Gasification and Pyrolysis of Posidonia oceanica in the Presence of Dolomite

Resumen del póster presentado en Symposium on Renewable Energy and Products from Biomass and Waste, CIUDEN (Cubillos de Sil, León, Spain), 12-13 May 2015

On Ukrainian Gas Transit and South Stream. There may be more than meets the eye. CEPS Commentaries, 21 March 2014

The EU relies to a considerable degree on imports to meet its demand for natural gas. Whereas Norwegian export pipelines are directly connected to the EU gas system, a major share of Russian gas flows through the Ukrainian territory before reaching consumers located other consumers located down in the supply chain (e.g. Slovakia, Hungary or Italy). But is the Ukrainian gas transit route still a risk? Will the construction of the South Stream pipeline further reduce the importance of Ukraine as a transit country? Or is there more at stake here than meets the eye?

Is Europe vulnerable to Russian gas cuts? CEPS Commentaries, 12 March 2014

The EU relies heavily on imports to meet its demand for natural gas. Nearly 23% of the gas burned by the EU member states is produced in Russian gas fields. Ukraine remains one of the main supply routes for Russian gas flowing into Europe. Consequently, mounting tensions between Russia and Ukraine concerning the Crimean Peninsula brought back memories of past gas supply disruptions, most notably of 2009. The question today is whether the EU in 2014 is equally vulnerable to potential (forced or voluntary) cuts in Russian gas supplies as it was five years ago. In this commentary, Arno Behrens and Julian Wieczorkiewicz look into two different scenarios. First, could Europe sustain longer cuts in gas supplies from Russia? And second, what impact would disruptions of Russian gas deliveries to Ukraine have on the EU? Essentially the authors argue that Russia is highly dependent on gas exports to Europe, while Europe could resort to alternatives to Russian gas. In addition, Europe is much better prepared for potential short-term supply disruptions than it was five years ago.

A Gas Hub for Ukraine. CEPS Commentary, 11 June 2014

For many years, when natural gas was mentioned in conjunction with Ukraine, it meant nothing but trouble. But at the very moment when Ukraine's territorial integrity is at stake, natural gas could become part of the solution. Due to its massive storage potential, namely one-third that of the EU (or seven-times that of the UK), Ukraine is a natural candidate for an eastern European gas hub. Becoming an integrated part of the European gas market has economic and political merits – both for Ukraine and the EU.

Security of Russian gas supplies to the EU - the question of infrastrucutral connections. OSW Point of View, February 2005

The energy security of countries importing energy resources depends largely on the shape and quality of operational transport connections. This is particularly important in the case of natural gas supplies. Natural gas is transported mostly by gas pipelines which permanently connect gas producers and consumers. Thus Europe as a consumer is "tied" to certain gas suppliers for anywhere between a dozen and several tens of years. As their own resources are becoming depleted, the EU Member States get increasingly dependent on import of natural gas. The present paper discusses the existing and projected gas transport routes from Russia to the EU. The first part deals with the importance of gas exports to the economy of the Russian Federation, and the second delves into the EU Member States' dependence on gas imports. Then this paper examines the differences in perceiving the energy security issue between the old and the new Member States, those differences stemming from the different degrees of their dependence on Russian supplies. In the third part, two new transport route projects for Russian gas supplies to the EU are compared and it is argued that from the point of view of the Community's interests, the Yamal gas pipeline is a better solution than the North European (Trans-Baltic) gas pipeline.

Gazprom's expansion in the EU - co-operation or domination? OSW Report, April 2008

The energy sector, especially with regard to natural gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the character of this co-operation has given rise to increasing doubts both in Brussels and among the EU member states. The questions have emerged whether this co-operation does not make the EU excessively dependent on Russian energy supplies, and whether Gazprom's presence in the EU will not allow Moscow to interfere in the proces of devising the EU energy policy. This report is intended to present the factual base and data necessary to provide accurate answers to the foregoing questions. The first part of the report presents the scope and character of Gazprom's economic presence in the EU member states. The second part shows the presence of the EU investors in Russia. The data presented has been provided by the International Energy Agency, European Commission, the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. Some of the data is the result of calculations made by the Centre for Eastern Studies' experts who were basing on the data provided by energy companies, the specialist press and news agencies.

