Price risk management in the copper market using commodity derivatives and options strategies

Metals price risk management is a key issue related to financial risk in metal markets because of uncertainty of commodity price fluctuation, exchange rate, interest rate changes and huge price risk either to metals’ producers or consumers. Thus, it has been taken into account by all participants in metal markets including metals’ producers, consumers, merchants, banks, investment funds, speculators, traders and so on. Managing price risk provides stable income for both metals’ producers and consumers, so it increases the chance that a firm will invest in attractive projects. The purpose of this research is to evaluate risk management strategies in the copper market. The main tools and strategies of price risk management are hedging and other derivatives such as futures contracts, swaps and options contracts. Hedging is a transaction designed to reduce or eliminate price risk. Derivatives are financial instruments, whose returns are derived from other financial instruments and they are commonly used for managing financial risks. Although derivatives have been around in some form for centuries, their growth has accelerated rapidly during the last 20 years. Nowadays, they are widely used by financial institutions, corporations, professional investors, and individuals. This project is focused on the over-the-counter (OTC) market and its products such as exotic options, particularly Asian options. The first part of the project is a description of basic derivatives and risk management strategies. In addition, this part discusses basic concepts of spot and futures (forward) markets, benefits and costs of risk management and risks and rewards of positions in the derivative markets. The second part considers valuations of commodity derivatives. In this part, the options pricing model DerivaGem is applied to Asian call and put options on London Metal Exchange (LME) copper because it is important to understand how Asian options are valued and to compare theoretical values of the options with their market observed values. Predicting future trends of copper prices is important and would be essential to manage market price risk successfully. Therefore, the third part is a discussion about econometric commodity models. Based on this literature review, the fourth part of the project reports the construction and testing of an econometric model designed to forecast the monthly average price of copper on the LME. More specifically, this part aims at showing how LME copper prices can be explained by means of a simultaneous equation structural model (two-stage least squares regression) connecting supply and demand variables. A simultaneous econometric model for the copper industry is built: {█(Q_t^D=e^((-5.0485))∙P_((t-1))^((-0.1868) )∙〖GDP〗_t^((1.7151) )∙e^((0.0158)∙〖IP〗_t ) @Q_t^S=e^((-3.0785))∙P_((t-1))^((0.5960))∙T_t^((0.1408))∙P_(OIL(t))^((-0.1559))∙〖USDI〗_t^((1.2432))∙〖LIBOR〗_((t-6))^((-0.0561))@Q_t^D=Q_t^S )┤ P_((t-1))^CU=e^((-2.5165))∙〖GDP〗_t^((2.1910))∙e^((0.0202)∙〖IP〗_t )∙T_t^((-0.1799))∙P_(OIL(t))^((0.1991))∙〖USDI〗_t^((-1.5881))∙〖LIBOR〗_((t-6))^((0.0717) Where, Q_t^D and Q_t^Sare world demand for and supply of copper at time t respectively. P(t-1) is the lagged price of copper, which is the focus of the analysis in this part. GDPt is world gross domestic product at time t, which represents aggregate economic activity. In addition, industrial production should be considered here, so the global industrial production growth that is noted as IPt is included in the model. Tt is the time variable, which is a useful proxy for technological change. A proxy variable for the cost of energy in producing copper is the price of oil at time t, which is noted as POIL(t ) . USDIt is the U.S. dollar index variable at time t, which is an important variable for explaining the copper supply and copper prices. At last, LIBOR(t-6) is the 6-month lagged 1-year London Inter bank offering rate of interest. Although, the model can be applicable for different base metals' industries, the omitted exogenous variables such as the price of substitute or a combined variable related to the price of substitutes have not been considered in this study. Based on this econometric model and using a Monte-Carlo simulation analysis, the probabilities that the monthly average copper prices in 2006 and 2007 will be greater than specific strike price of an option are defined. The final part evaluates risk management strategies including options strategies, metal swaps and simple options in relation to the simulation results. The basic options strategies such as bull spreads, bear spreads and butterfly spreads, which are created by using both call and put options in 2006 and 2007 are evaluated. Consequently, each risk management strategy in 2006 and 2007 is analyzed based on the day of data and the price prediction model. As a result, applications stemming from this project include valuing Asian options, developing a copper price prediction model, forecasting and planning, and decision making for price risk management in the copper market.

