Trends and Disparities in Mortality Among Spanish-Born and Foreign-Born Populations Residing in Spain, 1999–2008

Spain’s immigrant population has increased 380 % in the last decade, accounting for 13.1 % of the total population. This fact has led her to become during 2009 the eighth recipient country of international immigrants in the world. The aim of this article is to describe the evolution of mortality and the main causes of death among the Spanish-born and foreign-born populations residing in Spain between 1999 and 2008. Age-standardised mortality rates (ASRs), average age and comparative mortality ratios among foreign-born and Spanish-born populations residing in Spain were computed for every year and sub-period by sex, cause of death and place of birth as well as by the ASR percentage change. During 1999–2008 the ASR showed a progressive decrease in the risk of death in the Spanish-born population (−17.8 % for men and −16.6 % for women) as well as in the foreign-born one (−45.9 % for men and −35.7 % for women). ASR also showed a progressive decrease for practically all the causes of death, in both populations. It has been observed that the risk of death due to neoplasms and respiratory diseases among immigrants is lower than that of their Spanish-born counterparts, but risk due to external causes is higher. Places of birth with the greater decreases are Northern Europe, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Southern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean. The research shows the differences in the reduction of death risk between Spanish-born and immigrant inhabitants between 1999 and 2008. These results could contribute to the ability of central and local governments to create effective health policy. Further research is necessary to examine changes in mortality trends among immigrant populations as a consequence of the economic crisis and the reforms in the Spanish health system. Spanish data sources should incorporate into their records information that enables them to find out the immigrant duration of permanence and the possible impact of this on mortality indicators.

Is Europe vulnerable to Russian gas cuts? CEPS Commentaries, 12 March 2014

The EU relies heavily on imports to meet its demand for natural gas. Nearly 23% of the gas burned by the EU member states is produced in Russian gas fields. Ukraine remains one of the main supply routes for Russian gas flowing into Europe. Consequently, mounting tensions between Russia and Ukraine concerning the Crimean Peninsula brought back memories of past gas supply disruptions, most notably of 2009. The question today is whether the EU in 2014 is equally vulnerable to potential (forced or voluntary) cuts in Russian gas supplies as it was five years ago. In this commentary, Arno Behrens and Julian Wieczorkiewicz look into two different scenarios. First, could Europe sustain longer cuts in gas supplies from Russia? And second, what impact would disruptions of Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine have on the EU? Essentially the authors argue that Russia is highly dependent on gas exports to Europe, while Europe could resort to alternatives to Russian gas. In addition, Europe is much better prepared for potential short-term supply disruptions than it was five years ago.

Common Security and Defence in 2014: Revise and resubmit. CEPS Commentaries, 27 March 2014

The conclusions of the December 2013 European Council on defence sounded like a ‘revise and resubmit’ recommendation for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). That outcome was not too disappointing in itself, because precise technical guidelines were provided to revamp Europe’s defence, with good prospects of real progress. But it was not too ambitious either, as a clear indication of Europe’s future role in global security was in effect postponed until 2015, thus requiring ‘resubmission’ at a later date. Furthermore, member states did not seem particularly committed to reaching a formal agreement on a common strategic narrative; a sign that the governance gap continues to affect CSDP. Giovanni Faleg asks whether the European Council on defence marked the twilight of CSDP, or whether we will now see a new phase of cooperation, characterised by escalating external pressures in the southern neighbourhood and a resurgent Russian threat in the east.

Security of Russian gas supplies to the EU - the question of infrastrucutral connections. OSW Point of View, February 2005

The energy security of countries importing energy resources depends largely on the shape and quality of operational transport connections. This is particularly important in the case of natural gas supplies. Natural gas is transported mostly by gas pipelines which permanently connect gas producers and consumers. Thus Europe as a consumer is "tied" to certain gas suppliers for anywhere between a dozen and several tens of years. As their own resources are becoming depleted, the EU Member States get increasingly dependent on import of natural gas. The present paper discusses the existing and projected gas transport routes from Russia to the EU. The first part deals with the importance of gas exports to the economy of the Russian Federation, and the second delves into the EU Member States' dependence on gas imports. Then this paper examines the differences in perceiving the energy security issue between the old and the new Member States, those differences stemming from the different degrees of their dependence on Russian supplies. In the third part, two new transport route projects for Russian gas supplies to the EU are compared and it is argued that from the point of view of the Community's interests, the Yamal gas pipeline is a better solution than the North European (Trans-Baltic) gas pipeline.

