Machine-tool selection and operation allocation in FMS: solving a fuzzy goal-programming model using a genetic algorithm

The decision-making process for machine-tool selection and operation allocation in a flexible manufacturing system (FMS) usually involves multiple conflicting objectives. Thus, a fuzzy goal-programming model can be effectively applied to this decision problem. The paper addresses application of a fuzzy goal-programming concept to model the problem of machine-tool selection and operation allocation with explicit considerations given to objectives of minimizing the total cost of machining operation, material handling and set-up. The constraints pertaining to the capacity of machines, tool magazine and tool life are included in the model. A genetic algorithm (GA)-based approach is adopted to optimize this fuzzy goal-programming model. An illustrative example is provided and some results of computational experiments are reported.

Integrated Reservoir Operation Modeling for Irrigation Systems - A Multi-Objective Approach

An integrated reservoir operation model is presented for developing effective operational policies for irrigation water management. In arid and semi-arid climates, owing to dynamic changes in the hydroclimatic conditions within a season, the fixed cropping pattern with conventional operating policies, may have considerable impact on the performance of the irrigation system and may affect the economics of the farming community. For optimal allocation of irrigation water in a season, development of effective mathematical models may guide the water managers in proper decision making and consequently help in reducing the adverse effects of water shortage and crop failure problems. This paper presents a multi-objective integrated reservoir operation model for multi-crop irrigation system. To solve the multi-objective model, a recent swarm intelligence technique, namely elitist-mutated multi-objective particle swarm optimisation (EM-MOPSO) has been used and applied to a case study in India. The method evolves effective strategies for irrigation crop planning and operation policies for a reservoir system, and thereby helps farming community in improving crop benefits and water resource usage in the reservoir command area.

An intelligent procurement marketplace for web services composition

This paper presents an intelligent procurement marketplace for finding the best mix of web services to dynamically compose the business process desired by a web service requester. We develop a combinatorial auction approach that leads to an integer programming formulation for the web services composition problem. The model takes into account the Quality of Service (QoS) and Service Level Agreements (SLA) for differentiating among multiple service providers who are capable of fulfilling a functionality. An important feature of the model is interface aware composition.

Incentive compatible mechanisms for group ticket allocation in software maintenance services

A customer reported problem (or Trouble Ticket) in software maintenance is typically solved by one or more maintenance engineers. The decision of allocating the ticket to one or more engineers is generally taken by the lead, based on customer delivery deadlines and a guided complexity assessment from each maintenance engineer. The key challenge in such a scenario is two folds, un-truthful (hiked up) elicitation of ticket complexity by each engineer to the lead and the decision of allocating the ticket to a group of engineers who will solve the ticket with in customer deadline. The decision of allocation should ensure Individual and Coalitional Rationality along with Coalitional Stability. In this paper we use game theory to examine the issue of truthful elicitation of ticket complexities by engineers for solving ticket as a group given a specific customer delivery deadline. We formulate this problem as strategic form game and propose two mechanisms, (1) Division of Labor (DOL) and (2) Extended Second Price (ESP). In the proposed mechanisms we show that truth telling by each engineer constitutes a Dominant Strategy Nash Equilibrium of the underlying game. Also we analyze the existence of Individual Rationality (IR) and Coalitional Rationality (CR) properties to motivate voluntary and group participation. We use Core, solution concept from co-operative game theory to analyze the stability of the proposed group based on the allocation and payments.

Pricing a Shared Access Link for Fair and Efficient Operation with Variable User Data Rates

The literature on pricing implicitly assumes an "infinite data" model, in which sources can sustain any data rate indefinitely. We assume a more realistic "finite data" model, in which sources occasionally run out of data; this leads to variable user data rates. Further, we assume that users have contracts with the service provider, specifying the rates at which they can inject traffic into the network. Our objective is to study how prices can be set such that a single link can be shared efficiently and fairly among users in a dynamically changing scenario where a subset of users occasionally has little data to send. User preferences are modelled by concave increasing utility functions. Further, we introduce two additional elements: a convex increasing disutility function and a convex increasing multiplicative congestion-penally function. The disutility function takes the shortfall (contracted rate minus present rate) as its argument, and essentially encourages users to send traffic at their contracted rates, while the congestion-penalty function discourages heavy users from sending excess data when the link is congested. We obtain simple necessary and sufficient conditions on prices for fair and efficient link sharing; moreover, we show that a single price for all users achieves this. We illustrate the ideas using a simple experiment.