959 resultados para Papal courts.
Resumo:
This chapter explores the extent to which courts can contribute to the countering of terrorism. It suggests that the contribution will depend on the type of actor the courts are attempting to hold to account as well as on the powers that are conferred on courts by national and international legal regimes. It concludes that courts are most legitimate and effective in relation to terrorist suspects and law enforcers, but less so in relation to counter-terrorism operatives and law-makers.
Resumo:
The term sports law is fourfold in nature and encompasses: (a) traditional areas of law, such as contract, tort, criminal, administrative and EU law, as applied to disputes of a sporting origin; (b) the particular impact that a range of statutory provisions might have on sport; for example, legislation governing discriminatory and unsafe practices in a workplace or monopolistic or fraudulent behaviour in an industry; (c) issues of public and social policy otherwise influencing the legislature and the courts, from the allocation of resources to the allocation of risk; and (d) lex sportiva, where that term is taken to reflect the various internal administrative regulations and awards by dispute-resolving mechanisms in sport. As a matter of practice, sports law tends to be concerned with the application of contract and commercial law principles to professional sport - and namely the application of such branches of law to disputes relating to the following "three pillars" of modern, professional sport i.e., disputes relating to the payment, sponsorship or endorsement of those who play sport for a living; disputes arising from decisions made by sports governing bodies; and disputes arising from the application of law to the holding of sports events.
Resumo:
A concussed participant leaving the field of play is one of the most worrying sights in sport. It is also one that might have serious legal implications for sports governing bodies. Over the past number of years, a major class action suit has rumbled through the US courts as taken against that country's biggest professional sport, the National Football League. The NFL is at present attempting to settle the lawsuit from more than 4,500 retired players who claim that the NFL knew for decades about the chronic health risks associated with cumulative concussions in American football but failed to warn players or take preventative steps. Testimony from retired NFL players has revealed stories of chronic headaches, Alzheimer-like forgetfulness, altered personalities and sometimes a downward spiral into depression, violence and suicide. Medical research is suggesting that professional American football players are three times more likely to die as a result of certain neurodegenerative diseases than the general population. This paper notes that the concerns about concussion are not confined to the NFL and extend to contact sport more widely and notably rugby union. This paper also assesses the reaction of leading sports governing bodies globally to the recorded medical risks and accompanying legal vulnerabilities.
Resumo:
This paper reviews decisions from the Northern Ireland and England and Wales High Courts and Courts of Appeal as well as the UK Supreme Court relating to tort and principally to the tort of negligence in the past 12 months or so.
In structure, the paper will be presented in four parts. First, three preliminary points relating to contemporary features of the NI civil courts: personal litigants – Devine v McAteer [2012] NICA 30 (7 September 2012); pre-action protocols – Monaghan v Graham [2013] NIQB 53 (3 May 2013); and the rise of alternative dispute resolution. On the last named issue, the recent decision of PGF II SA v OMFS Company 1 Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1288 (23 October 2013) on unreasonable refusal to mediate, will be discussed.
Second, the paper moves to consider the law of negligence generally and case law from the NI High Court reiterating Lord Hoffmann’s view in Tomlinson v Congleton Borough Council [2004] 1 AC 46 that no duty of care arises from obvious risks of injury. In this, reference will be made to the application of the above “Hoffmann principle” in West Sussex County Council v Pierce [2013] EWCA Civ 1230 (16 October 2013), which concerned an accident sustained by a child at school. A similar set of facts was presented recently to the UK Supreme Court in Woodland v Essex County Council [2013] UKSC 66 (23 October 2013). The decision there, on non-delegable duties of care, will have a significant impact for schools in the provision of extracurricular activities.
Third, I will review a NI case of note on the duty of care of solicitors in the context of professional negligence in the context of conflicting advice by counsel.
Fourth, I will examine a series of cases on employer liability and including issues such as the duty of care towards the volunteer worker; tort and safety at work principles generally; and, more specifically, the duty of care of the employer towards an employee who suffers psychiatric illness as a result of stress and/or harassment at work. On the issue of workplace stress, the NI courts have made extensive reference to the Hale LJ principles found in the Court of Appeal decision of Hatton v Sutherland [2002] 1 All ER 1 and applied to those who have suffered trauma in reporting on or policing “the troubles” in Northern Ireland. On the issue of statutory harassment at work, the paper will also mention the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Hayes v Willoughby [2013] UKSC 17 (20 March 2013).