The gas target model for the Visegard 4 Region: conceptual analysis. OSW Report, May 2013

The similarity of issues and geographical proximity have led the Visegrad 4 countries (V4) to undertake closer collaboration in natural gas policy, notably by agreeing on a common security of supply strategy, including regional emergency planning, and a common implementation of the Gas Target Model (GTM) that European regulators have proposed for the medium-long term design of the EU gas market, and which has been endorsed by the Madrid Regulatory Forum. As a contribution to this collaboration, the present paper will analyse how the GTM may be implemented in the V4 region, with a view to maximize the benefits that arise from joint implementation. A most relevant conclusion of the GTM is that markets should be large enough to attract market players and investments, so that sufficient diversity of sources may be reached and market power indicators are kept below dangerous levels. In most cases, this requires physical and/or virtual interconnection of present markets, which is also useful to achieve the required security of supply standards, as envisaged in the Regulation 994/2010/EC.

The eastern ‘partnership’ of gas. Gazprom and CNPC strike a deal on gas supplies to China. OSW COMMENTARY No. 139, 2014-06-16

The CEOs of Gazprom and China’s CNPC signed a contract concerning Russian gas supplies to China on 21 May 2014 in Shanghai. The contract had been under negotiation for many years and was signed in the presence of the two countries’ presidents. Under this 30-year deal, ultimately 38 billion m3 of natural gas will be exported annually from eastern Siberian fields (Chayandinskoye and Kovyktinskoye) via the Power of Siberia pipeline planned for construction in 2015–2019. The lengthy negotiation process (initial talks regarding this issue began back in the 1990s), the circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract (it was signed only on the second day of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Shanghai, and the Russian president’s personal engagement in the final phase of the talks turned out to be a key element) and information concerning the provisions of the contract (the clause determining the contract price has not been revealed) all indicate that the terms of the compromise are more favourable for China than for Russia. This contract is at present important to Russia mainly for political reasons (it will use the future diversification of gas export routes as an instrument in negotiations with the EU). However, the impact of this instrument seems to be limited since supplies cannot be redirected from Europe to Asia. It is unclear whether the contract will bring the anticipated long-term economic benefits to Gazprom. The gas price is likely to remain at a level of between US$350 and US$390 per 1000 m3. Given the high costs of gas field operation and production and transport infrastructure development, this may mean that supplies will be carried out at the margin of profitability. The Shanghai contract does not conclude the negotiation process since a legally binding agreement on gas pipeline construction has not been signed and not all of the financial aspects of the project have been agreed upon as yet (such as the issue of possible Chinese prepayments for gas supplies).

Energy Union: Can Europe learn from Japan’s joint gas purchasing? CEPS Commentary, 11 December 2014

Japan’s two major electricity producing companies reached a preliminary agreement recently to establish a joint venture for the procurement of fossil fuel resources, primarily liquefied natural gas (LNG). The authors of this commentary ask whether this commercial initiative could serve as an example to Europe of how to increase the negotiating power of individual EU member states. They conclude that a private joint gas procurement company may indeed offer a solution for EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, instead of yet another source of confrontation. Given the political volatility in the region, it could well be the key to balancing out the need for security of supply with an offer to guarantee security of demand, thereby creating the climate for stable commercial relations.

German companies strengthen their cooperation with Russian gas suppliers. OSW Commentary No. 64, 2011-10-24

Germany’s decision to give up the use of nuclear energy will force it to find a conventional low-carbon energy source as a replacement; in the short term, in addition to coal, this is likely to be gas. Due to their continued high debt and the losses associated with the end of atomic power, German companies will not be able to spend large funds on investing in conventional energy. First of all, they will aim to raise capital and repay their debts. The money for this will come from selling off their less profitable assets; this will include sales on the gas market. This will create opportunities for natural gas exporters and extraction companies such as Gazprom to buy back some of the German companies’ assets (electricity companies, for example). The German companies will probably continue to seek to recover the costs incurred in the investment projects already underway, such as Nord Stream, the importance of which will grow after Russian gas imports increase. At the same time, because of their debts, the German companies will seek to minimise their investment costs by selling some shares on the conventional energy market, to Russian corporations among others; the latter would thus be able to increase their stake in the gas market in both Western (Germany, Great Britain, the Benelux countries) and Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic). It is possible that while establishing the details of cooperation between the Russian and German companies, Russia will try to put pressure on Germany to give up competing projects such as Nabucco. However, a well-diversified German energy market should be able to defend itself against attempts to increase German dependence on Russian gas supplies and the dictates of high prices.

