Agriculture, Food and the TTIP: Possibilities and Pitfalls. CEPS Special Report No. 99/December 2014. TTIP Series No. 3 and Paper No. 1 in the CEPS-CTR project “TTIP in the balance’’

Progress in agriculture and food issues in the TTIP talks will largely be determined by the level of ambition in the negotiations as a whole. If ambitions are modest, a low-level agreement could probably be reached that includes some limited commitments on agricultural market access and food regulations. These could include promises of mutual support in the area of opening up agricultural markets through the WTO and of further Transatlantic cooperation in trying to resolve conflicts over food regulations. Bolder ambitions would allow more scope for tackling the difficult problems, though at the cost of time. It would be unfortunate if the opportunity were not taken to make some significant progress in removing some longstanding irritants in the area of agricultural policy and food regulations: this is where the economic gains are likely to be significant and the spill-overs useful. This paper argues the case that it is worthwhile making the effort to secure a constructive and imaginative agreement on agriculture and food regulations in the TTIP. A fairly detailed suggestive list of potential sub-deals in agro-food, supported by the analysis in the paper, is the most concrete one of a series of policy conclusions

The ICC Debate and the EU-U.S. Struggle for Influence: The Case of the Balkan-6. ACES Working Paper No. 11, October 2007

The objectives of the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) for the countries of the Balkan region are generally assumed to be complementary. They both stress and condition their support and assistance on the progress that these countries make with regards to economic modernization, build-up of social institutions, and respect for international law. However, this rhetoric doesn't always match the facts on the ground. Often, instead of dealing with a cohesive set of policy recommendations, the countries in the region are faced with contradictory alternatives and zero-sum choices. The debate over the development of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was such a case. It centered on whether the countries in the region should exempt US personnel from the jurisdiction of the Court while in the country and thus rendering them immune from prosecution for any crimes committed for which the US courts were not willing or able to take any action. The final outcome was mixed. Three of the countries - Croatia, Serbia (and Montenegro), and Slovenia - decided not to give in to US pressure, while the remaining three - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia - ignored the pleas and threats of the EU and of the various international non-governmental organizations and decided to sign Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs) with the US. How can one explain such divergent outcomes? I argue that the credibility of actors involved played an important role in determining whether threats coming from the US or the EU were more credible, thus tipping the scales in favor of signing BIAs with the US. However, the issue of threat credibility serves only to narrow down the choices of actors. Further determination of the outcome necessitates a look at the nature of the security context in which these countries exist and operate.

Focal points and fiscal discipline. ACES Cases No. 2013.2

Many studies suggest that balanced budget rules can restrain sovereign debt and lower sovereign borrowing costs, even if those rules are never enforced in court. Typically, this is explained as a result of a legal deterrence logic, in which the threat of judicial enforcement deters sovereigns from violating the rules. By contrast, we argue that balanced budget rules work by coordinating decentralized punishment of sovereigns by bond markets, rather than by posing a credible threat of judicial enforcement. Therefore, the clarity of the focal point provided by the rule, rather than the strength of its judicial enforcement mechanisms, determines its effectiveness. We develop a formal model that captures the logic of our argument, and we assess this model using data on US states. We then consider implications of our argument for the impact of the balanced budget rules recently imposed on eurozone states in the Fiscal Compact Treaty.

Israel and Palestine and state (un)sustainability. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 5/June 2011

This report explores the concept of state (un)sustainability in Israel and Palestine. The starting point sees conflict resolution as an independent variable for any change and progress in the area, in terms of a political, just and credible agreement between the two parties, which will then play a decisive role in the development of the Mediterranean region. These developments and prospects for a solution are then evaluated on the basis of state (un)sustainability, a broad notion that refers to the possibilities for long-term development at the political, social and economic levels. The very nature of Israel’s democracy and its relations with its Arab minority, the challenges related to the establishment of a viable and sustainable Palestinian state, and the regional dimension of all the actors involved are considered in order to evaluate future scenarios in this context. Three scenarios are tested: sustainability, which corresponds to the end of the conflict and the establishment of two viable and independent states with a tangible improvement in political and economic indicators; unsustainability, which refers to the perpetuation of the political status quo and the progressive deterioration of all political, economic and social indicators; and finally, weak stability, which entails the achievement of a sterile political stability, able to sustain the present status quo but unable to confront the main challenges for the future of the country(ies).

