Design of distributed adaptive neural traffic signal timing controller by cuckoo search optimization

This paper focuses on designing an adaptive controller for controlling traffic signal timing. Urban traffic is an inevitable part in modern cities and traffic signal controllers are effective tools to control it. In this regard, this paper proposes a distributed neural network (NN) controller for traffic signal timing. This controller applies cuckoo search (CS) optimization methods to find the optimal parameters in design of an adaptive traffic signal timing control system. The evaluation of the performance of the designed controller is done in a multi-intersection traffic network. The developed controller shows a promising improvement in reducing travel delay time compared to traditional fixed-time control systems.

Protecting Your Search Privacy: A Lesson Plan

Each year search engines like Google, Bing and Yahoo, complete trillions of search queries online. Students are especially dependent on these search tools because of their popularity, convenience and accessibility. However, what students are unaware of, by choice or naiveté is the amount of personal information that is collected during each search session, how that data is used and who is interested in their online behavior profile. Privacy policies are frequently updated in favor of the search companies but are lengthy and often are perused briefly or ignored entirely with little thought about how personal web habits are being exploited for analytics and marketing. As an Information Literacy instructor, and a member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, I believe in the importance of educating college students and web users in general that they have a right to privacy online. Class discussions on the topic of web privacy have yielded an interesting perspective on internet search usage. Students are unaware of how their online behavior is recorded and have consistently expressed their hesitancy to use tools that disguise or delete their IP address because of the stigma that it may imply they have something to hide or are engaging in illegal activity. Additionally, students fear they will have to surrender the convenience of uber connectivity in their applications to maintain their privacy. The purpose of this lightning presentation is to provide educators with a lesson plan highlighting and simplifying the privacy terms for the three major search engines, Google, Bing and Yahoo. This presentation focuses on what data these search engines collect about users, how that data is used and alternative search solutions, like DuckDuckGo, for increased privacy. Students will directly benefit from this lesson because informed internet users can protect their data, feel safer online and become more effective web searchers.

In search of academic identity : physical education, sport science and the field of human movement studies

This thesis addresses the problem of the academic identity of the area traditionally referred to as physical education. The study is a critical examination of the argu ments for the justi cation of this area as an autonomous branch of knowledge. The investigation concentrates on a selected number of arguments. The data collection comprised articles books and proceedings of conferences. The preliminary assessment of these materials resulted in a classi cation of the arguments into three groups. The rst group comprises the arguments in favour of physical education as an academic discipline. The second includes the arguments supporting a science of sport. The third consists of the arguments in favour of to a eld of human movement study. The examination of these arguments produced the following results. (a) The area of physical education does not satisfy the conditions presupposed by the de nition of academic discipline. This is so because the area does not form an integrated system of scienti c theories. (b) The same di culty emerges from the examination of the ar guments for sport science. There is no science of sport because there is no integrated system of scienti c theories related to sport. (c) The arguments in favour of a eld of study yielded more productive results. However di culties arise from the de nition of human movement. The analysis of this concept showed that its limits are not well demarcated. This makes it problematic to take human movement as the focus of a eld of studies. These aspects led to the conclusion that such things as an academic discipline of physical education sport science and eld of human movement studies do not exist. At least there are not such things in the sense of autonomous branches of knowledge. This does not imply that a more integrated inquiry based on several disciplines is not possible and desirable. This would enable someone entering phys ical education to nd a more organised structure of knowledge with some generally accepted problem situations procedures and theories on which to base professional practice.

Income inequality in a job-search model with heterogeneous discount factors: (revised version, forthcoming 2006, Revista Economia)

This paper investigates the income inequality generated by a jobsearch process when di§erent cohorts of homogeneous workers are allowed to have di§erent degrees of impatience. Using the fact the average wage under the invariant Markovian distribution is a decreasing function of the discount factor (Cysne (2004, 2006)), I show that the Lorenz curve and the between-cohort Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality can be easily derived in this case. An example with arbitrary measures regarding the wage o§ers and the distribution of time preferences among cohorts provides some insights into how much income inequality can be generated, and into how it varies as a function of the probability of unemployment and of the probability that the worker does not Önd a job o§er each period.

Income inequality in a job-search model with heterogeneous time preferences

This paper explores the use of an intertemporal job-search model in the investigation of within-cohort and between-cohort income inequality, the latter being generated by the heterogeneity of time preferences among cohorts of homogenous workers and the former by the cross-sectional turnover in the job market. It also offers an alternative explanation for the empirically-documented negative correlation between time preference and labor income. Under some speciÖc distributions regarding wage offers and time preferences, we show how the within-cohort and between-cohort Gini coe¢ cients of income distribution can be calculated, and how they vary as a function of the parameters of the model.

A search-theoretic explanation for the negative correlation between labor income and impatience

Lawrance (1991) has shown, through the estimation of consumption Euler equations, that subjective rates of impatience (time preference) in the U.S. are three to Öve percentage points higher for households with lower average labor incomes than for those with higher labor income. From a theoretical perspective, the sign of this correlation in a job-search model seems at Örst to be undetermined, since more impatient workers tend to accept wage o§ers that less impatient workers would not, thereby remaining less time unemployed. The main result of this paper is showing that, regardless of the existence of e§ects of opposite sign, and independently of the particular speciÖcations of the givens of the model, less impatient workers always end up, in the long run, with a higher average income. The result is based on the (unique) invariant Markov distribution of wages associated with the dynamic optimization problem solved by the consumers. An example is provided to illustrate the method.

