A new species of the genus Pimelerodius Vanin from the Amazon Region, with notes on the geografic distribution of Pimelerodius motacilla (Boheman) (Coleoptera, Curculionidae, Otidocephalini)

Pimelerodius punctiventris sp. nov. (type locality Brazil, Amazonas, Itacoatiara) is described and illustrated. The new taxon is compared with similar species, being distinguished from the other 12 known species of the genus by the presence of punctures in ventrite I. The available published key for identification of species of Pimelerodius is adapted to include the new species. A modification of the generic description of the aedeagus of Pimelerodius is provided, a necessity due to the differences observed in the aedeagus of the new species. The occurrence of P. motacilla (Boheman, 1843) in the Amazon Region, recorded in sympatry with P. punctiventris in Itacoatiara, AM, is discussed and confirmed, based on the study of 41 available specimens.

Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

Many have observed that political candidates running for election areoften purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In thispaper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model theelectoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In thefirst stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies,and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity.Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustainedin equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variablefor the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the sameelectoral objectives end up ``separating'', that is, assuming different ideological positions.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Allocating ideas: Horizontal competition in tournaments

We develop a stylized model of horizontal and vertical competition intournaments with two competing firms. The sponsor cares about the qualityof the design but also about the design location. A priori not even thesponsor knows his preferred design location, which is only discoveredonce he has seen the actual proposals. We show that the more efficientfirm is more likely to be conservative when choosing the design location.Also, to get some differentiation in design locations, the cost differencebetween contestants can neither be too small nor too big. Therefore, ifthe sponsor mainly cares about the design location, participation in thetournaments by the two lowest cost contestants cannot be optimal for thesponsor.

Competition amongst contests

This article analyses the allocation of prizes in contests. While existing models consider a single contest with an exogenously given set of players, in our model several contests compete for participants. As a consequence, prizes not only induce incentive effects but also participation effects. We show that contests that aim to maximize players aggregate effort will award their entire prize budget to the winner. In contrast, multiple prizes will be awarded in contests that aim to maximize participation and the share of the prize budget awarded to the winner increases in the contests randomness. We also provide empirical evidence for this relationship using data from professional road running. In addition, we show that prize structures might be used to screen between players of differing ability.

Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations

We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. Theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject, and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Non-monophyly of the woody bamboos (Bambuseae; Poaceae): a multi-gene region phylogenetic analysis of Bambusoideae s.s.

The taxonomy of Bambusoideae is in a state of flux and phylogenetic studies are required to help resolve systematic issues. Over 60 taxa, representing all subtribes of Bambuseae and related non-bambusoid grasses were sampled. A combined analysis of five plastid DNA regions, trnL intron, trnL-F intergenic spacer, atpB-rbcL intergenic spacer, rps16 intron, and matK, was used to study the phylogenetic relationships among the bamboos in general and the woody bamboos in particular. Within the BEP clade (Bambusoideae s.s., Ehrhartoideae, Pooideae), Pooideae were resolved as sister to Bambusoideae s.s. Tribe Bambuseae, the woody bamboos, as currently recognized were not monophyletic because Olyreae, the herbaceous bamboos, were sister to tropical Bambuseae. Temperate Bambuseae were sister to the group consisting of tropical Bambuseae and Olyreae. Thus, the temperate Bambuseae would be better treated as their own tribe Arundinarieae than as a subgroup of Bambuseae. Within the tropical Bambuseae, neotropical Bambuseae were sister to the palaeotropical and Austral Bambuseae. In addition, Melocanninae were found to be sister to the remaining palaeotropical and Austral Bambuseae. We discuss phylogenetic and morphological patterns of diversification and interpret them in a biogeographic context.

Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition

We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economicperformance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies,and shows the compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates. Together, these results give rise to the formation ofpolitical parties, as infinetely-lived agents with a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy positions. We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer satisfied.

