Malta Transformed by Multi-level Governance: More Than Just an Outcome of Europeanisation. Occasional Paper 03/2014

Malta has been transformed in many ways with and by EU Membership. This paper goes beyond the more obvious impacts of ‘Europeanisation’ and instead reviews the implications of an explosion of multi-level governance on doing politics in Malta. While for most of its recent political history, there has been a clawing back of power by the central government – as when the Gozo Civic Council (1960-1973), an early foray into regional government, was “unceremoniously dissolved” in 1973 – this trend was reversed with the setting up of local councils as from 1994, an advisory Malta Council for Economic and Social Development (MCESD) in 2001, and then EU membership in 2004. These events have created a profligacy of decision-making tiers and multiplied the tensions that exist between different levels of governance in this small archipelago state. Malta has never experienced such pluralism before. In fact, since 1966, only two political parties have been represented in the national legislature and, therefore, there has been no division of powers between the executive and the national parliament. This paper reviews the implications of these developments on two hot political issues in 2014: the International Investor Programme (IIP) proposed by the Labour Government in its 2014 Budget; and the location of a Liquid Natural Gas (LNG)-storage vessel inside Marsaxlokk harbour.

In a state of necessity. How has Orban changed Hungary. OSW Point of View Number 41, April 2014

Viktor Orban’s sweeping victory in the 2010 election ensured his party, Fidesz, a constitutional two-thirds majority in parliament. The party took over the rule of the country from the discredited political left when Hungary was plunged in political and economic crisis. Claiming that the circumstances were unusual and that it had a strong electoral mandate, Fidesz introduced radical changes in the country and thus challenged the previous economic and political order. These changes have led to an unprecedented concentration of power and provoked a discussion on the limits of democracy and the rule of law in the European Union. The state’s economic role has strengthened. The Orban government has been unable to overcome economic stagnation but it has managed to stabilise Hungary’s budget situation, which needs to deal with the high debt. Hungary’s relations with most partners in the EU and NATO have cooled due to controversial moves made by its government. As regards foreign policy and economic co-operation, Orban has granted high priority to the ‘Eastern opening’, where Russia has assumed the leading role.

The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View, September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 4. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 5. Has it been profitable for Russia? 6. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: 5. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). 6. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. 8. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. 5. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Changes in the political elite, economy and society of Belarus: Appearances and reality. OSW Study 30/2008

In late 2006 and early 2007, relations between Russia and Belarus were hit by the most serious crisis in many years. In a setting of heightened tension, the Belarusian authorities decided to gradually modify their economic policy and thoroughly restructure the ruling class. The new situation created new, much more difficult challenges for the Belarusian opposition. The processes initiated by the authorities were not intended to bring about either the democratisation of public and political life or full economic liberalisation; their only purpose was to enable the regime to tackle new challenges and survive in the changing international context. Nevertheless, modernisation has been initiated in Belarus' authoritarian system of power, which until now was considered to be completely incapable of reform. This puts the country's main political and economic partners, including the European Union, in a new situation.

The impact of the withdrawal from Afghanistan on Russia’s security. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 54, March 2014

ISAF’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 will directly impact the wider region. Not only is there a risk of instability spilling over to Central Asia, but the drawdown will also accelerate the ongoing shift in the balance of power in Central Asia towards China. Should a spillover occur, the burden will mainly fall on Russia and China. Russia will, however, only continue playing the dominant role in the security of the former Soviet Central Asia (FSCA) until China takes on responsibility for the security of its direct sphere of influence or “dingwei”. Russia’s Near Abroad, however, overlaps both with the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood in Europe and China’s dingwei in Central Asia and the Far East. It is, therefore, necessary to approach Russian reactions to these encroachments on its historical spheres of influence in a single context, taking into account the interrelationship between these three.

The War republics in the Donbas one year after the outbreak of the conflict. OSW Commentary Number 174, 17 June 2015

