937 resultados para Probationary employees
Resumo:
Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj
Resumo:
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A "selfish" employer can profitably exploit such preferences among its employees by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium and thus, they would leave employees feeling envy or guilt when they do not meet the employer's demands. Such contracts resemble team and relative performance contracts, and thus we derive conditions under which it may be beneficial to form work teams of employees with distributional concerns who were previously working individually. Similar results are obtained for status-seeking and efficiency concerns preferences.
Resumo:
The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.
Resumo:
We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.
Resumo:
This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.
Resumo:
An excess of hepatitis cases, in the research center of Petrobrás located in the Fundaão Island, within the city of Rio de Janeiro, was notified during the second half of March 1980. In recent years this center has had an average of four cases per year, but between March 5th and April 25th, sixteen cases were reported. The cause and possible source of infection were investigated. A serologic diagnosis of hepatitis A was made by showing IgG serum antibodies against this virus in patients. No subclinical cases among a group of 60 healthy employees could be identified. A questionnaire was circulated to investigate a possible commom source of infection. Evaluation of the water supply system indicated that it had recently been contaminated. Information obtained from other medical services in the island failed to reveal that the episode was part of a larger outbreak.
Resumo:
This paper reports on: (a) new primary source evidence on; and (b) statistical and econometric analysis of high technology clusters in Scotland. It focuses on the following sectors: software, life sciences, microelectronics, optoelectronics, and digital media. Evidence on a postal and e-mailed questionnaire is presented and discussed under the headings of: performance, resources, collaboration & cooperation, embeddedness, and innovation. The sampled firms are characterised as being small (viz. micro-firms and SMEs), knowledge intensive (largely graduate staff), research intensive (mean spend on R&D GBP 842k), and internationalised (mainly selling to markets beyond Europe). Preliminary statistical evidence is presented on Gibrat’s Law (independence of growth and size) and the Schumpeterian Hypothesis (scale economies in R&D). Estimates suggest a short-run equilibrium size of just 100 employees, but a long-run equilibrium size of 1000 employees. Further, to achieve the Schumpeterian effect (of marked scale economies in R&D), estimates suggest that firms have to grow to very much larger sizes of beyond 3,000 employees. We argue that the principal way of achieving the latter scale may need to be by takeovers and mergers, rather than by internally driven growth.
Resumo:
The project aims to achieve two objectives. First, we are analysing the labour market implications of the assumption that firms cannot pay similarly qualified employees differently according to when they joined the firm. For example, if the general situation for workers improves, a firm that seeks to hire new workers may feel it has to pay more to new hires. However, if the firm must pay the same wage to new hires and incumbents due to equal treatment, it would either have to raise the wage of the incumbents, or offer new workers a lower wage than the firm would do otherwise. This is very different from the standard assumption in economic analysis that firms are free to treat newly hired workers independently of existing hires. Second, we will use detailed data on individual wages to try to gauge whether (and to what extent) equity is a feature of actual labour markets. To investigate this, we are using two matched employer-employee panel datasets, one from Portugal and the other from Brazil. These unique datasets provide objective records on millions of workers and their firms over a long period of time, so that we can identify which firms employ which workers at each time. The datasets also include a large number of firm and worker variables.
Resumo:
This study assesses the industrial relations application of the „loyalty-exit-voice‟ proposition. The loyalty concept is linked to reciprocal employer-employee arrangements and examined as a job attribute in a vignette questionnaire distributed to low and medium-skilled employees. The responses provided by employees in three European countries indicate that reciprocal loyalty arrangements, which involve the exchange of higher effort for job security, are one of the most desirable job attributes. This attribute exerts a higher impact on the job evaluations provided by unionised workers, compared to their non-union counterparts. This pattern is robust to a number of methodological considerations. It appears to be an outcome of adaptation to union mediated cooperation. Overall the evidence suggests that the loyalty-job evaluation profiles of unionised workers are receptive to repeated interaction and negative shocks, such as unemployment experience. This is not the case for the non-union workers. Finally, unionised workers appear to „voice‟ a lower job satisfaction, but exhibit low „exit‟ intentions, compared to the non-unionised labour.
Resumo:
This study assesses the 'fair-wage-effort' hypothesis, by examining (a) the relationship between relative wage comparisons and job satisfaction and quitting intensions, and (b) the relative ranking of stated effort inducing-incentives, in a novel dataset of unionised and non-unionised European employees. By distinguishing between downward and upward-looking wage comparisons, it is shown that wage comparisons to similar workers exert an asymmetric impact on the job satisfaction of union workers, a pattern consistent with inequity-aversion and conformism to the reference point. Moreover, union workers evaluate peer observation and good industrial relations more highly than payment and other incentives. In contrast, non-union workers are found to be more status-seeking in their satisfaction responses and less dependent on their peers in their effort choices The results are robust to endogenous union membership, considerations of generic loss aversion and across different tenure profiles. They are supportive of the individual egalitarian bias of collective wage determination and self-enforcing effort norms.
Resumo:
The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. Journal of Economic Literature classiffication numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot Competition, Contract Delegation, Moral Hazard, Entry, Market Size, Wage Cost.
