985 resultados para investment strategy
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Abstract OBJECTIVE To relate the managerial competencies required of nurses with the process of change experienced in the expansion of the Family Health Strategy (FHS). METHOD A qualitative research conducted in primary health care in a southern Brazilian city, through interviews with 32 managerial and clinical nurses. The interviews were processed by IRAMUTEQ software. The resulting classes were examined under five managerial competencies to promote change. RESULTS The four classes obtained from data were: the Family Health Strategy expansion process; confrontations and potentialities; mobilization for the change; innovations in medical and nursing consultations. The classes were related to one or more competencies. CONCLUSION The expansion of the Family Health Strategy requires managerial competencies of implementing and sustaining change, negotiating agreements and commitments, using power and influence ethically and effectively, sponsoring and selling new ideas, and encouraging and promoting innovation.
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A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - April 2007
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A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - May 2007
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Two populations of the wasp Trypoxylon rogenhoferi Kohl, 1884 from São Carlos and Luís Antônio, State of São Paulo, Brazil, were observed and sampled from May 1999 to February 2001 using trap-nests. This mass-provisioning wasp was used to test some aspects of optimal sex allocation theory. Both populations fit all the predictions of the models of Green and Brockmann and Grafen. Maternal provisions determined the size of each offspring, and females allocated well-stocked brood cells to daughters, the sex that benefits most being large. This strategy resulted in a difference in size between the sexes. In São Carlos, female weight at emergence was 1.18 times that of males, in Luís Antônio this value was 1.13. The brood cell volume was correlated with both wing length and weight at emergence in both sexes, and the chance that a given brood cell contained a male offspring decreased with increased brood cell volume. In T. rogenhoferi female body size was related to fitness. Larger females were able to collect more mass of spiders per day, the spiders they captured were heavier, and they provisioned more brood cells per day. They also produced larger daughters. For males, no relationship between body size and fitness was found, but the data were scarce. Since the patterns of provisioning were variable among different females in both study sites, it is possible that the females not follow a unique strategy for sex allocation. The sex ratio and/or investment ratio in the São Carlos population was female-biased and in Luís Antônio, male-biased. In spite of the influence of trap-nests diameters on male production in Luís Antônio, there is some evidence that in São Carlos population the local availability of prey and/or lower rate of parasitism may be major forces in determining the observed sex ratio, but further studies are necessary to verify such hypothesis.
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A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - June 2007
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A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - July 2007
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A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - August 2007
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This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.
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Throughout the 19th century and until the mid-20th century, in terms of long-terminvestment in human capital and, above all, in education, Spain lagged far behind theinternational standards and, more specifically, the levels attained by its neighbours inEurope. In 1900, only 55% of the population could read; in 1950, the figure was 93%.This no doubt contributed to a pattern of slower economic growth in which thephysical strength required for agricultural work, measured here through height, had alarger impact than education on economic growth. It was not until the 1970s, with thearrival of democracy, that the Spanish education system was modernized and theinfluence of education on economic growth increased.
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In this paper I analyze the effects of insider trading on real investmentand the insurance role of financial markets. There is a single entrepreneurwho, at a first stage, chooses the level of investment in a risky business.At the second stage, an asset with random payoff is issued and then the entrepreneurreceives some privileged information on the likely realization of productionreturn. At the third stage, trading occurs on the asset market, where theentrepreneur faces the aggregate demand coming from a continuum of rationaluniformed traders and some noise traders. I compare the equilibrium withinsider trading (when the entrepreneur trades on her inside information in theasset market) with the equilibrium in the same market without insider trading. Ifind that permitting insider trading tends to decrease the level of realinvestment. Moreover, the asset market is thinner and the entrepreneur's netsupply of the asset and the hedge ratio are lower, although the asset priceis more informative and volatile.
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A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - September 2007
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A-1 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program - October 2007
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The Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC) (also referred to as 457/401(a) deferred compensation) is a voluntary retirement savings program designed to help you meet your need for income at retirement and lower your current income taxes. Your contributions to RIC are automatically withdrawn from your paycheck and you are credited with an employer match. You may enroll*and make changes at any time. Other advantages are explained below…keep reading about this excellent employee benefit!
