Testing financing constraints on firm investment using variable capital

We consider a dynamic multifactor model of investment with financing imperfections,adjustment costs and fixed and variable capital. We use the model to derive a test offinancing constraints based on a reduced form variable capital equation. Simulation resultsshow that this test correctly identifies financially constrained firms even when the estimationof firms investment opportunities is very noisy. In addition, the test is well specified inthe presence of both concave and convex adjustment costs of fixed capital. We confirmempirically the validity of this test on a sample of small Italian manufacturing companies.

Recent misconceptions about the "database search problem": a probabilistic analysis using Bayesian networks

This paper analyses and discusses arguments that emerge from a recent discussion about the proper assessment of the evidential value of correspondences observed between the characteristics of a crime stain and those of a sample from a suspect when (i) this latter individual is found as a result of a database search and (ii) remaining database members are excluded as potential sources (because of different analytical characteristics). Using a graphical probability approach (i.e., Bayesian networks), the paper here intends to clarify that there is no need to (i) introduce a correction factor equal to the size of the searched database (i.e., to reduce a likelihood ratio), nor to (ii) adopt a propositional level not directly related to the suspect matching the crime stain (i.e., a proposition of the kind 'some person in (outside) the database is the source of the crime stain' rather than 'the suspect (some other person) is the source of the crime stain'). The present research thus confirms existing literature on the topic that has repeatedly demonstrated that the latter two requirements (i) and (ii) should not be a cause of concern.

Improving generalized regression analysis for the spatial prediction of forest communities

Aim This study used data from temperate forest communities to assess: (1) five different stepwise selection methods with generalized additive models, (2) the effect of weighting absences to ensure a prevalence of 0.5, (3) the effect of limiting absences beyond the environmental envelope defined by presences, (4) four different methods for incorporating spatial autocorrelation, and (5) the effect of integrating an interaction factor defined by a regression tree on the residuals of an initial environmental model. Location State of Vaud, western Switzerland. Methods Generalized additive models (GAMs) were fitted using the grasp package (generalized regression analysis and spatial predictions, http://www.cscf.ch/grasp). Results Model selection based on cross-validation appeared to be the best compromise between model stability and performance (parsimony) among the five methods tested. Weighting absences returned models that perform better than models fitted with the original sample prevalence. This appeared to be mainly due to the impact of very low prevalence values on evaluation statistics. Removing zeroes beyond the range of presences on main environmental gradients changed the set of selected predictors, and potentially their response curve shape. Moreover, removing zeroes slightly improved model performance and stability when compared with the baseline model on the same data set. Incorporating a spatial trend predictor improved model performance and stability significantly. Even better models were obtained when including local spatial autocorrelation. A novel approach to include interactions proved to be an efficient way to account for interactions between all predictors at once. Main conclusions Models and spatial predictions of 18 forest communities were significantly improved by using either: (1) cross-validation as a model selection method, (2) weighted absences, (3) limited absences, (4) predictors accounting for spatial autocorrelation, or (5) a factor variable accounting for interactions between all predictors. The final choice of model strategy should depend on the nature of the available data and the specific study aims. Statistical evaluation is useful in searching for the best modelling practice. However, one should not neglect to consider the shapes and interpretability of response curves, as well as the resulting spatial predictions in the final assessment.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit ofYoung (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi-strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest wecharacterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incompleteinformation of Nash's demand game, or a simple version ofthe so-called sealed bid double auction. For both gamesselection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesianequilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient.

Hiring and firing costs, adverse selection and long-term unemployment

In this paper, we present a matching model with adverse selection that explains why flows into and out of unemployment are much lower in Europe compared to North America, while employment-to-employment flows are similar in the two continents. In the model,firms use discretion in terms of whom to fire and, thus, low quality workers are more likely to be dismissed than high quality workers. Moreover, as hiring and firing costs increase, firms find it more costly to hire a bad worker and, thus, they prefer to hire out of the pool of employed job seekers rather than out of the pool of the unemployed, who are more likely to turn out to be 'lemons'. We use microdata for Spain and the U.S. and find that the ratio of the job finding probability of the unemployed to the job finding probability of employed job seekers was smaller in Spain than in the U.S. Furthermore, using U.S. data, we find that the discrimination of the unemployed increased over the 1980's in those states that raised firing costs by introducing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.