Game-theoretic view on intermediated exchange

Intermediaries permeate modern economic exchange. Most classical models on intermediated exchange are driven by information asymmetry and inventory management. These two factors are of reduced significance in modern economies. This makes it necessary to develop models that correspond more closely to modern financial marketplaces. The goal of this dissertation is to propose and examine such models in a game theoretical context. The proposed models are driven by asymmetries in the goals of different market participants. Hedging pressure as one of the most critical aspects in the behavior of commercial entities plays a crucial role. The first market model shows that no equilibrium solution can exist in a market consisting of a commercial buyer, a commercial seller and a non-commercial intermediary. This indicates a clear economic need for non-commercial trading intermediaries: a direct trade from seller to buyer does not result in an equilibrium solution. The second market model has two distinct intermediaries between buyer and seller: a spread trader/market maker and a risk-neutral intermediary. In this model a unique, natural equilibrium solution is identified in which the supply-demand surplus is traded by the risk-neutral intermediary, whilst the market maker trades the remainder from seller to buyer. Since the market maker’s payoff for trading at the identified equilibrium price is zero, this second model does not provide any motivation for the market maker to enter the market. The third market model introduces an explicit transaction fee that enables the market maker to secure a positive payoff. Under certain assumptions on this transaction fee the equilibrium solution of the previous model applies and now also provides a financial motivation for the market maker to enter the market. If the transaction fee violates an upper bound that depends on supply, demand and riskaversity of buyer and seller, the market will be in disequilibrium.

Strategies for the Next Generation of Conservation: Lessons from a Life in Environmental Leadership

Successful leadership in the conservation community depends upon leaders with a vision who can engage collaborators in a transaction to create something of enduring value. Ideally, results are achieved in a win-win fashion with other stakeholders. However, a good leader must employ a broader range of tools.

Portfolio-optimization models for small investors

Since 2010, the client base of online-trading service providers has grown significantly. Such companies enable small investors to access the stock market at advantageous rates. Because small investors buy and sell stocks in moderate amounts, they should consider fixed transaction costs, integral transaction units, and dividends when selecting their portfolio. In this paper, we consider the small investor’s problem of investing capital in stocks in a way that maximizes the expected portfolio return and guarantees that the portfolio risk does not exceed a prescribed risk level. Portfolio-optimization models known from the literature are in general designed for institutional investors and do not consider the specific constraints of small investors. We therefore extend four well-known portfolio-optimization models to make them applicable for small investors. We consider one nonlinear model that uses variance as a risk measure and three linear models that use the mean absolute deviation from the portfolio return, the maximum loss, and the conditional value-at-risk as risk measures. We extend all models to consider piecewise-constant transaction costs, integral transaction units, and dividends. In an out-of-sample experiment based on Swiss stock-market data and the cost structure of the online-trading service provider Swissquote, we apply both the basic models and the extended models; the former represent the perspective of an institutional investor, and the latter the perspective of a small investor. The basic models compute portfolios that yield on average a slightly higher return than the portfolios computed with the extended models. However, all generated portfolios yield on average a higher return than the Swiss performance index. There are considerable differences between the four risk measures with respect to the mean realized portfolio return and the standard deviation of the realized portfolio return.

Firms, do you know your currency risk exposure? Survey results

This paper surveys the currency risk management practices of Swiss industrial corporations. We find tha industrials do not quantify their currency risk exposure and investigate possible reasons. One possibility is that firms do not think they need to know because they use on-balance-sheet instruments to protect themselves before and after currency rates reach troublesome levels. This is puzzling because a rough estimate of at least cash flow exposure is not a prohibitive task and could be helpful. It is also puzzling that firms use currency derivatives to hedge/insure individual short-term transactions, without apparently trying to estimate aggregate transaction exposure.

Vertikale Integration und Unternehmenserfolg: eine empirische Untersuchung in der Formel 1

Die neue Theorie der Unternehmung befasst sich unter anderem mit der zentralen Frage, wie sich vertikale Integrationsentscheidungen auf das Investitionsverhalten von Unternehmen und deren Gewinne auswirken. In der Formel 1 kann seit dem Jahr 2002 eine Tendenz zur Gründung oder Übernahme von Rennställen durch große Automobilkonzerne beobachtet werden, die bisher nur als Motorenlieferanten auftraten. Die vorliegende Untersuchung zeigt, dass die vertikale Vorwärtsintegration von Automobilkonzernen den Teamerfolg in der Formel 1 steigert. Es wird insbesondere deutlich, dass vertikal integrierte Teams höhere Investitionen tätigen und dadurch die Qualität der Fahrer und die technische Qualität der Rennwagen verbessern. Diese Faktoren wirken signifikant auf den Rennerfolg. According to the (new) theory of the firm vertically integrated firms might under certain conditions outperform disintegrated firms. In particular, in a situation with high transaction specific investments and measurement problems concerning individual performance an underinvestment problem may arise. In this paper we show for Formula One motor racing that integrated firms solve arising underinvestment problems more efficiently than disintegrated firms and that the decision to integrate positively affect the firm’s performance.

