Imperfect Attention and Menu Evaluation

We model the choice behaviour of an agent who suffers from imperfect attention. We define inattention axiomatically through preference over menus and endowed alternatives: an agent is inattentive if it is better to be endowed with an alternative a than to be allowed to pick a from a menu in which a is is the best alternative. This property and vNM rationality on the domain of menus and alternatives imply that the agent notices each alternative with a given menu-dependent probability (attention parameter) and maximises a menu independent utility function over the alternatives he notices. Preference for flexibility restricts the model to menu independent attention parameters as in Manzini and Mariotti [19]. Our theory explains anomalies (e.g. the attraction and compromise effect) that the Random Utility Model cannot accommodate.

Competing for Attention: Is the Showiest also the Best?

We introduce attention games. Alternatives ranked by quality (producers, politicians, sexual partners...) desire to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by investing in their own salience. We prove that if alternatives can control the attention they get, then ”the showiest is the best”: the equilibrium ordering of salience (weakly) reproduces the quality ranking and the best alternative is the one that gets picked most often. This result also holds under more general conditions. However, if those conditions fail, then even the worst alternative can be picked most often.

Still in the Era of Area Studies? Political-Scientific Perspectives on European Competition Policy in the 2000s

This note reviews the political-scientific literature on European competition policy (ECP) in the 2000s. Based on a data set extracted from four well-known journals, and using an upfront methodology and explicit criteria, it analyzes the literature both quantitatively and qualitatively. On the quantitative side, it shows that, although a few sub-policy areas are still neglected, ECP is not the under-researched policy it used to be. On the qualitative side, the literature has greatly improved since the 1990s: Almost all articles now present a clear research question, and most advance specific theoretical claims/hypotheses. Yet, improvements can be made on research design, statistical testing, and, above all, state-of-the-art theorizing (e.g. in the game-theoretical treatment of delegation problems). Indeed, it is paradoxical that ECP specialists do not pay more attention to theoretical questions which are so central to the actual policy area they study.

Emissions distribution in post-Kyoto international negotiations: a policy

An abundant scientific literature about climate change economics points out that the future participation of developing countries in international environmental policies will depend on their amount of pay offs inside and outside specific agreements. These studies are aimed at analyzing coalitions stability typically through a game theoretical approach. Though these contributions represent a corner stone in the research field investigating future plausible international coalitions and the reasons behind the difficulties incurred over time to implement emissions stabilizing actions, they cannot disentangle satisfactorily the role that equality play in inducing poor regions to tackle global warming. If we focus on the Stern Review findings stressing that climate change will generate heavy damages and policy actions will be costly in a finite time horizon, we understand why there is a great incentive to free ride in order to exploit benefits from emissions reduction efforts of others. The reluctance of poor countries in joining international agreements is mainly supported by historical responsibility of rich regions in generating atmospheric carbon concentration, whereas rich countries claim that emissions stabilizing policies will be effective only when developing countries will join them.Scholars recently outline that a perceived fairness in the distribution of emissions would facilitate a wide spread participation in international agreements. In this paper we overview the literature about distributional aspects of emissions by focusing on those contributions investigating past trends of emissions distribution through empirical data and future trajectories through simulations obtained by integrated assessment models. We will explain methodologies used to elaborate data and the link between real data and those coming from simulations. Results from this strand of research will be interpreted in order to discuss future negotiations for post Kyoto agreements that will be the focus of the next. Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen at the end of 2009. A particular attention will be devoted to the role that technological change will play in affecting the distribution of emissions over time and to how spillovers and experience diffusion could influence equality issues and future outcomes of policy negotiations.

Ad-Pay: Programa de control de bons d'hores

Sistema de fidelització de clients mitjançant bons d’hores que el client anirà recarregant i del que se li descomptaran les feines que se li vagin fent. També ha d’ajudar a assegurar-se el cobrament de les feines realitzades. L’aplicació és capaç de mantenir una cartera de clients amb el seu saldo de bons, fer les imposicions de diners i introduir els albarans de les feines produïdes. També mostra dades interessants perquè el gerent de l’empresa client pugui treure les estadístiques necessàries per explotar al màxim la capacitat de la seva empresa.

Sistema de copia de seguridad automática para un programa de diseño técnico

Partint de les mancances quant a salvaguarda de dades presents en un programa de disseny tècnic, es du a terme un estudi de les tècniques necessàries per a solucionar aquestes i es detalla la seva posterior implementació en forma de llibreria. Així, s’aconsegueix oferir les funcionalitats de recuperació de dades, anul·lació d’operacions i històric de canvis, sense afectar de forma apreciable a les prestacions del programari.