Nonparametric bounds on the returns to language skills

This paper applies the theoretical literature on nonparametric bounds ontreatment effects to the estimation of how limited English proficiency (LEP)affects wages and employment opportunities for Hispanic workers in theUnited States. I analyze the identifying power of several weak assumptionson treatment response and selection, and stress the interactions between LEPand education, occupation and immigration status. I show that thecombination of two weak but credible assumptions provides informative upperbounds on the returns to language skills for certain subgroups of thepopulation. Adding age at arrival as a monotone instrumental variable alsoprovides informative lower bounds.

Selection of artificial hosts for oviposition by wild Anastrepha obliqua (Macquart) (Diptera, Tephritidae): influence of adult food and effect of experience

Several factors influence the selection of oviposition substrates by insects. The aim of the present work was to find answers to the following questions related to the oviposition behavior of Anastrepha obliqua. Can carbohydrates (glucose or sucrose) present in the adult diet have influence on the female preference for an oviposition substrate with similar composition? Can the previous experience with a host containing one of mentioned carbohydrates interfere in further selection of oviposition substrates? The results showed that the kind of carbohydrate present in the adult diet did not affect the female preference for an artificial oviposition substrate, neither when it was presented by itself nor in combination with brewer's yeast. The effect of experience in the oviposition behavior was observed when there was a previous contact with artificial oviposition substrates containing yeast and sucrose. The data are discussed in terms of the behavioral plasticity presented by this species in relation to feeding and oviposition behaviors.

Dynamic adverse selection and debt

This paper argues that the strategic use of debt favours the revelationof information in dynamic adverse selection problems. Our argument is basedon the idea that debt is a credible commitment to end long term relationships.Consequently, debt encourages a privately informed party to disclose itsinformation at early stages of a relationship. We illustrate our pointwith the financing decision of a monopolist selling a good to a buyerwhose valuation is private information. A high level of (renegotiable)debt, by increasing the scope for liquidation, may induce the highvaluation buyer to buy early at a high price and thus increase themonopolist's expected payoff. By affecting the buyer's strategy, it mayreduce the probability of excessive liquidation. We investigate theconsequences of good durability and we examine the way debt mayalleviate the ratchet effect.

Long-run selection and the work ethic

That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.

Forecasting and turning point predictions in a Bayesian panel VAR model

We provide methods for forecasting variables and predicting turning points in panel Bayesian VARs. We specify a flexible model which accounts for both interdependencies in the cross section and time variations in the parameters. Posterior distributions for the parameters are obtained for a particular type of diffuse, for Minnesota-type and for hierarchical priors. Formulas for multistep, multiunit point and average forecasts are provided. An application to the problem of forecasting the growth rate of output and of predicting turning points in the G-7 illustrates the approach. A comparison with alternative forecasting methods is also provided.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

KIT mutations and dose selection for imatinib in patients with advanced gastrointestinal stromal tumours.

A recent randomized EORTC phase III trial, comparing two doses of imatinib in patients with advanced gastrointestinal stromal tumours (GISTs), reported dose dependency for progression-free survival. The current analysis of that study aimed to assess if tumour mutational status correlates with clinical response to imatinib. Pre-treatment samples of GISTs from 377 patients enrolled in phase III study were analyzed for mutations of KIT or PDGFRA by combination of D-HPLC and direct sequencing of tumour genomic DNA. Mutation types were correlated with patients' survival data. The presence of exon 9-activating mutations in KIT was the strongest adverse prognostic factor for response to imatinib, increasing the relative risk of progression by 171% (P<0.0001) and the relative risk of death by 190% (P<0.0001) when compared with KIT exon 11 mutants. Similarly, the relative risk of progression was increased by 108% (P<0.0001) and the relative risk of death by 76% (P=0.028) in patients without detectable KIT or PDGFRA mutations. In patients whose tumours expressed an exon 9 KIT oncoprotein, treatment with the high-dose regimen resulted in a significantly superior progression-free survival (P=0.0013), with a reduction of the relative risk of 61%. We conclude that tumour genotype is of major prognostic significance for progression-free survival and overall survival in patients treated with imatinib for advanced GISTs. Our findings suggest the need for differential treatment of patients with GISTs, with KIT exon 9 mutant patients benefiting the most from the 800 mg daily dose of the drug.