Trudny "Sojusznik" Bialorus w polityce Rosji. Prace OSW 2008. = Difficult "ally." Belarus in Russia's foreign policy. OSW Study 28/2008

Belarus holds a special position in Russian policy due to its geopolitical, military and transit significance. Russia's influence and position in the entire Eastern European region largely depend on how strong Russian influence in Belarus is. The process of Russian-Belarusian integration began in 1994, when Alyaksandr Lukashenka came to power in Minsk. At the time, Russia's policy towards Belarus was based on twomain assumptions. Firstly, the Kremlin supported Lukashenka's authoritarian regime. This allowed Russia to keep Belarus within its orbit of political influence and prevent other states from getting involved, since an undemocratic Belarus could not count on closer contacts with the West. Secondly, Russia heavily subsidised Belarus with cheap energy resources (way below the market price) and allowed the duty-free access of Belarusian goods to its market. Thus Belarus became a kind of 'sponsored authoritarianism' with a specific economic model, owing its existence to Russia's economic and political support. At the same time, Moscow's key objective in its policy towards Belarus was to make Minsk accept the Russian conditions concerning integration, which would in fact lead to Belarus' incorporation by the Russian Federation. However, Belarus managed to maintain its sovereignty, while Alyaksandr Lukashenka bandied the term 'integration' about in order to maintain the preferential model of his state's relations with Russia. Russia's intention to alter the nature of these bilateral relations became evident when Vladimir Putin took power in 2000. However, Moscow faced Minsk's refusal to accept the Russian integration plan (which, among other measures, provided for the takeover of Belarusian economic assets by Russian companies). This forced Russia to use its main tool against Minsk: the supplies of cheap gas and oil that had been sustaining Belarus' archaic economy. The most serious crisis in Russian-Belarusian relations broke out at the beginning of 2007, following Moscow's decision to raise the energy resource prices. This decision marked the beginning of the application of market principles to settlements between Moscow and Minsk. The key question this study is meant to answer concerns the consequences of the aforementioned decision by Russia for future Russian-Belarusian relations. Are they at a turning point? What are Russia's policy objectives? What results can come from the process of moving mutual relations onto an economic footing? What policy will replace Russia's 'sponsoring of Belarusian authoritarianism', which it has been implementing since 1994? Finally, what further measures will Russia undertake towards Belarus? The current study consists of five chapters. The first chapter offers a brief presentation of Belarus' significance and position in Russian policy. The second analyses the development of Russian-Belarusian political relations, first of all the establishment of the Union State, Belarus' position in Russian domestic policy and Russia's influence on Belarusian policy. The third chapter presents bilateral economic relations, primarily energy issues. The fourth chapter describes the state and perspectives of military cooperation between the two states. The fifth chapter presents conclusions, where the author attempts to define the essence of the ongoing re-evaluation in Russian-Belarusian relations and to project their future model.

Gazprom's position on the Russian gas market weakening. OSW Commentary No. 70, 2012-02-23

As the difficulties Gazprom has faced in recent years on the European market have multiplied1, so more and more symptoms have appeared which may suggest that the company’s dominant position is deteriorating. The decision made by the Russian government in June 2011 to double the tax Gazprom has to pay on the extraction of gas, which was later approved by parliament, was the first time in many years when the company’s fiscal privileges were withdrawn. The process of Gazprom’s assets being taken over by private companies and business partners from within Vladimir Putin’s closest circle is underway. More and more frequently attempts are being made to challenge the company’s monopoly in areas of key importance for the functioning of the entire gas sector, such as Gazprom’s exclusive right to dispose of the Russian gas transportation system and its exports monopoly. Competition from independent gas producers on the domestic market is growing, and Gazprom is gradually being pushed out of some of that market’s most profitable segments (industrial clients). The emerging tendencies in the Russian gas sector derive from a number of factors – from the situation on the European gas market, through difficulties hampering the development of the sector in Russia itself, to the private interests of the current ruling class and its business partners. The plans for a structural reform of the monopoly (including isolating gas transportation system from Gazprom), presented since 2000 by the Ministry for Economic Development and since 2003 by the Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), suggest a direction for the changes necessary to stimulate the sector’s development and improve the efficiency of Gazprom itself. However, the monopolist’s current business model gives the government full control over this strategic enterprise, which is a core of Putin’s concept for developing Russia as a global energy power. Despite Putin’s recent statement that he “does not rule out privatising Gazprom in the future” (made at a meeting with political scientists in Moscow on 6 February this year), any structural reform of Gazprom (and consequently, a weakening of the state’s control over it) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Still, the developments on the domestic market – growing pressure from other gas companies (oil corporations and independent producers) and changes on the European market2 – may result in the weakening of Gazprom’s monopoly privileges and a gradual deterioration of its special status within Russia.

