Rapid differentiation of isomeric lipids by photodissociation mass spectrometry of fatty acid derivatives

RATIONALE Both traditional electron ionization and electrospray ionization tandem mass spectrometry have demonstrated limitations in the unambiguous identification of fatty acids. In the former case, high electron energies lead to extensive dissociation of the radical cations from which little specific structural information can be obtained. In the latter, conventional collision-induced dissociation (CID) of even-electron ions provides little intra-chain fragmentation and thus few structural diagnostics. New approaches that harness the desirable features of both methods, namely radical-driven dissociation with discrete energy deposition, are thus required. METHODS Herein we describe the derivatization of a structurally diverse suite of fatty acids as 4-iodobenzyl esters (FAIBE). Electrospray ionization of these derivatives in the presence of sodium acetate yields abundant [M+Na]+ ions that can be mass-selected and subjected to laser irradiation (=266nm) on a modified linear ion-trap mass spectrometer. RESULTS Photodissociation (PD) of the FAIBE derivatives yields abundant radical cations by loss of atomic iodine and in several cases selective dissociation of activated carboncarbon bonds (e.g., at allylic positions) are also observed. Subsequent CID of the [M+NaI]center dot+ radical cations yields radical-directed dissociation (RDD) mass spectra that reveal extensive carboncarbon bond dissociation without scrambling of molecular information. CONCLUSIONS Both PD and RDD spectra obtained from derivatized fatty acids provide a wealth of structural information including the position(s) of unsaturation, chain-branching and hydroxylation. The structural information obtained by this approach, in particular the ability to rapidly differentiate isomeric lipids, represents a useful addition to the lipidomics tool box. Copyright (c) 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Hydroxyl radical formation in the gas phase oxidation of distonic 2-methylphenyl radical cations

The reactions of distonic 4-(N, N, N-trimethylammonium)-2-methylphenyl and 5-(N, N, N-trimethylammonium)-2-methylphenyl radical cations (m/z 149) with O-2 are studied in the gas phase using ion-trap mass spectrometry. Photodissociation (PD) of halogenated precursors gives rise to the target distonic charge-tagged methylphenyl radical whereas collision-induced dissociation (CID) is found to produce unreactive radical ions. The PD generated distonic radicals, however, react rapidly with O-2 to form \[M + O2](center dot+) and \[M + O-2 - OH](center dot+) ions, detected at m/z 181 and m/z 164, respectively. Quantum chemical calculations using G3SX(MP3) and M06-2X theories are deployed to examine key decomposition pathways of the 5-(N, N, N-trimethylammonium)-2-methylphenylperoxyl radical and rationalise the observed product ions. The prevailing product mechanism involves a 1,5- H shift in the peroxyl radical forming a QOOH-type intermediate that subsequently eliminates (OH)-O-center dot to yield charge-tagged 2-quinone methide. Our study suggests that the analogous process should occur for the neutral methylphenyl + O-2 reaction, thus serving as a plausible source of (OH)-O-center dot radicals in combustion environments. Grants: ARC/DP0986738, ARC/DP130100862

Formation and Fragmentation of Unsaturated Fatty Acid M-2H+Na (-) Ions: Stabilized Carbanions for Charge-Directed Fragmentation

Fatty acids are long-chain carboxylic acids that readily produce \[M - H](-) ions upon negative ion electrospray ionization (ESI) and cationic complexes with alkali, alkaline earth, and transition metals in positive ion ESI. In contrast, only one anionic monomeric fatty acid-metal ion complex has been reported in the literature, namely \[M - 2H + (FeCl)-Cl-II](-). In this manuscript, we present two methods to form anionic unsaturated fatty acid-sodium ion complexes (i.e., \[M - 2H + Na](-)). We find that these ions may be generated efficiently by two distinct methods: (1) negative ion ESI of a methanolic solution containing the fatty acid and sodium fluoride forming an \[M - H + NaF](-) ion. Subsequent collision-induced dissociation (CID) results in the desired \[M - 2H + Na](-) ion via the neutral loss of HF. (2) Direct formation of the \[M - 2H + Na](-) ion by negative ion ESI of a methanolic solution containing the fatty acid and sodium hydroxide or bicarbonate. In addition to deprotonation of the carboxylic acid moiety, formation of \[M - 2H + Na](-) ions requires the removal of a proton from the fatty acid acyl chain. We propose that this deprotonation occurs at the bis-allylic position(s) of polyunsaturated fatty acids resulting in the formation of a resonance-stabilized carbanion. This proposal is supported by ab initio calculations, which reveal that removal of a proton from the bis-allylic position, followed by neutral loss of HX (where X = F- and -OH), is the lowest energy dissociation pathway.

