Direct investment in real estate

Momentum strategies have the potential to generate extra profits in private real estate markets. Tests of a variety of frequencies of portfolio reweighting identify periods of winner and loser performance. There are strong potential gains from momentum strategies that are based on prior returns over a 6- to 12-month period. Whether these gains are attainable for real-world investors depends on transaction costs, but some momentum strategies do produce net excess returns. The findings hold even if returns are unsmoothed to reflect underlying market prices.

Real estate investment in global financial centers: risk, return and contagion

Global financial activity is heavily concentrated in a small number of world cities –international financial centers. The office markets in those cities receive significant flows of investment capital. The growing specialization of activity in IFCs and innovations in real estate investment vehicles lock developer, occupier, investment, and finance markets together, creating common patterns of movement and transmitting shocks from one office market throughout the system. International real estate investment strategies that fail to recognize this common source of volatility and risk may fail to deliver the diversification benefits sought.

Principal-agent issues in asset acquisition: UK institutions and their investment agents

This paper explores principal‐agent issues in the stock selection processes of institutional property investors. Drawing upon an interview survey of fund managers and acquisition professionals, it focuses on the relationships between principals and external agents as they engage in property transactions. The research investigated the extent to which the presence of outcome‐based remuneration structures could lead to biased advice, overbidding and/or poor asset selection. It is concluded that institutional property buyers are aware of incentives for opportunistic behaviour by external agents, often have sufficient expertise to robustly evaluate agents’ advice and that these incentives are counter‐balanced by a number of important controls on potential opportunistic behaviour. There are strong counter‐incentives in the need for the agents to establish personal relationships and trust between themselves and institutional buyers, to generate repeat and related business and to preserve or generate a good reputation in the market.