Estudios de la edad y crecimiento de la Sardina Sardinops sagax sagax de la region central del Perú

En el presente trabajo se estima la edad y crecimiento de sardina, sardinops Sagax Sagax en la región central del Perú durante 1980, mediante la lectura directa de otolitos por contaje de anillos de crecimiento y por retrocálculo en las medidas de las mismas estructuras. Para determinar la edad, se ha seguido la evolución de la naturaleza del borde del otolito, así como también se realizaron mediciones de cada anillo de crecimiento y se estableció la proporcionalidad entre el incremento en longitud del otolito (R) y del pez (L), resultando la ecuación siguiente: L = - 1.032 + 15.174 R Las expresiones que describen el crecimiento en longuitud según el modelo de Van Bertalanffy, se señalan a continuación: Por contaje de anillos: L = 39.8 [1 - e-.22 (t+0.84) ] Por retrocálculo: L = 37.49 [1 - e-.22(t+ o.71)] La relación de la edad con las tallas de captura determinan que la pesquería de consumo durante 1980, estuvo constituida mayormente por ejemplares adultos de 4, 5 y 6 años de edad; análogamente en la pesquería industrial predominaron los individuos jóvenes (edades O, 1 y 2).

On information and competition in private value auctions

How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment?We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers updated expected valuations. We define the class of precision criteria following this approach and different notions of dispersion, and relate them to existing criteria of informativeness. Using supermodular precision, we obtain three results: (1) a more precise information structure yields a more efficient allocation; (2) the auctioneer provides less than the efficient level of information since more information increases bidder informational rents; (3) there is a strategic complementarity between information and competition, so that both the socially efficient and the auctioneer s optimal choice of precision increase with the number of bidders, and both converge as the number of bidders goes to infinity.

How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms

Under team production, those who monitor individual productivity areusually the only ones compensated with a residual that varies withthe performance of the team. This pattern is efficient, as is shownby the prevalence of conventional firms, except for small teams andwhen specialized monitoring is ineffective. Profit sharing in repeatedteam production induces all team members to take disciplinary actionagainst underperformers through switching and separation decisions,however. Such action provides effective self-enforcemnt when themarkets for team members are competitive, even for large teams usingspecialized monitoring. The traditional share system of fishing firmsshows that for this competition to provide powerful enough incentivesthe costs of switching teams and measuring team productivity must bebellow. Risk allocation may constrain the organizational designdefined by the use of a share system. It does not account for itsexistence, however.

Optimization of multiclass queueing networks with changeover times via the achievable region approach: Part I, the single-station case

We address the performance optimization problem in a single-stationmulticlass queueing network with changeover times by means of theachievable region approach. This approach seeks to obtainperformance bounds and scheduling policies from the solution of amathematical program over a relaxation of the system's performanceregion. Relaxed formulations (including linear, convex, nonconvexand positive semidefinite constraints) of this region are developedby formulating equilibrium relations satisfied by the system, withthe help of Palm calculus. Our contributions include: (1) newconstraints formulating equilibrium relations on server dynamics;(2) a flow conservation interpretation of the constraintspreviously derived by the potential function method; (3) newpositive semidefinite constraints; (4) new work decomposition lawsfor single-station multiclass queueing networks, which yield newconvex constraints; (5) a unified buffer occupancy method ofperformance analysis obtained from the constraints; (6) heuristicscheduling policies from the solution of the relaxations.

Insects associated with exposed decomposing bodies in the Colombian Andean Coffee Region

In Colombia, mainly classic forensic medicine methods were used to clarify crimes until 2004. However, other disciplines, including forensic entomology, started to be considered only after the New Accusatory System introduction in Bogotá and the Coffee Region in 2005. In order to provide tools for obtaining evidentiary material elements in judicial trials, it is presented here the succession of insects throughout the decomposition process of an exposed carcass of Sus scrofa Linnaeus 1758 (Suidae) and the Occurrence Matrix of colonizing species. This process was evaluated under ambient conditions in the Andean rural area of the city of Pereira, in the Mundo Nuevo district, located in a pre-montane Wet Forest area, from October to November 2006. A sampling period of 27 days and 3198 individuals were collected. We found these colonizing species in the following stages of decomposition: Lucilia eximia (Wiedemann, 1819) fresh; Hemilucilia semidiaphana (Rondani, 1850), Oxelytrum discicolle (Brullé, 1840), and Cochliomyia macellaria (Fabricius 1775) bloated; Chrysomya albiceps (Wiedemann 1819), Compsomyiops verena (Walker, 1849), Ophyra aenescens (Wiedemann, 1830) and Musca domestica Linnaeus, 1758 active; Fannia sp. advanced and Stearibia nigriceps (Meigen, 1826) remains. This study provides support tools to define the Post Mortem Interval that may be used by experts from government institutions and laboratories officially accredited.