Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

Determinantes da Estrutura de Capital de Companhias Abertas Brasileiras Não-Financeiras: Um Estudo Empírico com Dados em Painel

When a company desires to invest in a project, it must obtain resources needed to make the investment. The alternatives are using firm s internal resources or obtain external resources through contracts of debt and issuance of shares. Decisions involving the composition of internal resources, debt and shares in the total resources used to finance the activities of a company related to the choice of its capital structure. Although there are studies in the area of finance on the debt determinants of firms, the issue of capital structure is still controversial. This work sought to identify the predominant factors that determine the capital structure of Brazilian share capital, non-financial firms. This work was used a quantitative approach, with application of the statistical technique of multiple linear regression on data in panel. Estimates were made by the method of ordinary least squares with model of fixed effects. About 116 companies were selected to participate in this research. The period considered is from 2003 to 2007. The variables and hypotheses tested in this study were built based on theories of capital structure and in empirical researches. Results indicate that the variables, such as risk, size, and composition of assets and firms growth influence their indebtedness. The profitability variable was not relevant to the composition of indebtedness of the companies analyzed. However, analyzing only the long-term debt, comes to the conclusion that the relevant variables are the size of firms and, especially, the composition of its assets (tangibility).This sense, the smaller the size of the undertaking or the greater the representation of fixed assets in total assets, the greater its propensity to long-term debt. Furthermore, this research could not identify a predominant theory to explain the capital structure of Brazilian

Volatilidade dos retornos e governança: um estudo de eventos da crise do subprime

The financial crisis that occurred between the years 2007 and 2008, known as the subprime crisis, has highlighted the governance of companies in Brazil and worldwide. To monitor the financial risk, quantitative tools of risk management were created in the 1990s, after several financial disasters. The market turmoil has also led companies to invest in the development and use of information, which are applied as tools to support process control and decision making. Numerous empirical studies on informational efficiency of the market have been made inside and outside Brazil, revealing whether the prices reflect the information available instantly. The creation of different levels of corporate governance on BOVESPA, in 2000, made the firms had greater impairment in relation to its shareholders with greater transparency in their information. The purpose of this study is to analyze how the subprime financial crisis has affected, between January 2007 and December 2009, the volatility of stock returns in the BM&BOVESPA of companies with greater liquidity at different levels of corporate governance. From studies of time series and through the studies of events, econometric tests were performed by the EVIEWS, and through the results obtained it became evident that the adoption of good practices of corporate governance affect the volatility of returns of companies