Different levels of policy change: A comparison between the public discussion on social security in Sweden and in Finland

The deep economic recession that hit Sweden and Finland at the beginning of the 90s, and the fall in public revenues and rapidly growing public debts that followed on it, triggered a development of cutbacks and restructuring measures which has resulted in a scientific debate over what this has meant for these countries’ systems of social policy, traditionally resting on the Nordic welfare state paradigm. In this connection, questions of to what extent changes made can be ascribed mainly to the economic constraints posed by the recession at all, or rather, to other more long-term societal trends or phenomena, including globalisation, European integration and/or ideational or ideological shifts among influential (elite) groups, have often been touched upon. Applying an ideas-centred approach, this paper attempts to contribute to the knowledge on the reasoning of influential elite societal groups in social policy issues before, during and after the 90’s recession, by empirically analysing their statements on social security made in the press. A distinction is made between three different levels of proposed policy changes, reaching from minor alterations of single programs to changes of the policy paradigm. Results show that the 1990s did not only mean the emergence of suggestions for minor cutbacks in and alterations of prevailing programmes. The share of suggestions implying de facto a (further) departure from the basic features of the social security system also showed that the model was under continuous pressure throughout the 90s. However, many of the changes suggested were not justified by any clear references to a policy paradigm in either country (or not justified at all). Instead, references to “purely” structural justifications did become more common over time. In this respect, as regards social security, our results cannot confirm the fairly popular notion among many researchers of a clearly ideological attack on the welfare state. However, it remains uncertain whether and to what extent the increased proportion of references to “structural realities” in the 90s should be interpreted as an indication of a change in the idea of what the welfare state is and what the goals behind it are. Results further show that the patterns of the discussion in the two countries studied bore a remarkable resemblance at a general level, whereas there are indications of differences in the driving forces behind suggestions for similar reforms in these two countries.

Education and Ideologies of the Knowledge Economy: Europe and the Politics of Emulation

The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein famously proposed a style of philosophy that was directed against certain pictures [bild] that tacitly direct our language and forms of life. His aim was to show the fly the way out of the fly bottle and to fight against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language: “A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably” (Wittgenstein 1953, 115). In this context Wittgenstein is talking of philosophical pictures, deep metaphors that have structured our language but he does also use the term picture in other contexts (see Owen 2003, 83). I want to appeal to Wittgenstein in my use of the term ideology to refer to the way in which powerful underlying metaphors in neoclassical economics have a strong rhetorical and constitutive force at the level of public policy. Indeed, I am specifically speaking of the notion of ‘the performative’ in Wittgenstein and Austin. The notion of the knowledge economy has a prehistory in Hayek (1937; 1945) who founded the economics of knowledge in the 1930s, in Machlup (1962; 1970), who mapped the emerging employment shift to the US service economy in the early 1960s, and to sociologists Bell (1973) and Touraine (1974) who began to tease out the consequences of these changes for social structure in the post-industrial society in the early 1970s. The term has been taken up since by economists, sociologists, futurists and policy experts recently to explain the transition to the so-called ‘new economy’. It is not just a matter of noting these discursive strands in the genealogy of the ‘knowledge economy’ and related or cognate terms. We can also make a number of observations on the basis of this brief analysis. First, there has been a succession of terms like ‘postindustrial economy’, ‘information economy’, ‘knowledge economy’, ‘learning economy’, each with a set of related concepts emphasising its social, political, management or educational aspects. Often these literatures are not cross-threading and tend to focus on only one aspect of phenomena leading to classic dichotomies such as that between economy and society, knowledge and information. Second, these terms and their family concepts are discursive, historical and ideological products in the sense that they create their own meanings and often lead to constitutive effects at the level of policy. Third, while there is some empirical evidence to support claims concerning these terms, at the level of public policy these claims are empirically underdetermined and contain an integrating, visionary or futures component, which necessarily remains untested and is, perhaps, in principle untestable.

Welfare Lobby Groups responding to Globalisation: A Comparison of the Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) and the UK Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG)

The past decade has witnessed a period of intense economic globalisation. The growing significance of international trade, investment, production and financial flows appears to be curtailing the autonomy of individual nation states. In particular, globalisation appears to be encouraging, if not demanding, a decline in social spending and standards. However, many authors believe that this thesis ignores the continued impact of national political and ideological pressures and lobby groups on policy outcomes. In particular, it has been argued that national welfare consumer and provider groups remain influential defenders of the welfare state. For example, US aged care groups are considered to be particularly effective defenders of social security pensions. According to this argument, governments engaged in welfare retrenchment may experience considerable electoral backlash (Pierson 1996; Mishra 1999). Yet, it is also noted that governments can take action to reduce the impact of such groups by reducing their funding, and their access to policy-making and consultation processes. These actions are then justified on the basis of removing potential obstacles to economic competitiveness (Pierson 1994; Melville 1999).

