Mirror me : the effect of the voting advice application smartvote on voting preferences and behavior of Swiss voters

Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) have become a central component of election campaigns worldwide. Through matching political preferences of voters to parties and candidates, the web application grants voters a look into their political mirror and reveals the most suitable political choices to them in terms of policy congruence. Both the dense and concise information on the electoral offer and the comparative nature of the application make VAAs an unprecedented information source for electoral decision making. In times where electoral choices are found to be highly individualized and driven by political issue positions, an ever increasing number of voters turn to VAAs before casting their ballots. With VAAs in high demand, the question of their effects on voters has become a pressing research topic. In various countries, survey research has been used to proclaim an impact of VAAs on electoral behavior, yet practically all studies fail to provide the scientific evidence that would allow for making such claims. In this thesis, I set out to systematically establish the causal link between VAA use and electoral behavior, using various data sources and appropriate statistical techniques in doing so. The focus lies on the Swiss VAA smartvote, introduced in the forefront of the 2003 Swiss federal elections and meanwhile an integral part of the national election campaign, smartvote has produced over a million voting recommendations in the last Swiss federal elections to an active electorate of two million, potentially guiding a vast amount of voters in their choices on the ballot. In order to determine the effect of the VAA on electoral behavior, I analyze both voting preferences and choice among Swiss voters during two consecutive election periods. First, I introduce statistical techniques to adequately examine VAA effects in observational studies and use them to demonstrate that voters who used smartvote prior to the 2007 Swiss federal elections were significantly more likely to swing vote in the elections than non- users. Second, I analyze preference voting during the same election and show that the smartvote voting recommendation inclines politically knowledgeable voters to modify their ballots and cast candidate specific preference votes. Third, to further tackle the indication that smartvote use affects the preference structure of voters, I employ an experimental research design to demonstrate that voters who use the application tend to strengthen their vote propensities for their most preferred party and adapt their overall party preferences in a way that they consider more than one party as eligible vote options after engaging with the application. Finally, vote choice is examined for the 2011 Swiss federal election, showing once more that the VAA initiated a change of party choice among voters. In sum, this thesis presents empirical evidence for the transformative effect of the Swiss VAA smartvote on the electoral behavior.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.

A comparison of the processes of institutionalisation of political economy in Spain and Italy (1860-1900)

[spa] El estudio de los procesos a través de los cuales la economía política se ha transformado en una disciplina académica es un área de creciente interés en la historia del pensamiento económico. Dicho estudio se ha abordado a través del análisis de la importancia de la economía política en un conjunto de instituciones, consideradas clave en la expansión de la economía en las sociedades occidentales en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX y primeras décadas del XX: universidades, sociedades económicas, publicaciones periódicas de contenido económico y los parlamentos nacionales. Este papel presenta una comparación entre los desarrollos del proceso de institutionalización de la economía política en España e Italia, a través del estudio de la presencia de esta disciplina en las instituciones mencionadas para el periodo 1860-1900. El objetivo es medir la posible existencia de una vía común en la institucionalización de la economía política en ambos países, como un primer paso hacia la elaboración de un modelo supranacional de institucionalización de la economía en este periodo.

Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

[spa] En este trabajo analizamos la hipótesis que las transferencias asignadas a los municipios políticamente alineados generan un mayor apoyo político que las transferencias asignada a los municipios gobernados por la oposición. Para contrastar esta hipótesis utilizamos datos de las transferencias recibidas por 617 municipios españoles procedentes de dos niveles de gobierno superiores (Regional o Autonómico y Supra-Local o Diputaciones) durante el período 1993-2003, así como datos de los votos obtenidos en las tres elecciones celebradas en los diferentes niveles de gobierno durante este período.