Russia in Crisis: Year One. OSW Report, January 2010

Economic conditions which had favoured Russia’s development suddenly changed in mid-2008. The Russian economy was hit, on the one hand, by a drastic slump in oil prices (which fell from nearly US$150 to US$50 between July 2008 and January 2009), and on the other by the outflow of investors (a net of US$130 billion of capital left Russia in the fourth quarter of 2008). Within several months, the financial crisis became an economic crisis affecting the entire economy. The financial reserves accumulated in times of prosperity (more than US$162 billion in the stabilisation funds and nearly US$598 billion in the currency and gold reserve) alleviated the negative impact of the crisis, although this failed to prevent the deep declines in macroeconomic indicators. Russia is one of the states most severely affected by the crisis. In the first half of 2009, its GDP fell by 10.4% compared to the same period in the previous year, while industrial production dropped by nearly 15%, and a decrease in investments of over 18% was reported. The poor economic performance has strongly affected the Russian budget, which reported a deficit for the first time in ten years in 2009. During the first year of the crisis (August 2008 – September 2009), Russia’s financial reserves were seriously reduced as a result of the government’s anti-crisis policy and interventions from the central bank: the reserve fund decreased by nearly 45% to US$76 billion, and the central bank’s reserves shrunk by nearly US$200 billion to US$409 billion. Meanwhile, however, the money in the National Welfare Fund, which had been intended almost entirely to subsidise the Pensions Fund between 2010 and 2015, rose almost three-fold (to US$90 billion). According to government forecasts, the money from the reserve fund is also supposed to be spent fully in 2010. The financial crisis has triggered a dynamic outflow of capital from the Russian market. So-called speculative capital was the first to demonstrate the lack of confidence in the Russian market. In the first half of 2009, the growth rate of long-term investments also decreased noticeably, although no spectacular withdrawal of direct investments from Russia has been observed. The economic crisis has also halted the foreign expansion of Russian private capital, while state-owned capital strengthened its position as an investor. Russia’s raw materials companies continue to be the main category of foreign investors; however, new technologies are gaining prominence as the second main direction of Russian investments.

The War republics in the Donbas one year after the outbreak of the conflict. OSW Commentary Number 174, 17 June 2015

More than one year since the first pro-Russian moves in the Donbas, separatists have taken control of parts of the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts but are still unable to form truly functioning administrative structures. The exercise of power by the central administration of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) is restricted to resolving problems as they arise, while administration proper is the prerogative of the local authorities reporting to them which had been performing this function before the conflict broke out. The way the situation is developing and the fact that access to information is restricted make it difficult to determine the structure of the separatist government in more detail, precisely how it is organised, and what the internal hierarchy is like. The overriding goal of the governments of the DPR and the LPR is to maintain and develop their military potential. In effect, the lives of the so-called republics are subordinate to military goals. The Donbas separatism is a conglomerate of different groups of interests, with Russia at the fulcrum. Its representatives set the main tactical and strategic goals and thus have a decisive influence on the development of the situation in the region. Individual separatist groupings come into conflict, and some oligarchs linked to the former Party of Regions circles have also been making attempts to maintain their influence. The struggle between individual groups of interest is intensifying as the situation on the war front becomes calmer. Since the situation has temporarily stabilised after the seizure of Debaltseve, the central governments of the DPR and the LPR have made attempts to expand their influence, combating armed criminals who are outside their control and that of Russia. The civilian population is taking the brunt of the devastation caused by the war and the increasing militarisation of the region. Despite the fact that the intensity of the fighting on the war front is falling, worsening humanitarian problems are causing refugees to continue their flight from the territories controlled by the separatists. 2 million people have fled the conflict zone since the beginning of the war: 1.3 million of them have found shelter in other regions of Ukraine, and more than 700,000 have left for Russia. The region has also sustained great economic losses – most mines have been either destroyed or closed, many industrial plants have restricted or completely discontinued their production, and many firms have been taken over by force. In effect, the region has seen an economic downturn.

Increased frequency of the autism broader phenotype in mothers transmitting etiological CNVs to sons affected by Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD)

Introduction: Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a frequent and complex neurodevelopmental disorder, characterized by impairments in social communication and repetitive behaviors and with a high male to female ratio: ~4:1. Genetic factors, including rare Copy Number Variants (CNVs), have a substantial impact in ASD risk 1, and are associated with specific phenotypic manifestations 2. Recent studies reported that rare inherited CNVs are enriched in mothers of ASD children compared with mothers of controls and are preferentially transmitted from mothers to ASD children suggesting a sex bias in CNV transmission; further, the imbalanced transmission of small pathogenic CNVs from unaffected mothers to their sons with ASD has been described 3, 4. An increased prevalence of autism - like personality traits is found in unaffected relatives of ASD children, suggesting a genetic liability of a broader autism phenotype (BAP) 5. The BAP in parents of autistic children can be assessed by the Social Responsiveness Scale (SRS) 6 and Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAPQ) 7 reports . The SRS is 65 - item questionnaire to identify sub - clinical social impairments and interpersonal behaviour in individuals . The BAPQ is a 36 - item questionnaire measures social aloofness, rigid personality, and pragmatic language deficits in both parents and children.

