City of Perry, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2006

City Audit Report

City of Johnston, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings and Questioned Costs, June 30, 2006

City Audit Report

Shelby County Area Solid Waste Agency, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statement and Required Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2006

Other Audit Reports - 28E Organizations

Perry Community School District, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings and Questioned Costs, June 30, 2006

Community School District Audit Report

City of Shenandoah, Independent Auditor's Reports, Basic Financial Statements and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2006

City Audit Report

Central Iowa Juvenile Detention Center, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statement and Required Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2006

Other Audit Reports - 28E Organization

Evansdale Municipal Water Works, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statement and Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2006

Other Audit Reports - 28E Organizations

Audit report on a review of selected general and application controls over the University of Northern Iowa’s Modern Executive Management Financial Information System (MEMFIS) human resources and payroll modules for the period May 22, 2006 through June 12, 2006.

Audit report on a review of selected general and application controls over the University of Northern Iowa’s Modern Executive Management Financial Information System (MEMFIS) human resources and payroll modules for the period May 22, 2006 through June 12, 2006.

Jackson County Sanitary Disposal Agency independent auditor's reports, basic financial statements and required supplementary information, schedule of findings, June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Jackson County Sanitary Disposal Agency for the year ended June 30, 2006

Financial protection of patients through compensation of providers: the impact of health equity funds in Cambodia

Public providers have no financial incentive to respect their legal obligation to exempt the poor from user fees. Health Equity Funds (HEFs) aim to make exemptions effective by giving NGOs responsibility for assessing eligibility and compensating providers for lost revenue. We use the geographic spread of HEFs in Cambodia to identify their impact on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. Among households with some OOP payment, HEFs reduce the amount by 29%, on average. The effect is larger for households that are poorer, mainly use public health care and live closer to a district hospital. HEFs are more effective in reducing OOP payments when they are operated by a NGO, rather than the government, and when they operate in conjunction with the contracting of public health services. HEFs reduce households' health-related debt by around 25%, on average. There is no significant impact on non-medical consumption and health care utilisation

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Interbank market integration under asymmetric information

We argue that the main barrier to an integrated international interbankmarket is the existence of asymmetric information between differentcountries, which may prevail in spite of monetary integration or successfulcurrency pegging. In order to address this issue, we study the scope forinternational interbank market integration with unsecured lending whencross-country information is noisy. We find not only that an equilibriumwith integrated markets need not always exist, but also that when it does,the integrated equilibrium may coexist with one of interbank marketsegmentation. Therefore, market deregulation, per se, does not guaranteethe emergence of an integrated interbank market. The effect of a repo marketwhich, a priori, was supposed to improve efficiency happens to be morecomplex: it reduces interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentationequilibrium, but\ it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium, sincethe repo market will attract the best borrowers. The introduction of othertransnational institutional arrangements, such as multinational banking,correspondent banking and the existence of "too-big-to-fail" banks mayreduce cross country interest spreads and provide more insurance againstcountry wide liquidity shocks. Still, multinational banking, as theintroduction of repos, may threaten the integrated interbank marketequilibrium.

The effects of poor financial information systems on the long term sustainability of local public services. Empirical evidence from the Catalan Municipalities

In this paper we describe the existence of financial illusion in public accountingand we comment on its effects for the future sustainability of local publicservices. We relate these features to the lack of incentives amongst publicmanagers for improving the financial reporting and thus management of publicassets. Financial illusion pays off for politicians and managers since it allowsfor larger public expenditure increases and managerial slack, these beingarguments in their utility functions. This preference is strengthen by the shorttime perspective of politically appointed public managers. Both factors runagainst public accountability. This hypothesis is tested for Spain by using anunique sample. We take data from around forty Catalan local authorities withpopulation above 20,000 for the financial years 1993-98. We build this databasis from the Catalan Auditing Office Reports in a way that it can be linkedto some other local social and economic variables in order to test ourassumptions. The results confirm that there is a statistical relationship between the financialillusion index (FI as constructed in the paper) and higher current expenditure.This reflects on important overruns and increases of the delay in payingsuppliers, as well as on a higher difficulties to face capital finance. Mechanismsfor FI creation have to do among other factors, with delays in paying suppliers(and thereafter higher future financial costs per unit of service), no adequateprovision for bad debts and lack of appropriate capital funding either forreposition or for new equipments. For this, it is crucial to monitor the way inwhich capital transfers are accounted in local public sheet balances. As a result,for most of the Municipalities we analyse, the funds for guaranteeing continuityand sustainability of public services provision are today at risk.Given managerial incentives at present in public institutions, we conclude thatpublic regulation recently enforced for assuring better information systems inlocal public management may not be enough to change the current state of affairs.

A subsampling approach to estimating the distribution of diversing statistics with application to assessing financial market risks

In this paper we propose a subsampling estimator for the distribution ofstatistics diverging at either known rates when the underlying timeseries in strictly stationary abd strong mixing. Based on our results weprovide a detailed discussion how to estimate extreme order statisticswith dependent data and present two applications to assessing financialmarket risk. Our method performs well in estimating Value at Risk andprovides a superior alternative to Hill's estimator in operationalizingSafety First portofolio selection.