Choosing the Path of Austerity: How Policy Coalitions Shape Welfare-policy Choices in Periods of Fiscal Consolidation

In general, fiscal adjustments are associated with significant reductions in social spending. Hence, the welfare state is not spared from austerity. Because the welfare state is still central to party competition, this is electorally risky. The paper addresses the following questions: Do left parties differ from their centrist and rightist competitors in the design of austerity measures? And does government type has an impact on the extent to which austerity policies rely on social spending cuts? By comparing 17 OECD countries between 1982 and 2009 we show that if governments embark on a path to austerity, their ideology does not have a significant effect on the magnitude of welfare state retrenchment. However, if major opposition parties and interest groups rally against social spending cuts, a broad pro-reform coalition is a crucial precondition for large fiscal consolidation programs to rely on substantial cuts to social security.

The Territoriality of Fiscal Solidarity: Comparing Swiss Equalisation with European Union Structural Funding

This article theorises the territorial solidarity and fiscal federalism and compares Switzerland with the European Union. While inter-territorial solidarity is a prerequisite for legitimate fiscal equalisation, such equalisation in turn also contributes to the legitimacy of and solidarity within federal political systems. By cutting across territorial and ethno-national communities, fiscal transfers often contribute to both a “civic” sense of belonging and a “cosmopolitan” identity. After placing types and degrees of (inter-)territorial solidarity at the heart of our conceptual perspective, we discuss the effects of such solidarity through an analysis of two different forms of “federal” equalisation. Comparing the recently reformed Swiss fiscal equalisation system with the EU structural funds allows us to infer if, and how, the fiscal dimension of federalism matters for feelings of solidarity, reciprocity, unity and, ultimately, for the legitimacy of the very (nation-state or Union) structures that are to contribute to the ever-growing prosperity and happiness of their people(s). In Switzerland, a civic understanding of nationhood and cross-cutting cleavages were necessary conditions for extensive, effective and legitimate fiscal equalisation. We infer that, for the EU, this means that strengthening the equalisation component of the structural funds would contribute to an ever closer Union in a political sense: because fiscal equalisation and inter-territorial solidarity are interdependent, reinforcing the one also means cementing the other. Future studies of the EU and federal-type arrangements are advised to pay more explicit attention to the solidarity-element of territoriality – or the territoriality of (fiscal) solidarity.

Choosing the path of austerity: how parties and policy coalitions influence welfare state retrenchment in periods of fiscal consolidation

What are the conditions under which some austerity programmes rely on substantial cuts to social spending? More specifically, do the partisan complexion and the type of government condition the extent to which austerity policies imply welfare state retrenchment? This article demonstrates that large budget consolidations tend to be associated with welfare state retrenchment. The findings support a partisan and a politico-institutionalist argument: (i) in periods of fiscal consolidation, welfare state retrenchment tends to be more pronounced under left-wing governments; (ii) since welfare state retrenchment is electorally and politically risky, it also tends to be more pronounced when pursued by a broad pro-reform coalition government. Therefore, the article shows that during budget consolidations implemented by left-wing broad coalition governments, welfare state retrenchment is greatest. Using long-run multipliers from autoregressive distributed lag models on 17 OECD countries during the 1982–2009 period, substantial support is found for these expectations.

The Relationship between Large Fiscal Adjustments and Short-Term Output Growth Under Alternative Fiscal Policy Regimes

A small, but growing, body of literature searches for evidence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contractions. That is, some evidence exists that large fiscal contractions stimulate short-run economic activity. Our paper continues this research effort by systematically examining the effects, if any, of unusual fiscal events - either non-Keynesian results within a Keynesian model or Keynesian results within a neoclassical model -- on short-run economic activity. We examine this issue within three separate models -- a St. Louis equation, a Hall-type consumption equation, and a growth accounting equation. Our empirical findings are mixed, and do not provide strong systematic support for the view that unusually large fiscal contractions/expansions reverse the effects of normal fiscal events. Moreover, we find only limited evidence that trigger points are empirically important.