Lichtheimia Infection in a Lymphoma Patient: Case Report and a Brief Review of the Available Diagnostic Tools

We describe the case of a patient with a T-lymphoblastic lymphoma whose disseminated mucormycosis was diagnosed with delay, and we address the diagnostic and therapeutic decision-making process and review the diagnostic workup of patients with potential IFD. The diagnosis was delayed despite a suggestive radiological presentation of the patient's pulmonary lesion. The uncommon risk profile (T-lymphoblastic lymphoma, short neutropenic phases) wrongly led to a low level of suspicion. The diagnosis was also hampered by the lack of indirect markers for infections caused by Mucorales, the low sensitivity of both fungal culture and panfungal PCR, and the limited availability of species-specific PCR. A high level of suspicion of IFD is needed, and aggressive diagnostic procedures should be promptly initiated even in apparently low-risk patients with uncommon presentations. The extent of the analytical workup should be decided on a case-by-case base. Diagnostic tests such as the galactomannan and β-D-glucan test and/or PCR on biological material followed by sequencing should be chosen according to their availability and after evaluation of their specificity and sensitivity. In high-risk patients, preemptive therapy with a broad-spectrum mould-active antifungal agent should be started before definitive diagnostic findings become available.

M-AARE - Coupling atmospheric, hydrological, hydrodynamic and damage models in the Aare river basin, Switzerland

The triggering mechanism and the temporal evolution of large flood events, especially of worst-case scenarios, are not yet fully understood. Consequently, the cumulative losses of extreme floods are unknown. To study the link between weather conditions, discharges and flood losses it is necessary to couple atmospheric, hydrological, hydrodynamic and damage models. The objective of the M-AARE project is to test the potentials and opportunities of a model chain that relates atmospheric conditions to flood losses or risks. The M-AARE model chain is a set of coupled models consisting of four main components: the precipitation module, the hydrology module, the hydrodynamic module, and the damage module. The models are coupled in a cascading framework with harmonized time-steps. First exploratory applications show that the one way coupling of the WRF-PREVAH-BASEMENT models has been achieved and provides promising new insights for a better understanding of key aspects in flood risk analysis.

The history of modern Europe : with a view of the progress of society from the rise of the modern kingdoms to the Peace of Paris in 1763 /

Includes bibliographical references.

Safety of oral tenofovir disoproxil fumarate-based pre-exposure prophylaxis for HIV prevention: prospective studies in HIV-uninfected men and women

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

A Study of the Association of Maternal Occupations and Deliveries by Cesarean Section for Infants Born in Washington, 2011-2013

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Genetic effects on alcohol dependence risk: re-evaluating the importance of psychiatric and other heritable risk factors

Background. Genetic influences have been shown to play a major role in determining the risk of alcohol dependence (AD) in both women and men; however, little attention has been directed to identifying the major sources of genetic variation in AD risk. Method. Diagnostic telephone interview data from young adult Australian twin pairs born between 1964 and 1971 were analyzed. Cox regression models were fitted to interview data from a total of 2708 complete twin pairs (690 MZ female, 485 MZ male, 500 DZ female, 384 DZ male, and 649 DZ female/male pairs). Structural equation models were fitted to determine the extent of residual genetic and environmental influences on AD risk while controlling for effects of sociodemographic and psychiatric predictors on risk. Results. Risk of AD was increased in males, in Roman Catholics, in those reporting a history of major depression, social anxiety problems, and conduct disorder, or (in females only) a history of suicide attempt and childhood sexual abuse; but was decreased in those reporting Baptist, Methodist, or Orthodox religion, in those who reported weekly church attendance, and in university-educated males. After allowing for the effects of sociodemographic and psychiatric predictors, 47 % (95 % CI 28-55) of the residual variance in alcoholism risk was attributable to additive genetic effects, 0 % (95 % CI 0-14) to shared environmental factors, and 53 % (95 % CI 45-63) to non-shared environmental influences. Conclusions. Controlling for other risk factors, substantial residual heritability of AD was observed, suggesting that psychiatric and other risk factors play a minor role in the inheritance of AD.