Time for the ECB to bite the bullet. CEPS Commentary, 19 January 2015

This Commentary summarises the main reasons why the ECB can no longer delay launching a massive bond-buying programme, also including sovereigns of eurozone member countries, and why such interventions will indeed be effective in raising inflation, thus restoring the ECB’s credibility and spurring economic activity. A credible programme must continue either until an explicit inflation target has been achieved or the ECB balance sheet has reached the €2 trillion target already announced by the ECB’s Governing Council. Regardless of how such interventions will be undertaken, they will reduce interest-rate spreads between eurozone markets, but it is nevertheless important that the ECB designs its operations so as to avoid any implication of direct support or deficit financing facilitation for the eurozone’s most indebted countries. Finally, some kind of guarantee against first losses by the ECB on its sovereign bonds may be appropriate, while entrusting open market operations to each national central bank for their own sovereigns could threaten the very survival of monetary union.

EU 2020 Renewable Energy Goals Insufficient. IES Policy Brief Issue 2012/01/January 2012

Summary. It is clear that any action to combat climate change must involve extensive efforts in reducing the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the energy sector. In the EU, nearly 80% of total GHG emissions come from the energy sector (European Commission, 2011, p. 21). Any credible action within the EU on combating climate change therefore requires deep shifts in the way we produce and use our energy. This paper highlights that renewable energy policies to 2020 are insufficient to meet the EU’s long-term climate policy objectives of reducing GHG emissions by between 80 and 95% by 2050, and thereby aiming to avoid an increase in global temperatures of more than 2°C. Such an ambition would likely require a very high share of renewable energy (in the range of 80 to 100%) in the overall energy mix of the EU, given current uncertainties about the feasibility of potential technological developments (e.g. carbon capture and storage technology).

GATS and the Social Regulation of Services. IES WORKING PAPER 3/2010

Many service transactions are highly complex, and their quality is difficult to ascertain for consumers. In order to have properly functioning service markets, the services thus often require regulation. However, with the advent of the WTO, international trade in services has become increasingly rule-bound. GATS has considerable, intricate effects on social regulation due to the characteristics of services. The allocation of regulatory jurisdiction between home and host country, for example, is rendered difficult by the process-based nature of a lot of services. The WTO US – Gambling dispute settlement report is the first to address GATS disciplines on social regulation in a detailed manner. This working paper submits that the US - Gambling report has increased interference with domestic social regulation and created regulatory uncertainty for WTO members. However, it is also argued that the real impact of the GATS on social regulation can only be understood by looking beyond the text of the GATS. GATS disciplines may become amplified through their interaction with domestic and other international law. The GATS also contains some “political” counterbalancing mechanisms that allow members to renegotiate their commitments. It is argued that these political mechanisms strengthen subsidiarity in the GATS, and make WTO dispute settlement bodies accountable to WTO members.

Public Procurement in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Negotiations. Paper No. 2 in the CEPS-CTR project "TTIP in the Balance" and CEPS Special Report No. 100/February 2015

For more than 20 years, the United States and the European Union have engaged in often-contentious negotiations over access to government procurement. The EU is dissatisfied with the level of procurement that the US has opened under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement and, as a consequence, it does not give the US its most comprehensive coverage. The US has been constrained in responding to the EU’s requests for greater access, especially to state procurement, by both its federal structure of government and by domestic purchasing requirements. At the current time, neither party has proposed a way to break the impasse. This paper reviews the current state of affairs between the US and the EU on government procurement, examining the procurement that they open to one another and the procurement that they withhold. It then proposes a strategy for the two sides to use the TTIP negotiations to move forward. This strategy includes both steps to expand their current commitments in the TTIP, as well as to develop a longer-term approach by making the TTIP a ‘living agreement’. This strategy suggests that the EU and the US could find a way to expand their access to government procurement contracts and at least partially defuse the issue.

Scanning the Options for a Structural Reform of the EU Emissions Trading System. CEPS Special Report 107, 19 May 2015

This paper provides a comprehensive overview and analysis of different options to reform the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). The options discussed include changes to address the rigidity of supply on the auctioning side, as well as reforms to add flexibility to free allocation. Additionally, other options that may enhance the functionality of the EU ETS are covered, drawing on examples and practices in other carbon-pricing mechanisms around the world. It is crucial to note that any reform of the EU ETS must consist of a package of options. Taken separately, the options may very well have beneficial effects, but they would also leave intact clear imperfections in the current design. Specifically where the auctioning supply mechanism and the flexibility in free allocation are concerned, we assess multiple options in each category, and present evidence for each option. Where appropriate, we suggest complementing these reform options with additional elements (presented in section 3.3). The aim of any structural reform should be to arrive at a set of options that forms a consistent and credible package. With this paper, we provide an evidence-based assessment of the various building blocks of such a reform.