The Economic Case for Fiscal Federalism in Scotland

In this paper we consider the case for assigning tax revenues to Scotland, by which we mean that taxes levied on Scottish tax bases should be returned to the Scottish budget. The budget, however, would continue to be supplemented by transfers from the Westminster budget. This arrangement differs from the current situation whereby public spending is largely financed by a bloc grant from Westminster. Our suggestion falls short of full fiscal federalism for Scotland . meaning that Scotland had control over choice of tax base and of tax rates, and fiscal transfers from Westminster would be minimal. We use propositions drawn from the theory of fiscal federalism to argue for a smaller vertical imbalance between taxes retained in Scotland and public spending in Scotland. A closer matching of spending with taxes would better signal to beneficiaries the true costs of public spending in terms of taxes raised. It would also create more complete incentives for politicians to provide public goods and services in quantities and at qualities that voters are actually willing to pay for. Under the current bloc grant system, the marginal tax cost of spending does not enter into political agents. calculations as spending is out of a fixed total budget. Moreover, the Scottish electorate is hindered in signaling its desire for local public goods and services since the size of the total budget is determined by a rigid formula set by Westminster. At the present time we reject proposals for full fiscal federalism because in sharply reducing vertical imbalance in the Scottish budget, it is likely to worsen horizontal balance between Scotland and the other UK regions. Horizontal balance occurs where similarly situated regions enjoy the same per capita level of public goods and services at the same per capita tax cost. The complete removal of the bloc grant under full fiscal federalism would remove the mechanism that currently promotes horizontal equity in the UK. Variability in own-source tax revenues creates other problems with full fiscal federalism. Taxes derived from North Sea oil would constitute a large proportion of Scottish taxes, but these are known to be volatile in the face of variable oil prices and the pound-dollar exchange rate. At the present time variability in oil tax revenue is absorbed by Westminster. Scotland is insulated through the bloc grant. This risk sharing mechanism would be lost with full fiscal federalism. It is true that Scotland could turn to financial markets to tide itself over oil tax revenue downturns, but as a much smaller and less diversified financial entity than the UK as a whole it would probably have to borrow on less favorable terms than can Westminster. Scotland would have to bear this extra cost itself. Also, with full fiscal federalism it is difficult to see how the Scottish budget could be used as a macroeconomic stabilizer. At present, tax revenue downturns in Scotland - together with the steady bloc grant - are absorbed through an increase in vertical imbalance. This acts as an automatic stabilizer for the Scottish economy. No such mechanism would exist under full fiscal federalism. The borrowing alternative would still exist but on the less favorable terms - as with borrowing to finance oil tax shortfalls.

California's School Finance Reform: An Experiment in Fiscal Federalism

The 1971 ruling of the California Supreme Court in the case of Serrano v. Priest initiated a chain of events that abruptly ended local financing of public schools in California. In seven short years, California transformed its school finance system from a decentralized one in which local communities chose how much to spend on their schools to a centralized one in which the state legislature determines the expenditures of every school district. This paper begins by describing California's school finance system before Serrano and the transformation from local to state finance. It then delineates some consequences of that transformation and draws lessons from California's experience with school finance reform.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL FAMILY PLANNING POLICY: AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS AFFECTING STATE EXPENDITURES, FISCAL YEARS 1976-1981 (WOMEN, BUDGET, POPULATION)

