EU support mechanisms to promote public private partnerships for financing Trans-European transport infrastructure

Since the mid 80ies the Trans ‐European Transport Network (TEN‐T) policy has been setting the framework for the development of infrastructure for the smooth functioning of the internal market within the European Union (EU). Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have always been regarded by the EU as a key instrument to promote the TEN‐T.

Analysis of safety-based incentives in public private partnerships. The case of Spain

OUTLINE: • Introduction • Experimental Setup • Experimental Procedure • Experimental Results - Surface Roughness - Residual Stresses - Friction - Wear - EDX • Conclusions

Development of a management system for virtual machines on private clouds

Cloud computing and, more particularly, private IaaS, is seen as a mature technol- ogy with a myriad solutions to choose from. However, this disparity of solutions and products has instilled in potential adopters the fear of vendor and data lock- in. Several competing and incompatible interfaces and management styles have increased even more these fears. On top of this, cloud users might want to work with several solutions at the same time, an integration that is difficult to achieve in practice. In this Master Thesis I propose a management architecture that tries to solve these problems; it provides a generalized control mechanism for several cloud infrastructures, and an interface that can meet the requirements of the users. This management architecture is designed in a modular way, and using a generic infor- mation model. I have validated the approach through the implementation of the components needed for this architecture to support a sample private IaaS solution: OpenStack.

Analysis of alternative tendering mechanisms for transportation Public-Private Partnerships

This paper describes a theoretical model based primarily on transaction costs, for comparing the various tendering mechanisms used for transportation Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects. In particular, the model contrasts negotiated procedures with the open procedure, as defined by the current European Union legislation on public tendering. The model includes both ex ante transaction costs (borne during the tendering stage) and ex post transaction costs (such as enforcement costs, re-negotiation costs, and costs arising from litigation between partners), explaining the trade-off between them. Generally speaking, it is assumed that the open procedure implies lower transaction costs ex ante, while the negotiated procedure reduces the probability of the appearance of new contingencies not foreseen in the contract, hence diminishing the expected value of transaction costs ex post. Therefore, the balance between ex ante and ex post transaction costs is the main criterion for deciding whether the open or negotiated procedure would be optimal. Notwithstanding, empirical evidence currently exists only on ex ante transaction costs in transportation infrastructure projects. This evidence has shown a relevant difference between the two procedures as far as ex ante costs are concerned, favouring the open procedure. The model developed in this paper also demonstrates that a larger degree of complexity in a contract does not unequivocally favour the use of a negotiated procedure. Only in those cases dealing with very innovative projects, where important dimensions of the quality of the asset or service are not verifiable, may we observe an advantage in favour of the negotiated procedure. The bottom line is that we find it difficult to justify the employment of negotiated procedures in most transportation PPP contracts, especially in the field of roads. Nevertheless, the field remains open for future empirical work and research on the levels of transaction costs borne ex post in PPP contracts, as well as on the probabilities of such costs appearing under any of the procurement procedures.

Application of Public Private Partnerships to the Spanish Airport System

The current deficit situation of the Spanish airport system suggests the need to manage this in a more efficient and profitable way. One of the possible options is through private management and being able to do this through Public Private Partnerships (PPP). This study analyzes the situation of the sector and its economic importance and the different possibilities for introducing private management in a public company, specifying the situation in the case of airports, presenting the advantages and disadvantages of these possibilities, and aiming at results obtained in other places where it has been applied. It is proposed that the ideal model for the introduction of private management would be through PPP models tailored to each airport, but having common characteristics according to the group they belong to. Finally, we observe that not all airports are commercially attractive, so that the PPP concept does not apply to all of them. In some cases even the operability itself is not viable at all, and that should be considered separately in order to avoid creating a private monopoly while trying to enhance competition among them.

Do Public Private Partnerships Improve Road Safety? The Case of Toll Concessions in Spain

El Transportation Research Board es un congreso de reconocido prestigio internacional en el ámbito de la investigación del transporte. Aunque las actas publicadas están en formato digital y sin ISSN ni ISBN, lo consideramos lo suficientemente importante como para que se considere en los indicadores. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to evaluate whether PPPs lead to an improvement in road safety, when compared with other infrastructure management systems. Second, is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPP contracts in Spain have been effective at improving safety performance. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high-capacity network covering years 2007-2009. The results showed that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not manageable by the private concessionaire such as the average annual daily traffic, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of accidents.