Explaining deviations from NAV in UK property companies: rationality and sentimentality

One of the most vexing issues for analysts and managers of property companies across Europe has been the existence and persistence of deviations of Net Asset Values of property companies from their market capitalisation. The issue has clear links to similar discounts and premiums in closed-end funds. The closed end fund puzzle is regarded as an important unsolved problem in financial economics undermining theories of market efficiency and the Law of One Price. Consequently, it has generated a huge body of research. Although it can be tempting to focus on the particular inefficiencies of real estate markets in attempting to explain deviations from NAV, the closed end fund discount puzzle indicates that divergences between underlying asset values and market capitalisation are not a ‘pure’ real estate phenomenon. When examining potential explanations, two recurring factors stand out in the closed end fund literature as often undermining the economic rationale for a discount – the existence of premiums and cross-sectional and periodic fluctuations in the level of discount/premium. These need to be borne in mind when considering potential explanations for real estate markets. There are two approaches to investigating the discount to net asset value in closed-end funds: the ‘rational’ approach and the ‘noise trader’ or ‘sentiment’ approach. The ‘rational’ approach hypothesizes the discount to net asset value as being the result of company specific factors relating to such factors as management quality, tax liability and the type of stocks held by the fund. Despite the intuitive appeal of the ‘rational’ approach to closed-end fund discounts the studies have not successfully explained the variance in closed-end fund discounts or why the discount to net asset value in closed-end funds varies so much over time. The variation over time in the average sector discount is not only a feature of closed-end funds but also property companies. This paper analyses changes in the deviations from NAV for UK property companies between 2000 and 2003. The paper present a new way to study the phenomenon ‘cleaning’ the gearing effect by introducing a new way of calculating the discount itself. We call it “ungeared discount”. It is calculated by assuming that a firm issues new equity to repurchase outstanding debt without any variation on asset side. In this way discount does not depend on an accounting effect and the analysis should better explain the effect of other independent variables.

Towards the "cult of the equity"? Insurance companies and the interwar capital market

This article examines the ways in which insurance companies modified their investment policies during the interwar years, arguing that this period marked the start of the transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ investment practice. Economic and financial conditions raised considerable doubts regarding the suitability of traditional insurance investments, while competitive conditions forced insurance offices to seek higher-yielding assets. These pressures led to a considerable increase in the proportion of new investment devoted to corporate securities, including ordinary shares. Meanwhile new insurance investment philosophies began to be advocated, which accorded both legitimacy and importance to the role of ordinary shares in insurance portfolios.

Do responsible real estate companies outperform their peers?

This paper investigates the relationship between corporate social and environmental performance and financial performance for a sample of publicly traded US real estate companies. Using the MSCI ESG (formerly KLD) database on seven Environmental, Social & Governance dimensions in the 2003-2010 period, and weighting the dimensions according to prominence in the real estate sector, we model Tobin's Q and annual total return in a panel data framework. The results indicate a positive relationship between ESG rating and Tobin's Q but this effect is driven by ESG concerns rather than strengths. Consistently across all model specifications, overall ESG ratings are associated with lower returns. Negative scores appear to result in higher returns in the short run but positive scores have no significant impact on returns.

The effects of institutional distance and headquarters’ financial performance on the generation of environmental standards in multinational companies

This article combines institutional and resources’ arguments to show that the institutional distance between the home and the host country, and the headquarters’ financial performance have a relevant impact on the environmental standardization decision in multinational companies. Using a sample of 135 multinational companies in three different industries with headquarters and subsidiaries based in the USA, Canada, Mexico, France, and Spain, we find that a high environmental institutional distance between headquarters’ and subsidiaries’ countries deters the standardization of environmental practices. On the other hand, high-profit headquarters are willing to standardize their environmental practices, rather than taking advantage of countries with lax environmental protection to undertake more pollution-intensive activities. Finally, we show that headquarters’ financial performance also imposes a moderating effect on the relationship between environmental institutional distance between countries and environmental standardization within the multinational company.

To what extent are EU steel companies susceptible to competitive loss due to climate policy?

In recognition of their competitive vulnerability, a set of special rules have been devised for managing sectors such as steel and cement within the EU ETS. These rules basically seek to set sector specific performance benchmarks and reward top performers. However, the steel sector as a whole will receive the vast majority of its allowances for free in Phase III. Perceptions of competitive vulnerability have been largely based on inherently hypothetical analyses which rely heavily on counterfactual scenario and abatement cost estimates often provided by firms themselves. This paper diverges from these approaches by providing a qualitative assessment of the two key reasons underpinning the competitive vulnerability argument of the EU Steel Companies based on interviews and case study involving the three largest producers of steel within the EU – AcerlorMittal, Corus, and ThyssenKrupp. We find that these arguments provide only partial and weak justifications for competitive loss and discriminatory treatment in the EUETS. This strategy is difficult to counter by governments due to information asymmetry; and it appears to have proved very successful insofar as it has helped the industry to achieve free allocation in Phases I-III of EU ETS by playing up the risk of carbon leakage.