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Desarrollo de una metodología para la creación de indicadores de evaluación del ProAire León 2008-2012

El uso de indicadores es una herramienta muy útil cuando intervienen varios factores dentro de un mismo estudio o comparación. En el presente proyecto se ha propuesto una metodología para evaluar un programa específico de acciones para la mejora de la calidad del aire (ProAire) en la ciudad guanajuatense de León, México. Se trata de la propuesta de indicadores ambientales, de salud, económicos y sociales que puedan aplicar en acciones del ProAire para evaluar su puesta en marcha y cómo, mediante toda la información recopilada a lo largo de este estudio, se van a aplicar estos indicadores, que van a dar una idea sobre cómo se está desarrollando el ProAire y si éste requiere de alguna modificación para mejorar. Al aplicarse los indicadores, se realiza un balance de cuáles son las acciones más importantes ambientalmente y socialmente y se hace hincapié en la necesidad de prestarles mayor atención. También se describen varias propuestas de mejora y consejos a aplicar en el programa para que éste sea más eficiente y los actores implicados puedan desarrollar sus acciones con mayor rapidez. Mediante el presente estudio se puede comprobar cómo de importante es la sociedad y los recursos económicos dentro de la problemática medioambiental.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

The Multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents' utilities that are attainable at equilibrium.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Programa de Reforma de Viviendas para las personas mayores de la provincia de Barcelona

Polítiques de millora d'accessibilitat a l'interior dels habitatges per a gent gran a la ciutat de Barcelona. Ponència presentada al 2º Espacio de Encuentro ADAVIV (Sant Sebastià, 9 Juny 2010) mejora de la accesibilidad en el interior de la vivienda promoción de la autonomía personal

Prevalence of and associated factors for adult attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in young Swiss men.

OBJECTIVE: The present study aimed to measure the prevalence of adult attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in a large, representative sample of young Swiss men and to assess factors associated with this disorder. METHODS: Our sample consisted of 5656 Swiss men (mean age 20 years) who participated in the Cohort Study on Substance Use Risk Factors (C-SURF). ADHD was assessed with the World Health Organization (WHO) adult ADHD Self Report Screener (ASRS). Logistic regression analyses were conducted to assess the association between ADHD and several socio-demographic, clinical and familial factors. RESULTS: The prevalence of ADHD was 4.0%, being higher in older and French-speaking conscripts. A higher prevalence also was identified among men whose mothers had completed primary or high school/university and those with a family history of alcohol or psychiatric problems. Additionally, adults with ADHD demonstrated impairment in their professional life, as well as considerable mental health impairment. CONCLUSION: Our results demonstrate that ADHD is common among young Swiss men. The impairments in function and mental health we observed highlight the need for further support and interventions to reduce burden in affected individuals. Interventions that incorporate the whole family also seem crucial.

Programa de introducción a la investigación y al desarrollo de las destrezas comunicativas (hablar y escribir correctamente): aplicación, desarrollo y resultados

Ante el nuevo reto que supone la adaptación al Espacio Europeo de Educación Superior (EEES) con una acción política que propone introducir importantes modificaciones en la concepción del proceso de enseñanza-aprendizaje entre las que se encuentran el replanteamiento del papel del profesor y del alumno, y el proceder metodológico en la acción docente, todos los agentes educativos deben aunar esfuerzos para articular medidas que posibiliten la adaptación a este nuevo escenario de manera óptima. Las universidades están ofreciendo a los docentes herramientas que puedan facilitar el acceso a los procesos de innovación educativa que exige el nuevo espacio de formación. En este marco es donde nace el proyecto titulado 'Programa de Introducción a la Investigación y al Desarrollo de las Destrezas Comunicativas (hablar y escribir correctamente)' que, valiéndose de los recursos tecnológicos que nos ofrece el Servicio de Innovación Educativa de la Universidad de Málaga, busca mejorar las competencias de expresión oral y escrita de los alumnos, así como la capacidad para organizar sus trabajos de investigación de manera rigurosa y ordenada, siguiendo una secuenciación razonada y científica. En la presente comunicación se detallan los objetivos del proyecto, la descripción del mismo, el modo de proceder en su desarrollo, las partes de las que ha constado y las conclusiones a las que se ha llegado.