The Iasi-Ungheni pipeline: a means of achieving energy independence from Russia? Moldova's attempts at gas supply diversification. OSW Commentary No. 118, 2013-10-08

Since taking power in 2009, the Alliance for European Integration (AIE) has been trying to end Moldova’s dependence on Russian gas. Currently, natural gas accounts for about 50% of the country’s energy balance (excluding Transnistria), and Gazprom has a monopoly on the supply of gas to the republic. The key element of Chișinău’s diversification project is the construction of the Iasi-Ungheni pipeline, which is designed to link the Moldovan and Romanian gas transmission networks, and consequently make it possible for Moldova to purchase gas from countries other than Russia. Despite significant delays, construction work on the interconnector began in August 2013. The Moldovan government sees ensuring energy independence from Russia as its top priority. The significance and urgency of the project reflect Chișinău’s frustration at Moscow’s continued attempts to use its monopoly of Moldova’s energy sector to exert political pressure on the republic. Nonetheless, despite numerous declarations by Moldovan and Romanian politicians, the Iasi- -Ungheni pipeline will not end Moldova’s dependence on Russian gas before the end of the current decade. This timeframe is unrealistic for two reasons: first, because an additional gas pipeline from Ungheni to Chisinau and a compression station must be constructed, which will take at least five years and will require significant investment; and second, because of the unrelenting opposition to the project coming from Gazprom, which currently controls Moldova’s pipelines and will likely try to torpedo any energy diversification attempts. Independence from Russian gas will only be possible after the the Gazprom-controlled Moldova-GAZ, the operator of the Moldovan transmission network and the country’s importer of natural gas, is divided. The division of the company has in fact been envisaged in the EU’s Third Energy Package, which is meant to be implemented by Moldova in 2020.

Gas demand for power generation peaked as early as 2010. CEPS Commentary, 12 February 2016

The outlook for natural gas demand is often considered bright, especially for gas used to generate electricity. This is because gas is the cleanest of all fossil fuels. The carbon intensity of modern gas-fired power stations is less than 50% that of modern coal plants. Moreover, gas-fired units are well-suited to follow rapid swings in supply and demand due to their flexibility. In the future, these balancing tasks will become more and more important given the intermittent character of the supply of wind and solar power. Gas seems to hold out the promise of being a key pillar of the energy transition and the perfect partner of renewables. Given the EU’s long-term climate policy goals, however, there is strong evidence that demand for gas for purposes of power generation peaked as early as 2010.

(Table 1) Mean grain sizes and standard deviations of gas hydrate samples

Methane hydrates are present in marine seep systems and occur within the gas hydrate stability zone. Very little is known about their crystallite sizes and size distributions because they are notoriously difficult to measure. Crystal size distributions are usually considered as one of the key petrophysical parameters because they influence mechanical properties and possible compositional changes, which may occur with changing environmental conditions. Variations in grain size are relevant for gas substitution in natural hydrates by replacing CH4 with CO2 for the purpose of carbon dioxide sequestration. Here we show that crystallite sizes of gas hydrates from some locations in the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Mexico and Black Sea are in the range of 200-400 µm; larger values were obtained for deeper-buried samples from ODP Leg 204. The crystallite sizes show generally a log-normal distribution and appear to vary sometimes rapidly with location.

(Table 1) Crystal sizes of measured samples from the Bush Hill region in the Gulf of Mexico and from ODP Leg 204 at the Hydrate Ridge offshore Oregon

The grain sizes of gas hydrate crystallites are largely unknown in natural samples. Single grains are hardly detectable with electron or optical microscopy. For the first time, we have used high-energy synchrotron diffraction to determine grain sizes of six natural gas hydrates retrieved from the Bush Hill region in the Gulf of Mexico and from ODP Leg 204 at the Hydrate Ridge offshore Oregon from varying depth between 1 and 101 metres below seafloor. High-energy synchrotron radiation provides high photon fluxes as well as high penetration depth and thus allows for investigation of bulk sediment samples. Gas hydrate grain sizes were measured at the Beam Line BW 5 at the HASYLAB/Hamburg. A 'moving area detector method', originally developed for material science applications, was used to obtain both spatial and orientation information about gas hydrate grains within the sample. The gas hydrate crystal sizes appeared to be (log-)normally distributed in the natural samples. All mean grain sizes lay in the range from 300 to 600 µm with a tendency for bigger grains to occur in greater depth. Laboratory-produced methane hydrate, aged for 3 weeks, showed half a log-normal curve with a mean grain size value of c. 40 µm. The grains appeared to be globular shaped.