Inflation and income inequality: A link through the job-search process

In this paper I devise a new channel by means of which the (empirically documented) positive correlation between ináation and income inequality can be understood. Available empirical evidence reveals that ináation increases wage dispersion. For this reason, the higher the ináation rate, the higher turns out to be the beneÖt, for a worker, of making additional draws from the distribution of wages, before deciding whether to accept or reject a job o§er. Assuming that some workers have less access to information (wage o§ers) than others, I show that the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution turns out to be an increasing function of the wage dispersion and, consequently, of the rate of ináation. Two examples are provided to illustrate the mechanism.

Income inequality: the role of impatience in a job-search process

This paper investigates the income inequality generated by a jobsearch process when di§erent cohorts of homogeneous workers are allowed to have di§erent degrees of impatience. Using the fact the average wage under the invariant Markovian distribution is a decreasing function of the time preference (Cysne (2004)), I show that the Lorenz curve and the between-cohort Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality can be easily derived in this case. An example with arbitrary measures regarding the wage o§ers and the distribution of time preferences among cohorts provides some quantitative insights into how much income inequality can be generated, and into how it varies as a function of the probability of unemployment and of the probability that the worker does not Önd a job o§er each period.

Business competition dynamics: agent-based modeling simulations of firms in search of economic performance

A intenção deste trabalho é explorar dinâmicas de competição por meio de “simulação baseada em agentes”. Apoiando-se em um crescente número de estudos no campo da estratégia e teoria das organizações que utilizam métodos de simulação, desenvolveu-se um modelo computacional para simular situações de competição entre empresas e observar a eficiência relativa dos métodos de busca de melhoria de desempenho teorizados. O estudo também explora possíveis explicações para a persistência de desempenho superior ou inferior das empresas, associados às condições de vantagem ou desvantagem competitiva

A dynamic model of price competition with switching and search costs

Em modelos de competição de preços, somente um custo de procura positivo por parte do consumidor não gera equilíbrio com dispersão de preços. Já modelos dinâmicos de switching cost consistentemente geram este fenômeno bastante documentado para preços no varejo. Embora ambas as literaturas sejam vastas, poucos modelos tentaram combinar as duas fricções em um só modelo. Este trabalho apresenta um modelo dinâmico de competição de preços em que consumidores idênticos enfrentam custos de procura e de switching. O equilíbrio gera dispersão nos preços. Ainda, como os consumidores são obrigados a se comprometer com uma amostra fixa de firmas antes dos preços serem definidos, somente dois preços serão considerados antes de cada compra. Este resultado independe do tamanho do custo de procura individual do consumidor.

Using consumer search cost and loyalty to explain dispersion in banking fees

Pode-se observar uma considerável dispersão entre os preços que diferentes bancos comerciais no Brasil cobram por um mesmo pacote homogêneo de serviços— dispersão esta que é sustentada ao longo do tempo. Em uma tentativa de replicar esta observação empírica, foi desenvolvido um simples modelo que lança mão do arcabouço da literatura de custos de procura (search costs) e que baseia-se também na lealdade por parte dos consumidores. Em seguida, dados de preços referentes ao setor bancário brasileiro são aplicados ao modelo desenvolvido e alguns exercícios empíricos são então realizados. Esses exercícios permitem que: (i) os custos de procura incorridos pelos consumidores sejam estimados, ao fixar-se os valores dos demais parâmetros e (ii) as correspondentes perdas de peso-morto que surgem como consequência dos custos de procura incorridos pelos consumidores sejam também estimadas. Quando apenas 80% da população é livre para buscar por bancos que cobrem menores tarifas, à taxa de juros mensal de 0,5%, o valor estimado do custo de procura médio incorrido pelos consumidores chega a 1805,80 BRL, sendo a correspondente perda de peso-morto média na ordem de 233,71 BRL por consumidor.

A dynamic model of simultaneous price competition with switching and search costs

Esse artigo apresenta um modelo dinâmico de competição em precos que incorpora tanto custos de procura quanto custos de switching e onde que as decisões do consumidor e das firmas são simultâneas. Dadas as hipóteses feitas n ós veremos que este modelo possui equilí brio. As principais propriedades do equil íbrio deste modelo são: Se os custos de procura forem baixos o suficiente, em equilí brio o consumidor vai procurar todas as firmas no mercado enquanto que o aumento dos custos de procura vai reduzir a propor cão de firmas que o consumidor busca. Um resultado contraintuitivo e que os pre cos esperados pagos pelo consumidor normalmente decresce em nossas computa cões numéricas do equil íbrio quando os custos de procura aumentam. Enquanto que aumentar os custos de switching tamb ém vai produzir o resultado contraituitivo que as firmas unmatched vão diminuir suas ofertas de modo a atrair o consumidor.