ATLAS.ti. RESULTS: In total, 77 interviews were conducted (38 before the regulation change and 39 after the regulation change) with 31 detainees (mean age 35 years, range 22-60 years) and 27 prison staff (mean age 46 years, range 29-65 years). Both detainees and staff expressed satisfaction regarding their involvement in the study, and wished to be informed about the results. They expected concrete changes in smoke-free regulation, and that the research would help to find ways to motivate detainees to quit smoking. CONCLUSION: Active involvement of stakeholders promotes public health. Interviewing detainees and prison staff as part of an action-research study aimed at tackling a public health matter is a way of raising awareness and facilitating change in prisons. Research needs to be conducted independently from the prison administrators in order to increase trust and to avoid misunderstandings.
Resumo:
We study a general static noisy rational expectations model where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust. JEL Classification: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Rational expectations equilibrium, asymmetric information, risk exposure, hedging, supply information, information acquisition.
Resumo:
This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively moderate rst-best level of cronyism within a firm. The institutional framework of the public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political appointments (such that the subordinate's reappointment is conditioned on the chief's re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme case. JEL classifi cation: D72, D73, D86. Keywords: Cronyism; Meritocracy; Manager; Bureaucrat; Politician.