This time it’s different: Turbo-charging regulatory cooperation in TTIP. Paper No. 7 in the CEPS-CTR project ‘TTIP in the Balance’ and CEPS Special Report No. 110/June 2015

Regulatory cooperation is both one of the most ambitious and contentious parts of the EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. In this paper, having identified the many levels of international regulatory cooperation, we show that TTIP regulatory cooperation will be significant, but not ambitious, while political and legal limits on cooperation in both the EU and the US minimise the concerns. For transatlantic regulatory cooperation to work, it must accept these political and legal constraints, build trust and confidence among counterpart regulators so they see that their transatlantic partner can help them do their work better, and provide tools to help regulators on both sides make informed decisions while retaining their regulatory autonomy and accountability to their politicians and citizens. A TTIP that provides these tools – and some more detailed instruments to that effect – will be more ambitious than previous trade agreements, and should, over the longer term, provide both the economic and regulatory benefits that the two sides envisage. The paper incorporates comparisons with the relevant chapters of recent FTAs the US and the EU have concluded, so as to clarify the approaches and degrees of ambition in this area. This comparison suggests that the TTIP regulatory cooperation will probably be more ambitious in terms of commitments and have a wider scope than any of these FTAs.

Enhancing the Prospects of the EU’s Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas in the Mediterranean: Lessons from the Eastern Partnership. CEPS Commentary, 24 June 2015

In their March 2015 Consultation paper on the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Commission and the High Representative raised the question whether the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) “are the right objective for all or should more tailor-made alternatives be developed, to reflect differing interests and ambitions of some partners?” Such ambitious but complex trade agreements have now finally been signed with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, but they are still on the table for several Mediterranean ENP countries. Although these Mediterranean partners have a completely different political, economic and legal relationship with the EU, some important lessons can be drawn from the ‘Eastern DCFTA experience’. In particular, the DCFTA negotiators should avoid overly ambitious and ill-defined legislative approximation commitments and develop a comprehensive implementation strategy.

Ensuring the EU’s future as a security provider Five recommendations for the June European Council’s session on CSDP. EPC Commentary, 23 June 2015

On 25 and 26 June 2015, the Heads of State or Government of the European Union (EU) will convene to discuss the implementation of their Conclusions on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from December 2013. A substantial and frank debate among EU leaders is urgently needed in order to forge a lasting and credible vision for CSDP.

Paper Tiger or Game-Changer? Challenges of and Opportunities for EU Engagement with the Eurasian Economic Union. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers (BRIGG) 1/2015.

The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) started work on 1 January 2015. Considered as Russia’s response to the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP), it has been almost ignored in Brussels. However, with the Ukraine crisis and the deteriorating relations with Moscow, some European leaders have begun to reconsider Putin’s proposal for a region-to-region engagement. This paper tries to analyse under which conditions this could represent a long-term solution for a new European order. First, it is argued that the EEU is still far from being a credible international interlocutor. Second, Russia’s commitment to international trade rules and liberalization is questioned, whereas its geopolitical objectives seem predominant. EU engagement with the EEU in Ukraine would mean, in the short term, legitimizing Russia’s vision of a ‘bipolar Europe’ divided in spheres of influence. In the long run, prospects for inter-regional cooperation remain open, but the way to go is long and full of obstacles.

spotlight europe #2015/04—October 2015: A Fiscal Union for Europe – Building Block and Not a Magic Bullet

The dramatic negotiations with Greece in the past few months have been a telling reminder of the weaknesses of the euro area. Most of the commentators are of the opinion that if the monetary union is going to be crisis-resistant and stable in the long term, certain very important elements will have to be changed. However, there is little or no agreement when it comes to specifying the "what" and the "how". In particular there are heated debates about the right steps to further integration in the area of fiscal policy. "Fiscal union can create stability only if it includes both credible budgetary rules and some kind of risk sharing", argue Katharina Gnath and Jörg Haas in the latest spotlight europe. However, "whilst it is an important and effective way of stabilizing the euro area, it should not exclude the use of other instruments."

Nord Stream II - yes or no? - Political decision of a political Commission. EPC Commentary, 14 June 2016

When the new European Commission started work in autumn 2014, the president of the Commission took great pride in calling it a ‘political Commission’, which will be big on big things and small on small. Whilst the EU is currently dealing with many crises, reality is that things do not come much bigger than Nord Stream II. Will this be a political Commission that stands by its principles, including respect for liberty, democracy, the rule of law and human rights? Will this Commission have the backbone to politically assess a project that threatens EU unity and its core values, undermines the Union’s commonly agreed commitment to building an Energy Union and facilitates Russia’s aggression against Ukraine? President Juncker’s controversial visit to Russia and meeting with President Putin on 16-17 June is a test-case: will this Commission be ready to defend its commitments and principles when discussing ‘economic issues’?