The Life and Times of Bills

Time is one of the scarcest resources in modern parliaments. In parliamentary systems of government the control of time in the chamber is a significant power resource enjoyed – to varying degrees – by parliamentary majorities and the governments they support. Minorities may not be able to muster enough votes to stop bills, but they may have – varying degrees of – delaying powers enabling them to extract concessions from majorities attempting to get on with their overall legislative programme. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the dynamics of the legislative process in 17 West European parliaments from the formal initiation of bills to their promulgation. The ‘biographies’ of a sample of bills are examined using techniques of event-history analysis (a) charting the dynamics of the legislative process both across the life-times of individual bills and different political systems and (b) examining whether, and to what extent, parliamentary rules and some general regime attributes influence the dynamics of this process, speeding up or delaying the passage of legislation. Using a veto-points framework and transaction cost politics as a theoretical framework, the quantitative analyses suggest a number of counter-intuitive findings (e.g., the efficiency of powerful committees) and cast doubt on some of the claims made by Tsebelis in his veto-player model.

Carbon sequestration in community forests: trade-offs, multiple outcomes and institutional diversity in the Bolivian Amazon

Carbon sequestration in community forests presents a major challenge for the Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) programme. This article uses a comparative analysis of the agricultural and forestry practices of indigenous peoples and settlers in the Bolivian Amazon to show how community-level institutions regulate the trade-offs between community livelihoods, forest species diversity, and carbon sequestration. The authors argue that REDD+ implementation in such areas runs the risk of: 1) reinforcing economic inequalities based on previous and potential land use impacts on ecosystems (baseline), depending on the socio-cultural groups targeted; 2) increasing pressure on land used for food production, possibly reducing food security and redirecting labour towards scarce off-farm income opportunities; 3) increasing dependence on external funding and carbon market fluctuations instead of local production strategies; and 4) further incentivising the privatization and commodification of land to avoid transaction costs associated with collective property rights. The article also advises against taking a strictly economic, market-based approach to carbon sequestration, arguing that such an approach could endanger fragile socio-ecological systems. REDD+ schemes should directly support existing efforts towards forest sustainability rather than simply compensating local land users for avoiding deforestation and forest degradation

Explaining Variations in Client Extra Costs between Software Projects Offshored to India

Gaining economic benefits from substantially lower labor costs has been reported as a major reason for offshoring labor-intensive information systems services to low-wage countries. However, if wage differences are so high, why is there such a high level of variation in the economic success between offshored IS projects? This study argues that offshore outsourcing involves a number of extra costs for the ^his paper was recommended for acceptance by Associate Guest Editor Erran Carmel. client organization that account for the economic failure of offshore projects. The objective is to disaggregate these extra costs into their constituent parts and to explain why they differ between offshored software projects. The focus is on software development and maintenance projects that are offshored to Indian vendors. A theoretical framework is developed a priori based on transaction cost economics (TCE) and the knowledge-based view of the firm, comple mented by factors that acknowledge the specific offshore context The framework is empirically explored using a multiple case study design including six offshored software projects in a large German financial service institution. The results of our analysis indicate that the client incurs post contractual extra costs for four types of activities: (1) re quirements specification and design, (2) knowledge transfer, (3) control, and (4) coordination. In projects that require a high level of client-specific knowledge about idiosyncratic business processes and software systems, these extra costs were found to be substantially higher than in projects where more general knowledge was needed. Notably, these costs most often arose independently from the threat of oppor tunistic behavior, challenging the predominant TCE logic of market failure. Rather, the client extra costs were parti cularly high in client-specific projects because the effort for managing the consequences of the knowledge asymmetries between client and vendor was particularly high in these projects. Prior experiences of the vendor with related client projects were found to reduce the level of extra costs but could not fully offset the increase in extra costs in highly client-specific projects. Moreover, cultural and geographic distance between client and vendor as well as personnel turnover were found to increase client extra costs. Slight evidence was found, however, that the cost-increasing impact of these factors was also leveraged in projects with a high level of required client-specific knowledge (moderator effect).