Efficient selective identity-based encryption without random oracles

We construct two efficient Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) systems that admit selective-identity security reductions without random oracles in groups equipped with a bilinear map. Selective-identity secure IBE is a slightly weaker security model than the standard security model for IBE. In this model the adversary must commit ahead of time to the identity that it intends to attack, whereas in an adaptive-identity attack the adversary is allowed to choose this identity adaptively. Our first system—BB1—is based on the well studied decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption, and extends naturally to systems with hierarchical identities, or HIBE. Our second system—BB2—is based on a stronger assumption which we call the Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Inversion assumption and provides another approach to building IBE systems. Our first system, BB1, is very versatile and well suited for practical applications: the basic hierarchical construction can be efficiently secured against chosen-ciphertext attacks, and further extended to support efficient non-interactive threshold decryption, among others, all without using random oracles. Both systems, BB1 and BB2, can be modified generically to provide “full” IBE security (i.e., against adaptive-identity attacks), either using random oracles, or in the standard model at the expense of a non-polynomial but easy-to-compensate security reduction.

Short signature without random oracles and the SDH assumption in bilinear groups

We describe a short signature scheme that is strongly existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen message attack in the standard security model. Our construction works in groups equipped with an efficient bilinear map, or, more generally, an algorithm for the Decision Diffie-Hellman problem. The security of our scheme depends on a new intractability assumption we call Strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH), by analogy to the Strong RSA assumption with which it shares many properties. Signature generation in our system is fast and the resulting signatures are as short as DSA signatures for comparable security. We give a tight reduction proving that our scheme is secure in any group in which the SDH assumption holds, without relying on the random oracle model.

Multiple-time signature schemes against adaptive chosen message attacks

Multiple-time signatures are digital signature schemes where the signer is able to sign a predetermined number of messages. They are interesting cryptographic primitives because they allow to solve many important cryptographic problems, and at the same time offer substantial efficiency advantage over ordinary digital signature schemes like RSA. Multiple-time signature schemes have found numerous applications, in ordinary, on-line/off-line, forward-secure signatures, and multicast/stream authentication. We propose a multiple-time signature scheme with very efficient signing and verifying. Our construction is based on a combination of one-way functions and cover-free families, and it is secure against the adaptive chosen-message attack.

Cryptanalysis of the convex hull click human identification protocol

Recently, a convex hull-based human identification protocol was proposed by Sobrado and Birget, whose steps can be performed by humans without additional aid. The main part of the protocol involves the user mentally forming a convex hull of secret icons in a set of graphical icons and then clicking randomly within this convex hull. While some rudimentary security issues of this protocol have been discussed, a comprehensive security analysis has been lacking. In this paper, we analyze the security of this convex hull-based protocol. In particular, we show two probabilistic attacks that reveal the user’s secret after the observation of only a handful of authentication sessions. These attacks can be efficiently implemented as their time and space complexities are considerably less than brute force attack. We show that while the first attack can be mitigated through appropriately chosen values of system parameters, the second attack succeeds with a non-negligible probability even with large system parameter values that cross the threshold of usability.

Graph coloring applied to secure computation in non-Abelian groups

We study the natural problem of secure n-party computation (in the computationally unbounded attack model) of circuits over an arbitrary finite non-Abelian group (G,⋅), which we call G-circuits. Besides its intrinsic interest, this problem is also motivating by a completeness result of Barrington, stating that such protocols can be applied for general secure computation of arbitrary functions. For flexibility, we are interested in protocols which only require black-box access to the group G (i.e. the only computations performed by players in the protocol are a group operation, a group inverse, or sampling a uniformly random group element). Our investigations focus on the passive adversarial model, where up to t of the n participating parties are corrupted.

Cryptanalysis of WG-7 : a lightweight stream cipher

WG-7 is a stream cipher based on WG stream cipher and has been designed by Luo et al. (2010). This cipher is designed for low cost and lightweight applications (RFID tags and mobile phones, for instance). This paper addresses cryptographic weaknesses of WG-7 stream cipher. We show that the key stream generated by WG-7 can be distinguished from a random sequence after knowing 213.5 keystream bits and with a negligible error probability. Also, we investigate the security of WG-7 against algebraic attacks. An algebraic key recovery attack on this cipher is proposed. The attack allows to recover both the internal state and the secret key with the time complexity about 2/27.

Truncated differential analysis of reduced-round LBlock

In this paper we present truncated differential analysis of reduced-round LBlock by computing the differential distribution of every nibble of the state. LLR statistical test is used as a tool to apply the distinguishing and key-recovery attacks. To build the distinguisher, all possible differences are traced through the cipher and the truncated differential probability distribution is determined for every output nibble. We concatenate additional rounds to the beginning and end of the truncated differential distribution to apply the key-recovery attack. By exploiting properties of the key schedule, we obtain a large overlap of key bits used in the beginning and final rounds. This allows us to significantly increase the differential probabilities and hence reduce the attack complexity. We validate the analysis by implementing the attack on LBlock reduced to 12 rounds. Finally, we apply single-key and related-key attacks on 18 and 21-round LBlock, respectively.

Cyber security of networked critical infrastructures [Guest Editorial]

A new era of cyber warfare has appeared on the horizon with the discovery and detection of Stuxnet. Allegedly planned, designed, and created by the United States and Israel, Stuxnet is considered the first known cyber weapon to attack an adversary state. Stuxnet's discovery put a lot of attention on the outdated and obsolete security of critical infrastructure. It became very apparent that electronic devices that are used to control and operate critical infrastructure like programmable logic controllers (PLCs) or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems lack very basic security and protection measures. Part of that is due to the fact that when these devices were designed, the idea of exposing them to the Internet was not in mind. However, now with this exposure, these devices and systems are considered easy prey to adversaries.

