Cardiac Remodeling: Concepts, Clinical Impact, Pathophysiological Mechanisms and Pharmacologic Treatment

Abstract Cardiac remodeling is defined as a group of molecular, cellular and interstitial changes that manifest clinically as changes in size, mass, geometry and function of the heart after injury. The process results in poor prognosis because of its association with ventricular dysfunction and malignant arrhythmias. Here, we discuss the concepts and clinical implications of cardiac remodeling, and the pathophysiological role of different factors, including cell death, energy metabolism, oxidative stress, inflammation, collagen, contractile proteins, calcium transport, geometry and neurohormonal activation. Finally, the article describes the pharmacological treatment of cardiac remodeling, which can be divided into three different stages of strategies: consolidated, promising and potential strategies.

Analysis Treatment Guideline versus Clinical Practice Protocol in Patients Hospitalized due to Heart Failure

Background: Despite the availability of guidelines for treatment of heart failure (HF), only a few studies have assessed how hospitals adhere to the recommended therapies. Objectives: Compare the rates of adherence to the prescription of angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor or angiotensin II receptor blockers (ACEI/ARB) at hospital discharge, which is considered a quality indicator by the Joint Commission International, and to the prescription of beta-blockers at hospital discharge, which is recommended by national and international guidelines, in a hospital with a case management program to supervise the implementation of a clinical practice protocol (HCP) and another hospital that follows treatment guidelines (HCG). Methods: Prospective observational study that evaluated patients consecutively admitted to both hospitals due to decompensated HF between August 1st, 2006, and December 31st, 2008. We used as comparing parameters the prescription rates of beta-blockers and ACEI/ARB at hospital discharge and in-hospital mortality. Results: We analyzed 1,052 patients (30% female, mean age 70.6 ± 14.1 years), 381 (36%) of whom were seen at HCG and 781 (64%) at HCP. The prescription rates of beta-blockers at discharge at HCG and HCP were both 69% (p = 0.458), whereas those of ACEI/ARB were 83% and 86%, respectively (p = 0.162). In-hospital mortality rates were 16.5% at HCP and 27.8% at HCG (p < 0.001). Conclusion: There was no difference in prescription rates of beta-blocker and ACEI/ARB at hospital discharge between the institutions, but HCP had lower in-hospital mortality. This difference in mortality may be attributed to different clinical characteristics of the patients in both hospitals.

Technique and clinical applications of double balloon enteroscopy for the evaluation of small bowel diseases

Magdeburg, Univ., Med. Fak., Diss., 2012

Efficiency, corporate governance and performance of European commercial banks

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2013

"Eczema in psoriatico" : closing the gap between palmoplantar psoriasis and palmoplantar chronic contact dermatitis : a clinical, histological and immunohistological study

Magdeburg, Univ., Med. Fak., Diss., 2014

Multiple investigations in clinical trials

Magdeburg, Univ., Med. Fak., Habil.-Schr., 2014

Instruments for image guided procedures - IIGP : review summaries for minimal invasive and image guided technologies and clinical procedures : student review papers on selected topics

Michael Friebe, editor ; Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Institut für Medizintechnik, Lehrstuhl Kathetertechnologie und bildgesteuerte Therapie (INKA - Intelligente Katheter), Forschungscampus STIMULATE (Solution Centre for Image Guided Local Therapies)

Governance mechanisms in Spanish financial intermediaries

This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.

The Cost of ownership in the governance of interfirm collaborations

This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.

Corporate governance in banking: the role of board of directors

We test hypotheses on the dual role of boards of directors for a sample of large international commercial banks. We find an inverted U shaped relation between bank performance and board size that justifies a large board and imposes an efficient limit to the board’s size; a positive relation between the proportion of non-executive directors and performance; and a proactive role in board meetings. Our results show that bank boards’ composition and functioning are related to directors’ incentives to monitor and advise management. All these relations hold after we control for bank business, institutional differences, size, market power in the banking industry, bank ownership and investors’ legal protection.