Workfare Work: The Impact of Workfare on the Worker/Client Relationship

This article details the American experience of welfare reform, and specifically its experience instituting workfare programs for participants. In the United States, the term "welfare" is most commonly used to refer to the program for single mothers and their families, formerly called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and now, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). In 1996, politicians "ended welfare as we know it" by fundamentally changing this program with the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). The principal focus of the 1996 reform is mandatory work requirements enforced by sanctions and strict time limits on welfare receipt. While PRWORA's emphasis on work is not new, the difference is its significant ideological and policy commitment to employment, enforced by time limits. When welfare reform was enacted, some of its proponents recognized that welfare offices would have to change in order to develop individualized workfare plans, monitor progress, and impose sanctions. The "culture" of welfare offices had to be changed from being solely concerned with eligibility and compliance to individual, intensive casework. In this article, I will discuss how implementing workfare programs have influenced the relationship between clients and their workers at the welfare office. I start by describing the burdens faced by offices even before the enactment of welfare reform. Local welfare offices were expected to run programs that emphasized compliance and eligibility at the same time as workfare programs, which require intensive, personal case management. The next section of the paper will focus on strategies welfare offices and workers use to navigate these contradictory expectations. Lastly, I will present information on how clients react to workfare programs and some reasons they acquiesce to workfare contracts despite their unmet needs. I conclude with recommendations of how to make workfare truly work for welfare clients.

Beyond Kantianism - Response to Critiques

I am flattered and privileged to have received four such astute critiques of my work from an international cast. I will reflect at length about many of their points in future work but to respond fully would require a very long article and so I will highlight some of the more salient issues. The authors share misgivings about my commitment to a realist version of governmentality theory so I will try to articulate a bit more clearly how it is different from two major alternative perspectives highlighted by the authors: what I term a `discursive` governmentality perspective (Stenson 2005), and the neo-Marxist regulationist school of political economy. However, deeper normative questions are raised, for example by Wendy Larner, about what it means to be progressive or critical within the broad terrain of liberalism (which can include neo-liberals and neo-conservatives) in the wake of the collapse of communism and much of the power of western labour movements, the rise of the new emancipatory and environmental social movements and varieties of religious fundamentalism. As social scientists and university intellectuals we usually argue that our work differs from journalistic reportage or ideological polemics that gather supportive evidence through selective fact gathering. This is because we dig beneath the flux of events and surface appearances and debates to uncover the deeper structures of thought and social relations that shape our experiences and the flow of events. And we also engage with contrary evidence that troubles our truth claims. This is the work of theory. I accept that theory plays a vital role but argue for a more grounded approach rooted in empirical research using a variety of methods and data sources. Hence I adopt a more cautious approach to conceptions of the `deeper structures` we uncover. At best we can only know them through provisional heuristic modelling and it is best not to reify them.

Das radikale Milieu im vorrevolutionären Russland

This article traces the networks in the Russian revolutionary underground from the 1860s untill 1917 and subsumes them under the term radical milieu. Though there existed ideological differences all Russian radicals shared a common identity as „anti-society“ against the tsarist regime. In the radical milieu with its own values the participants tried to create their own reality, where all members regardless of their social origin or sex were seen as equal. The radical milieu was backed by a sphere of sympathisers that constituted the main source of material support and the main recruiting field. But the radicals were very careful when selecting new members for their underground world. Applicants had to fulfil defined criteria. The radical milieu in Russia was in a permanent danger to be infiltrated by the secret police. This situation between fear and hope was the background where ideas of solidarity but also visions of violence and revenge against the “traitors” were ripening and then became realised.

The "Image" of the Pharaoh in Judahite and Israelite Society According to the Glyptic Evidence

Among the many thousand scarabs, scaraboids and other stamp-seal amulets unearthed in Iron Age contexts in Cis- and Transjordan, there are many such seals showing royal Egyptian imagery on their bases. Focusing mainly on Pharaonic motifs, the paper aims to catalogue the principal iconemes, to trace their development throughout the Iron Ages and to extrapolate their significance vis-à-vis the contemporary glyptic assemblages. As will be shown, the royal imagery of the Egyptian king underwent considerable changes during pre-monarchic and monarchic times in Israel/Judah. This allows – to some extent – deducing the perception of the ‘image’ of the Egyptian king in this part of the Southern Levant at the close of the second and during the first centuries of the first millennium BCE. While the local seal production not only vividly copied earlier and contemporary Egyptian prototypes, it also developed idiosyncratic ‘Pharaonic’ motifs that were produced for the local market. On the other hand, imported Egyptian glyptic goods – such as scarabs and other amulet types – reveal further facets of the consumer behavior. They, too, shed light upon the ideological and religious preferences of the local population and illuminate the development of the vernacular attitude towards the Pharaonic symbols of power – including their obvious political and sacred connotations.

Mind the gap: Do proportional electoral systems foster a more equal representation of women and men, poor and rich?