Cryptanalysis of RC4(n, m) stream cipher

RC4(n, m) is a stream cipher based on RC4 and is designed by G. Gong et al. It can be seen as a generalization of the famous RC4 stream cipher designed by Ron Rivest. The authors of RC4(n, m) claim that the cipher resists all the attacks that are successful against the original RC4. The paper reveals cryptographic weaknesses of the RC4(n, m) stream cipher. We develop two attacks. The first one is based on non-randomness of internal state and allows to distinguish it from a truly random cipher by an algorithm that has access to 24·n bits of the keystream. The second attack exploits low diffusion of bits in the KSA and PRGA algorithms and recovers all bytes of the secret key. This attack works only if the initial value of the cipher can be manipulated. Apart from the secret key, the cipher uses two other inputs, namely, initial value and initial vector. Although these inputs are fixed in the cipher specification, some applications may allow the inputs to be under the attacker control. Assuming that the attacker can control the initial value, we show a distinguisher for the cipher and a secret key recovery attack that for the L-bit secret key, is able to recover it with about (L/n) · 2n steps. The attack has been implemented on a standard PC and can reconstruct the secret key of RC(8, 32) in less than a second.

Does counting still count? Revisiting the security of counting based user authentication protocols against statistical attacks

At NDSS 2012, Yan et al. analyzed the security of several challenge-response type user authentication protocols against passive observers, and proposed a generic counting based statistical attack to recover the secret of some counting based protocols given a number of observed authentication sessions. Roughly speaking, the attack is based on the fact that secret (pass) objects appear in challenges with a different probability from non-secret (decoy) objects when the responses are taken into account. Although they mentioned that a protocol susceptible to this attack should minimize this difference, they did not give details as to how this can be achieved barring a few suggestions. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by generalizing the attack with a much more comprehensive theoretical analysis. Our treatment is more quantitative which enables us to describe a method to theoretically estimate a lower bound on the number of sessions a protocol can be safely used against the attack. Our results include 1) two proposed fixes to make counting protocols practically safe against the attack at the cost of usability, 2) the observation that the attack can be used on non-counting based protocols too as long as challenge generation is contrived, 3) and two main design principles for user authentication protocols which can be considered as extensions of the principles from Yan et al. This detailed theoretical treatment can be used as a guideline during the design of counting based protocols to determine their susceptibility to this attack. The Foxtail protocol, one of the protocols analyzed by Yan et al., is used as a representative to illustrate our theoretical and experimental results.

Security evaluation of Rakaposhi Stream Cipher

Rakaposhi is a synchronous stream cipher, which uses three main components: a non-linear feedback shift register (NLFSR), a dynamic linear feedback shift register (DLFSR) and a non-linear filtering function (NLF). NLFSR consists of 128 bits and is initialised by the secret key K. DLFSR holds 192 bits and is initialised by an initial vector (IV). NLF takes 8-bit inputs and returns a single output bit. The work identifies weaknesses and properties of the cipher. The main observation is that the initialisation procedure has the so-called sliding property. The property can be used to launch distinguishing and key recovery attacks. The distinguisher needs four observations of the related (K,IV) pairs. The key recovery algorithm allows to discover the secret key K after observing 29 pairs of (K,IV). Based on the proposed related-key attack, the number of related (K,IV) pairs is 2(128 + 192)/4 pairs. Further the cipher is studied when the registers enter short cycles. When NLFSR is set to all ones, then the cipher degenerates to a linear feedback shift register with a non-linear filter. Consequently, the initial state (and Secret Key and IV) can be recovered with complexity 263.87. If DLFSR is set to all zeros, then NLF reduces to a low non-linearity filter function. As the result, the cipher is insecure allowing the adversary to distinguish it from a random cipher after 217 observations of keystream bits. There is also the key recovery algorithm that allows to find the secret key with complexity 2 54.

Active security in multiparty computation over black-box groups

Most previous work on unconditionally secure multiparty computation has focused on computing over a finite field (or ring). Multiparty computation over other algebraic structures has not received much attention, but is an interesting topic whose study may provide new and improved tools for certain applications. At CRYPTO 2007, Desmedt et al introduced a construction for a passive-secure multiparty multiplication protocol for black-box groups, reducing it to a certain graph coloring problem, leaving as an open problem to achieve security against active attacks. We present the first n-party protocol for unconditionally secure multiparty computation over a black-box group which is secure under an active attack model, tolerating any adversary structure Δ satisfying the Q 3 property (in which no union of three subsets from Δ covers the whole player set), which is known to be necessary for achieving security in the active setting. Our protocol uses Maurer’s Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) but preserves the essential simplicity of the graph-based approach of Desmedt et al, which avoids each shareholder having to rerun the full VSS protocol after each local computation. A corollary of our result is a new active-secure protocol for general multiparty computation of an arbitrary Boolean circuit.