Harry Potter and the Theory of Things

This thesis investigates the boundaries between body and object in J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series, seven children’s literature novels published between 1997 and 2007. Lord Voldemort, Rowling’s villain, creates Horcruxes—objects that contain fragments of his soul—in order to ensure his immortality. As vessels for human soul, these objects rupture the boundaries between body and object and become “things.” Using contemporary thing theorists including John Plotz and materialists Jean Baudrillard and Walter Benjamin, I look at Voldemort’s Horcruxes as transgressive, liminal, unclassifiable entities in the first chapter. If objects can occupy the juncture between body and object, then bodies can as well. Dementors and Inferi, dark creatures that Rowling introduces throughout the series, live devoid of soul. Voldemort, too, becomes a thing as he splits his soul and creates Horcruxes. These soulless bodies are uncanny entities, provoking fear, revulsion, nausea, and the loss of language. In the second chapter, I use Sigmund Freud’s theorization of the uncanny as well as literary critic Kelly Hurley to investigate how Dementors, Inferi, and Voldemort exist as body-turned-object things at the juncture between life and death. As Voldemort increasingly invests his immaterial soul into material objects, he physically and spiritually degenerates, transforming from the young, handsome Tom Marvolo Riddle into the snake-like villain that murdered Harry’s parents and countless others. During his quest to find and destroy Voldemort’s Horcruxes, Harry encounters a different type of object, the Deathly Hallows. Although similarly accessing boundaries between body/object, life/death, and materiality/immateriality, the three Deathly Hallows do not transgress these boundaries. Through the Deathly Hallows, Rowling provides an alternative to thingification: objects that enable boundaries to fluctuate, but not breakdown. In the third chapter, I return to thing theorists, Baudrillard, and Benjamin to study how the Deathly Hallows resist thingification by not transgressing the boundaries between body and object.

Representations of the Human/ Nonhuman Primate Divide: the Influence of Science, Fiction, and Science-Fiction on the Concept of 'Being Human'

For as far back as human history can be traced, mankind has questioned what it means to be human. One of the most common approaches throughout Western culture's intellectual tradition in attempts to answering this question has been to compare humans with or against other animals. I argue that it was not until Charles Darwin's publication of The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871) that Western culture was forced to seriously consider human identity in relation to the human/ nonhuman primate line. Since no thinker prior to Charles Darwin had caused such an identity crisis in Western thought, this interdisciplinary analysis of the history of how the human/ nonhuman primate line has been understood focuses on the reciprocal relationship of popular culture and scientific representations from 1871 to the Human Genome Consortium in 2000. Focusing on the concept coined as the "Darwin-Müller debate," representations of the human/ nonhuman primate line are traced through themes of language, intelligence, and claims of variation throughout the popular texts: Descent of Man, The Jungle Books (1894), Tarzan of the Apes (1914), and Planet of the Apes (1963). Additional themes such as the nature versus nurture debate and other comparative phenotypic attributes commonly used for comparison between man and apes are also analyzed. Such popular culture representations are compared with related or influential scientific research during the respective time period of each text to shed light on the reciprocal nature of Western intellectual tradition, popular notions of the human/ nonhuman primate line, and the development of the field of primatology. Ultimately this thesis shows that the Darwin-Müller debate is indeterminable, and such a lack of resolution makes man uncomfortable. Man's unsettled response and desire for self-knowledge further facilitates a continued search for answers to human identity. As the Human Genome Project has led to the rise of new debates, and primate research has become less anthropocentric over time, the mysteries of man's future have become more concerning than the questions of our past. The human/ nonhuman primate line is reduced to a 1% difference, and new debates have begun to overshadow the Darwin-Müller debate. In conclusion, I argue that human identity is best represented through the metaphor of evolution: both have an unknown beginning, both have an indeterminable future with no definite end, and like a species under the influence of evolution, what it means to be human is a constant, indeterminable process of change.