Portfolio-optimization models for small investors

Since 2010, the client base of online-trading service providers has grown significantly. Such companies enable small investors to access the stock market at advantageous rates. Because small investors buy and sell stocks in moderate amounts, they should consider fixed transaction costs, integral transaction units, and dividends when selecting their portfolio. In this paper, we consider the small investor’s problem of investing capital in stocks in a way that maximizes the expected portfolio return and guarantees that the portfolio risk does not exceed a prescribed risk level. Portfolio-optimization models known from the literature are in general designed for institutional investors and do not consider the specific constraints of small investors. We therefore extend four well-known portfolio-optimization models to make them applicable for small investors. We consider one nonlinear model that uses variance as a risk measure and three linear models that use the mean absolute deviation from the portfolio return, the maximum loss, and the conditional value-at-risk as risk measures. We extend all models to consider piecewise-constant transaction costs, integral transaction units, and dividends. In an out-of-sample experiment based on Swiss stock-market data and the cost structure of the online-trading service provider Swissquote, we apply both the basic models and the extended models; the former represent the perspective of an institutional investor, and the latter the perspective of a small investor. The basic models compute portfolios that yield on average a slightly higher return than the portfolios computed with the extended models. However, all generated portfolios yield on average a higher return than the Swiss performance index. There are considerable differences between the four risk measures with respect to the mean realized portfolio return and the standard deviation of the realized portfolio return.

Racial Origins of Jewish types

by R. N. Salaman

Inseparable, incapable, or invisible: Why public organizations award no-bid contracts

No-bid contracting is a highly prevalent practice in public procurement of technology services. Alt-hough no-bid contracting is a substantial problem since it reduces competition and welfare, the litera-ture lacks theoretical explanations and empirical tests for why public organizations award no-bid con-tracts. In this paper, we propose three theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting, drawing on transaction cost economics, organizational learning, and institutional theory. We also present how we test these explanations using a comprehensive sample of public procurement transactions. We expect to contribute theoretical explanations for no-bid contracting and practical implications for policy-makers.

The Impact of Human Asset Specificity on the Sourcing of Application Services

The question concerning the circumstances under which it is advantageous for a company to outsource certain information systems functions has been a controversial issue for the last decade. While opponents emphasize the risks of outsourcing based on the loss of strategic potentials and increased transaction costs, proponents emphasize the strategic benefits of outsourcing and high potentials of cost-savings. This paper brings together both views by examining the conditions under which both the strategic potentials as well as savings in production and transaction costs of developing and maintaining software applications can better be achieved in-house as opposed to by an external vendor. We develop a theoretical framework from three complementary theories and test it empirically based on a mail survey of 139 German companies. The results show that insourcing is more cost efficient and advantageous in creating strategic benefits through IS if the provision of application services requires a high amount of firm specific human assets. These relationships, however, are partially moderated by differences in the trustworthiness and intrinsic motivation of internal versus external IS professionals. Moreover, capital shares with an external vendor can lower the risk of high transaction costs as well the risk of loosing the strategic opportunities of an IS.

The Entrepreneurial Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the Entrepreneurial Firm

The entrepreneurial theory of the firm argues that entrepreneurship, properly understood, is a crucial but neglected element in explaining the nature and boundaries of the firm. By contrast, the theory of the entrepreneurial firm presumably seeks not to understand the nature and boundaries of "the firm" in general but rather to understand a particular type of firm: one that is entrepreneurial. This paper is an attempt to reconcile the two. After briefly delving for the concept of entrepreneurship in the work of Schumpeter, Kirzner, and (especially) Knight, the paper makes the case for the entrepreneurial theory of the firm. In such a theory, the firm exists as the solution to a coordination problem in a world of change and uncertainty, including Knightian or structural uncertainty. Taking a historical or developmental perspective, the paper then examines the changing nature of the entrepreneurial coordination problem over the life-cycle. In this formulation, "the entrepreneurial firm" is a nascent firm or proto-firm facing a problem of coordinating systemic change in economic capabilities. Lacking (by definition) adequate guidance from existing systems of rules of conduct embedded in markets or organizations, the entrepreneurial firm typically relies on a form of organization Max Weber called charismatic authority. In the end, although there is no such thing as a non-entrepreneurial firm, firms that must solve coordination problems in a world of novelty and systemic change ("entrepreneurial firms") are perhaps the purest case of the entrepreneurial theory of the firm.