Resumo:
In preparation for this talk I have reviewed cases of interest in the High Courts and Courts of Appeal of England and Wales and Northern Ireland from the past two years or so on professional negligence and liability and principally relating to solicitors.
There are six topics of interest: the general duty of care demanded of solicitors in the carrying out of their professional obligations; whether there is a specific duty on a solicitor to warn or advise a client of any implied risk in, say, a commercial transaction; what is the scope of the duty on a solicitor to explain the content of or clauses in a legal document; a recent case of interest applying the White v Jones principle to a disappointed beneficiary seeking to make a claim against a solicitor who negligently prepared a will; the practical, limitation issue of how to pinpoint in a professional negligence claim when the damage was first sustained by the claimant; and finally some case law here and in England and Wales on the (costs) implications for solicitors relating to any failure to adhere to case management protocols or related court directions.
Resumo:
Reparations are often declared victim-centred, but in transitional societies defining who is a victim and eligible for reparations can be a politically charged and controversial process. Added to this, the messy reality of conflict means that perpetrators and victims do not always fall in two separate categories. Instead in certain circumstances perpetrators can be victimised and victims can be responsible for victimising others. This article explores complex victims, who are responsible for victimising others, but have themselves been unlawfully victimised. Looking in particular at the 1993 Shankill bombing in Northern Ireland, as well as Colombia and Peru, such complex victims are often seen as ‘guilty’ or ‘bad’ victims undeserving of reparations. This article argues that complex victims need to be included in reparation mechanisms to ensure accountability and to prevent their exclusion becoming a source of victimisation and future violence. It considers alternative avenues of human rights courts, development aid, services and community reparations to navigate complex identities of victim-perpetrators. In concluding the author finds that complex identities can be accommodated in transitional societies reparation programmes through nuanced rules of eligibility and forms of reparations.
Resumo:
The movement for restorative justice (RJ) has struggled with marginalization on the soft end of the criminal justice system where the threat of net widening and iatrogenesis looms large. To realize the full potential of RJ as an alternative philosophy of justice, restorative practices need to expand beyond the world of adolescent and small-level offences into the deeper end of the justice system. Disciplinary hearings inside of adult prisons may be a strategic space to advance this expansion. This paper presents findings from a study of prison discipline in four UK prisons. The findings strongly suggest that in their current form, such disciplinary proceedings are viewed by prisoners as lacking in legitimacy. Although modelled after the adversarial system of the criminal court, the adjudications were instead universally derided as ‘kangaroo courts, lacking in the basic elements of procedural justice. Based on these findings, we argue that restorative justice interventions may offer a viable redress to these problems of legitimacy which, if successful, would have ramifications that extend well beyond the prison walls.
Resumo:
Libertarian paternalism, as advanced by Cass Sunstein, is seriously flawed, but not primarily for the reasons that most commentators suggest. Libertarian paternalism and its attendant regulatory implications are too libertarian, not too paternalistic, and as a result are in considerable tension with ‘thick’ conceptions of human dignity. We make four arguments. The first is that there is no justification for a presumption in favor of nudging as a default regulatory strategy, as Sunstein asserts. It is ordinarily less effective than mandates; such mandates rarely offend personal autonomy; and the central reliance on cognitive failures in the nudging program is more likely to offend human dignity than the mandates it seeks to replace. Secondly, we argue that nudging as a regulatory strategy fits both overtly and covertly, often insidiously, into a more general libertarian program of political economy. Thirdly, while we are on the whole more concerned to reject the libertarian than the paternalistic elements of this philosophy, Sunstein’s work, both in Why Nudge?, and earlier, fails to appreciate how nudging may be manipulative if not designed with more care than he acknowledges. Lastly, because of these characteristics, nudging might even be subject to legal challenges that would give us the worst of all possible regulatory worlds: a weak regulatory intervention that is liable to be challenged in the courts by well-resourced interest groups. In such a scenario, and contrary to the ‘common sense’ ethos contended for in Why Nudge?, nudges might not even clear the excessively low bar of doing something rather than nothing. Those seeking to pursue progressive politics, under law, should reject nudging in favor of regulation that is more congruent with principles of legality, more transparent, more effective, more democratic, and allows us more fully to act as moral agents. Such a system may have a place for (some) nudging, but not one that departs significantly from how labeling, warnings and the like already function, and nothing that compares with Sunstein’s apparent ambitions for his new movement.