Resumo:
Research in business dynamics has been advancing rapidly in the last years but the translation of the new knowledge to industrial policy design is slow. One striking aspect in the policy area is that although research and analysis do not identify the existence of an specific optimal rate of business creation and business exit, governments everywhere have adopted business start-up support programs with the implicit principle that the more the better. The purpose of this article is to contribute to understand the implications of the available research for policy design. Economic analysis has identified firm heterogeneity as being the most salient characteristic of industrial dynamics, and so a better knowledge of the different types of entrepreneur, their behavior and their specific contribution to innovation and growth would enable us to see into the ‘black box’ of business dynamics and improve the design of appropriate public policies. The empirical analysis performed here shows that not all new business have the same impact on relevant economic variables, and that self-employment is of quite a different economic nature to that of firms with employees. It is argued that public programs should not promote indiscriminate entry but rather give priority to able entrants with survival capacities. Survival of entrants is positively related to their size at birth. Innovation and investment improve the likelihood of survival of new manufacturing start-ups. Investment in R&D increases the risk of failure in new firms, although it improves the competitiveness of incumbents.
Resumo:
Among the various work stress models, one of the most popular to date is the job demands-‐control (JDC) model developed by Karasek (1979), which postulates that work-‐related strain will be the highest under work conditions characterized by high demands and low autonomy. The absence of social support at work will further increase negative outcomes. However, this model does not apply equally to all individuals and to all cultures. In the following studies, we assessed work characteristics, personality traits, culture-‐driven individual attributes, and work-‐related health outcomes, through the administration of questionnaires. The samples consist of Swiss (n = 622) and South African (n = 879) service-‐oriented employees (from health, finance, education and commerce sectors) and aged from 18 to 65 years old. Results generally confirm the universal contribution of high psychological demands, low decision latitude and low supervisor support at work, as well as high neuroticism predict the worse health outcomes among employees in both countries. Furthermore, low neuroticism plays a moderating role between psychological demands and burnout, while high openness and high conscientiousness each play a moderating role between decision latitude and burnout in South Africa. Results also reveal that culture-‐driven individual attributes play a role in both countries, but in a unique manner and according to the ethnic group of belonging. Given that organizations are increasingly characterized with multicultural employees as well as increasingly adverse and complex job conditions, our results help in identifying more updated and refined dynamics that are key between the employee and the work environment in today's context. -- L'un des modèles sur le stress au travail des plus répandus est celui développé par Karasek (1979), qui postule qu'une mauvaise santé chez les employés résulte d'une combinaison de demandes psychologiques élevées, d'une latitude décisionnelle faible et de l'absence de soutien social au travail. Néanmoins, ce modèle ne s'applique pas de façon équivalente chez tous les individus et dans toutes les cultures. Dans les études présentées, nous avons mesuré les caractéristiques de travail, les traits de personnalité, les traits culturels et les effets lies à la santé à l'aide de questionnaires. L'échantillon provient de la Suisse (n = 622) et de l'Afrique du Sud (n = 879) et comprend des employés de domaines divers en lien avec le service (notamment des secteurs de la santé, finance, éducation et commerce) tous âgés entre 18 et 65 ans. Les résultats confirment l'universalité des effets directs des demandes au travail, la latitude décisionnelle faible, le soutien social faible provenant du supérieur hiérarchique, ainsi que le névrosisme élevé qui contribuent à un niveau de santé faible au travail, et ce, dans les deux pays. De plus, un niveau faible de névrosisme a un effet de modération entre les demandes au travail et l'épuisement professionnel, alors que l'ouverture élevée et le caractère consciencieux élevé modèrent la relation entre la latitude décisionnelle et l'épuisement professionnel en Afrique du Sud. Nous avons aussi trouvé que les traits culturels jouent un rôle dans les deux pays, mais de façon unique et en fonction du groupe ethnique d'appartenance. Sachant que les organisations sont de plus en plus caractérisées par des employés d'origine ethnique variées, et que les conditions de travail se complexifient, nos résultats contribuent à mieux comprendre les dynamiques entre l'employé et l'environnement de travail contemporain. personnalité, différences individuelles, comparaisons culturelles, culture, stress au travail, épuisement professionnel, santé des employés.
Resumo:
Aquest projecte té com objectiu fer un sistema d’incidències pel control d’un magatzem robotitzat i del cost que comporta la resolució d’aquestes. D’aquesta manera es pretén canviar un mètode de treball rudimentari, passant a un altre totalment estructurat que serveixi per millorar el actual. Per això s’ha creat una aplicació basada en la tecnologia JSF, què permet aconseguir els nostres objectius. L’aplicació inclou una base de dades feta en PostGres SQL on es guardarà tota la informació que s’utilitza en la nostra aplicació. En aquesta memòria s’ha volgut explicar quins han estat els diferents passos que es van donar per poder assolir tots els nostres objectius. En la primera part realitzem una introducció a la situació del problema que es vol solucionar i descriurem els objectius que en hem marcat. Seguidament s’analitzen els requeriments i es detalla com s’implementen les diferents parts de l’aplicació. Per acabar parlem sobre el procés de testing realitzat que ens assegura el correcte funcionament del programa. Resumint, el objectiu principal d’aquest projecte consisteix en crear una eina que a la vegada que facilita la feina dels treballadors del magatzem, serveixi per al control de tot el sistema de treball als directius de l’empresa.
Resumo:
Recent research on the economic performance of women-controlled firms suggests that their underperformance may not result from differences in the managerial ability of women as compared to men, but it can be the result of different levels of start-up resources. Using accounting data, this paper examines the effects that selected start-up conditions have on the economic performance observed in a sample of 4450 Spanish manufacturing firms. The results indicate significant differences regarding the initial conditions, showing lower levels of assets and number of employees what have implications on the economic performance of women-controlled firms.