Female gender and low income are two markers for groups that have been historically disadvantaged within most societies. The study explores two research questions related to their political representation: (1) ‘Are parties biased towards the ideological preferences of male and rich citizens?’; and (2) ‘Does the proportionality of the electoral system moderate the degree of under-representation of women and poor citizens in the party system?’ A multilevel analysis of survey data from 24 parliamentary democracies indicates that there is some bias against those with low income and, at a much smaller rate, women. This has systemic consequences for the quality of representation, as the preferences of the complementary groups differ. The proportionality of the electoral system influences the degree of under-representation: specifically, larger district magnitudes help in closing the considerable gap between rich and poor.

Practice Movements: The Politics of Non-sovereign Power

Practice movements, that is, forms of unorganized collective action, are a central site of politics. Their defining moments are that their goals are expressed in practices rather than in words, and that these “pre-ideological” practices aim at access to or redistribution of goods, whether material or symbolic, rather than at representation. They are transgression rather than resistance in that they transgress restrictions inherent in the material organization of space, property relations, status orders, and normative regulations, be they laws, morals, or customs. Practice movements are above all about access and participation rather than about autonomy, and thus have an ambiguous relation to the transformation of the status quo. Their politics are transformative and they can produce temporary or lasting changes in the material grounds or in the regulation of the everyday life of those who pursue them, and potentially of the normativity and the organization of the wider social order.

Taking a New Look at Neo-Assyrian Gates

The Assyrian capitals are not only known for their magnificent temples and palaces, but also for their monumental city walls. The most impressive and at the same time most delicate features of all the town defenses were the city gates. As they interrupted the line of defense, they were al-ways a vulnerable spot of every system of fortifications. However, the walled cities’ economic needs demanded these gateways to be built, in order to ensure the steady flow of goods and pro-visions. Apart from that, they also had a significant ideological meaning, which is emphasized by many cuneiform texts. During the excavations of the Assyrian capitals of Ashur, Dūr Šarrūkīn, and Nineveh, a fairly large number of Assyrian city gates were brought to light. By re-examining the archaeological reports and employing remote sensing, many details of these structures can still be revealed. The paper aims at illuminating the different considerations that went into constructing these gates, as well as the development Assyrian city gates underwent and what may have influenced this process.

Neo-Assyrian concepts of fortification

The major cities of the Neo-Assyrian Empire were not only home to impressive palaces and temples, but they were also equipped with strong fortifications. The city walls were not only meant to keep out potential enemies, but by demonstrating Assyria’s power to any approaching person, they served an ideological purpose, as well. However, military efficiency was just as crucial, since, over its entire history, the empire repeatedly faced internal and external threats and could not have afforded to lose any of its urban centers which were essential to maintaining control over the various provinces or geographic regions associated with them. The study of Neo-Assyrian fortifications relies on evidence provided by archaeological excavations, the study of Assyrian reliefs and information from cuneiform texts. Even though these sources help us reconstruct the appearance of the town defenses, the question of why the individual fortification systems were built in a specific way cannot be addressed by these means alone. Remote sensing offers an opportunity to view the course and placement of the city walls within their topographical context. Furthermore, geographical information systems (GIS) offer a tool to illustrate the distribution of the strongly fortified Assyrian towns, thereby allowing us to recognize patterns and functions of regional fortification systems during the Neo-Assyrian period.

Shakespeare, the Middle Ages and the Luck of the British: Medievalism and National Identity in The Hollow Crown (2012)

Images of the medieval past have long been fertile soil for the identity politics of subsequent periods. Rather than “authentically” reproducing the Middle Ages, medievalism therefore usually tells us more about the concerns and ideological climate of its own time and place of origin. To dramatise the nascent nation, Shakespeare resorts to medievalism in his history plays. Centuries later, the BBC-produced television mini-serial The Hollow Crown – adapting Shakespeare’s second histories tetralogy – revamps this negotiation of national identity for the “Cultural Olympiad” in the run-up to the 2012 London Olympics. In this context of celebratory introspection, The Hollow Crown weaves a genealogical narrative consisting of the increasingly “glorious” medieval history depicted and “national” Shakespearean heritage in order to valorise 21st-century “Britishness”. Encouraging a reading of the histories as medieval history, the films construct an ostensibly inclusive, liberal-minded national identity grounded in this history. Moreover, medieval kingship is represented in distinctly sentimentalising and humanising terms, fostering emotional identification especially with the no longer ambivalent Hal/Henry V and making him an apt model for present-day British grandeur. However, the fact that the films in return marginalise female, Scottish, Irish and Welsh characters gives rise to doubts as to whether this vision of Shakespeare’s Middle Ages really is, as the producers claimed, “for everybody”.

Global evidence in local debates: the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) in Swiss direct-democratic debates on school policy

This article analyses the use of the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) and other evidence in educational policy discourse in the context of direct-democratic votes in Switzerland. The results of a quantitative content analysis show that PISA is used by all actors to support a wide range of policy measures and ideological positions. Other evidence, however, is only used to support single specific policy positions. These findings demonstrate the ubiquity of PISA. The article discusses these results in view of the question of whether the incorporation of evidence into policy debates contributes to informed discourse.