Resumo:
The article focuses on the recent developments as regards domestic violence within the context of the Council of Europe. Since 2007 the European Court of Human Rights has issued a series of important judgments in cases involving domestic violence. The most recent of these is Rumor v. Italy, in which the Court issued its judgment on 27 May 2014. The article analyses this case in the context of the Court’s previous jurisprudence on domestic violence. In addition, on 1 August 2014 the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence entered into force, and the article will include a number of reflections on the potential held by this Convention. No violation of the European Convention on Human Rights was found in Rumor, however the question of whether Italy would have been in breach of the provisions of the new Convention, to which it is a party, had this Convention been in force at the time of the relevant events, will be examined.
Resumo:
Where either the seller or buyer of landed property fails to complete a contract to sell land the non-breaching party has a right to seek specific performance of the contract. This remedy would compel the party in default to perform the contract on pain of being held in contempt of court if the court's order is not obeyed. The defaulting party would not be able to satisfy its obligations under the law by paying a sum of money as damages for breach of contract. This paper considers the impecuniosity defence to specific performance as recognised by courts in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. Where the buyer demonstrates that he or she simply cannot raise the funds to buy the property specific performance will not be decreed and the court will make an award of damages for breach of contract measured by the difference between the contract price and the market price of the property at the time of default. The paper considers the nature and parameters of this defence and how it differs (if at all) from the alternative defence of extreme hardship. The paper addresses the question of whether it might be better to move to a position where sellers of land in all cases no longer enjoy a presumption of specific performance but have to demonstrate that the alternative remedy of damages is clearly inadequate. If this should be so the paper goes on to consider whether abolition of the presumption in favour of specific performance for sellers should lead to abolition of the presumption of specific performance for buyers, as is the position in Canada following the Supreme Court's decision in Semelhago v Paramadevan [1996] 2 SCR 415.
Resumo:
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights recently delivered an important judgment on Article 3 ECHR in the case of Bouyid v Belgium. In Bouyid, the Grand Chamber was called upon to consider whether slaps inflicted on a minor and an adult in police custody were in breach of Article 3 ECHR, which provides that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. Overruling the Chamber judgment in the case, the Grand Chamber ruled by 14 votes to 3 that there had been a substantive violation of Article 3 in that the applicants had been subjected to degrading treatment by members of the Belgian police; it found that there had been a breach of the investigative duty under Article 3 also. In this comment, I focus on the fundamental basis of disagreement between the majority of the Grand Chamber and those who found themselves in dissent, on the question of whether there had been a substantive breach of Article 3. The crux of the disagreement lay in the understanding and application of the test of ‘minimum level of severity’, which the ECtHR has established as decisive of whether a particular form of ill-treatment crosses the Article 3 threshold, seen also in light of Article 3’s absolute character, which makes it non-displaceable – that is, immune to trade-offs of the type applicable in relation to qualified rights such as privacy and freedom of expression. I consider the way the majority of the Grand Chamber unpacked and applied the concept of dignity – or ‘human dignity’ – towards finding a substantive breach of Article 3, and briefly distil some of the principles underpinning the understanding of human dignity emerging in the Court’s analysis.
Resumo:
Discusses three Northern Ireland Court of Appeal decisions concerning the role of victim impact reports (VIRs) on sentencing in sexual violence cases, and illustrating how courts may be unable to rely on victims' accounts of the harm they suffered because the experts' reports were unreliable. Details key features of the cases, the use of VIRs as evidence-based harm, and why improved guidance on their use is needed in Northern Ireland.
Resumo:
This chapter focuses on the growing tendency of international human rights law to require states to protect the rights of non-nationals who are in the state unlawfully and of nationals and non-nationals who are outside the state, especially when any of these people are involved in terrorist or counter-terrorist activity. It reviews these additional obligations within a European context, focusing on EU law and the law of the European Convention on Human Rights and drawing on the case law of UK courts. Part 1 considers when a European state must grant asylum to alleged terrorists on the basis that otherwise they would suffer human rights abuses in the state from which they are fleeing. Part 2 examines whether, outside of asylum claims, a European state must not deport or extradite an alleged terrorist because he or she might suffer an abuse of human rights in the receiving state. Part 3 looks at whether a European state whose security forces are engaged in counter-terrorism activities abroad is obliged to protect the human rights of the individuals serving in those forces and/or the human rights of the alleged terrorists they are confronting. While welcoming the extension of state responsibility, the chapter notes that it is occurring in a way which introduces three aspects of relativity into the protection of human rights. First, European law protects only some human rights extra-territorially. Second, it protects those rights only when there is ‘a real risk’ of their being violated. Third, sometimes it protects those rights only when there is a real risk of their being violated ‘flagrantly’.