The purpose of this study was to analyze the implementation of national family planning policy in the United States, which was embedded in four separate statutes during the period of study, Fiscal Years 1976-81. The design of the study utilized a modification of the Sabatier and Mazmanian framework for policy analysis, which defined implementation as the carrying out of statutory policy. The study was divided into two phases. The first part of the study compared the implementation of family planning policy by each of the pertinent statutes. The second part of the study identified factors that were associated with implementation of federal family planning policy within the context of block grants.^ Implemention was measured here by federal dollars spent for family planning, adjusted for the size of the respective state target populations. Expenditure data were collected from the Alan Guttmacher Institute and from each of the federal agencies having administrative authority for the four pertinent statutes, respectively. Data from the former were used for most of the analysis because they were more complete and more reliable.^ The first phase of the study tested the hypothesis that the coherence of a statute is directly related to effective implementation. Equity in the distribution of funds to the states was used to operationalize effective implementation. To a large extent, the results of the analysis supported the hypothesis. In addition to their theoretical significance, these findings were also significant for policymakers insofar they demonstrated the effectiveness of categorical legislation in implementing desired health policy.^ Given the current and historically intermittent emphasis on more state and less federal decision-making in health and human serives, the second phase of the study focused on state level factors that were associated with expenditures of social service block grant funds for family planning. Using the Sabatier-Mazmanian implementation model as a framework, many factors were tested. Those factors showing the strongest conceptual and statistical relationship to the dependent variable were used to construct a statistical model. Using multivariable regression analysis, this model was applied cross-sectionally to each of the years of the study. The most striking finding here was that the dominant determinants of the state spending varied for each year of the study (Fiscal Years 1976-1981). The significance of these results was that they provided empirical support of current implementation theory, showing that the dominant determinants of implementation vary greatly over time. ^

Transparencia fiscal, social, económica y de acceso a la información

El objetivo del presente trabajo es observar el grado de visibilidad fiscal en el gobierno argentino, ya que la transparencia gubernamental es sumamente importante en todos los niveles de gobierno, nacional, provincial y también municipal debido a la mayor cercanía del ciudadano con los decisores de la política, posibilitando esto un mayor control de los actos públicos. En el mismo analizamos la transparencia, la equidad y la eficiencia en el uso de los fondos públicos, en el marco de la solvencia fiscal y la democratización de la toma de decisiones presupuestarias; recalcando la importancia que adquiere canalizar los esfuerzos por estimular y por promover la transparencia y la visibilidad de las cuentas públicas en el gobierno. Cada vez es más frecuente que los países dicten normas que protejan sus bases imponibles, las que pueden ser influenciadas en el marco de la planificación fiscal internacional; estas normas anti-elusivas, se conocen como Normas de Transparencia Fiscal Internacional (TFI). Argentina recientemente se convirtió en un país suscriptor a las normas de TFI. Pero resulta clave, mas allá de los aspectos normativos, avanzar en crear y consolidar una cultura de la transparencia entre todos los funcionarios públicos y la ciudadanía en general.

Federalismo fiscal en Argentina

Uno de los grandes temas pendientes a tratar en Argentina, y que acumula una deuda de 17 años, es el de redefinir el Régimen de Coparticipación Federal de Impuestos, a través de la sanción de una nueva Ley. Esto se fundamenta, básicamente, en que se trata de un mandato constitucional incumplido, ya que en la reforma de 1994 se estableció como plazo para el dictado de una nueva ley el año 1996; pero además, en el hecho de que el dictado de una nueva Ley de Coparticipación permitiría avanzar sobre un verdadero federalismo que posibilitaría la igualdad de oportunidades a todos los habitantes de nuestro país.

Análisis de solvencia fiscal para el caso de los municipios del Gran Mendoza (1997-2012)

El presente trabajo de investigación se basa en el análisis de solvencia y sustentabilidad fiscal de seis de los dieciocho municipios de la Provincia de Mendoza, aquellos que componen el área Metropolitana del Gran Mendoza: Capital, Godoy Cruz, Guaymallén, Luján de Cuyo, Maipú y Las Heras. Este centro urbano está ubicado al oeste de la República Argentina, en el piedemonte de la Cordillera de Los Andes. El Gran Mendoza se extiende de forma casi regular hacia el Nordeste, Este y Sur. Se trata de la cuarta aglomeración del país con 1.230.000 habitantes y ninguna de estas localidades departamentales del Gran Mendoza es dominante en la composición demográfica, ya que la población se distribuye uniformemente en toda el área.