More than one year since the first pro-Russian moves in the Donbas, separatists have taken control of parts of the Donbas and Luhansk oblasts but are still unable to form truly functioning administrative structures. The exercise of power by the central administration of the so-called ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ (DPR) and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’ (LPR) is restricted to resolving problems as they arise, while administration proper is the prerogative of the local authorities reporting to them which had been performing this function before the conflict broke out. The way the situation is developing and the fact that access to information is restricted make it difficult to determine the structure of the separatist government in more detail, precisely how it is organised, and what the internal hierarchy is like. The overriding goal of the governments of the DPR and the LPR is to maintain and develop their military potential. In effect, the lives of the so-called republics are subordinate to military goals. The Donbas separatism is a conglomerate of different groups of interests, with Russia at the fulcrum. Its representatives set the main tactical and strategic goals and thus have a decisive influence on the development of the situation in the region. Individual separatist groupings come into conflict, and some oligarchs linked to the former Party of Regions circles have also been making attempts to maintain their influence. The struggle between individual groups of interest is intensifying as the situation on the war front becomes calmer. Since the situation has temporarily stabilised after the seizure of Debaltseve, the central governments of the DPR and the LPR have made attempts to expand their influence, combating armed criminals who are outside their control and that of Russia. The civilian population is taking the brunt of the devastation caused by the war and the increasing militarisation of the region. Despite the fact that the intensity of the fighting on the war front is falling, worsening humanitarian problems are causing refugees to continue their flight from the territories controlled by the separatists. 2 million people have fled the conflict zone since the beginning of the war: 1.3 million of them have found shelter in other regions of Ukraine, and more than 700,000 have left for Russia. The region has also sustained great economic losses – most mines have been either destroyed or closed, many industrial plants have restricted or completely discontinued their production, and many firms have been taken over by force. In effect, the region has seen an economic downturn.

The German Constitutional Court’s decision about the European Central Bank’s OMT [Outright Monetary Transactions] mechanism: A masterpiece of judicial arrogance. European Policy Briefs No. 30, April 2014

The German Constitutional Court (BVG) recently referred different questions to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. They concern the legality of the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transaction mechanism created in 2012. Simultaneously, the German Court has threatened to disrupt the implementation of OTM in Germany if its very restrictive analysis is not validated by the European Court of Justice. This raises fundamental questions about the future efficiency of the ECB’s monetary policy, the damage to the independence of the ECB, the balance of power between judges and political organs in charge of economic policy, in Germany and in Europe, and finally the relationship between the BVG and other national or European courts.

The End of German Hegemony. CEPS Commentary, 16 October 2015

Without anyone quite noticing, Europe’s internal balance of power has been shifting. As Daniel Gros observes in this commentary, Germany’s dominant position, which has seemed absolute since the 2008 financial crisis, is gradually weakening – with far-reaching implications for the European Union.

Late Putin. The end of growth, the end of stability. OSW POINT OF VIEW #55, 2015-10-05

Since Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin as President in May 2012, the Russian system of power has become increasingly authoritarian, and has evolved towards a model of extremely personalised rule that derives its legitimacy from aggressive decisions in internal and foreign policy, escalates the use of force, and interferes increasingly assertively in the spheres of politics, history, ideology or even public morals. Putin’s power now rests on charismatic legitimacy to a much greater extent than it did during his first two presidential terms; currently the President is presented not only as an effective leader, but also as the sole guarantor of Russia’s stability and integrity. After 15 years of Putin’s rule, Russia’s economic model based on revenue from energy resources has exhausted its potential, and the country has no new model that could ensure continued growth for the economy. The Putinist system of power is starting to show symptoms of agony – it has been unable to generate new development projects, and has been compensating for its ongoing degradation by escalating repression and the use of force. However, this is not equivalent to its imminent collapse.

Gas demand for power generation peaked as early as 2010. CEPS Commentary, 12 February 2016

The outlook for natural gas demand is often considered bright, especially for gas used to generate electricity. This is because gas is the cleanest of all fossil fuels. The carbon intensity of modern gas-fired power stations is less than 50% that of modern coal plants. Moreover, gas-fired units are well-suited to follow rapid swings in supply and demand due to their flexibility. In the future, these balancing tasks will become more and more important given the intermittent character of the supply of wind and solar power. Gas seems to hold out the promise of being a key pillar of the energy transition and the perfect partner of renewables. Given the EU’s long-term climate policy goals, however, there is strong evidence that demand for gas for purposes of power generation peaked as early as 2010.

De-authoring or Authoring?: A plunge into the question of authorship and language in J.M. Coetzee's Foe

J. M. Coetzee's Foe is not only a post-colonial novel, but it is also a re-writing of a classic, and its main themes are language, authorship, power and identity. Moreover, Foe is narrated by a woman, while written by a male, Nobel prize winning South African author. The aim of my tesina is to focus on the question of authorship and the role of language in Foe. Without any claim to be exhaustive, in the first section I will examine some selected extracts of Coetzee's book, in order to provide an analysis of the novel. These quotations will mainly be its metalinguistic parts and will be analysed in the “theory” sections of my work, relying on literary theory and on previous works on the novel. Among others, I will cover themes such as the relationship between speech and writing, the connection between writing, history, and memory, the role of silence and alternative ways of communicating and the relationship between literary authority and truth. These arguments will be the foundation for my second section, in which I will attempt to shed a light on the importance of the novel from a linguistic point of view, but always keeping an eye on the implication that this has on authorship. While it is true that it is less politically-permeated than Coetzee's previous works, Foe is above all a “journey of discovery” in the world of language and authorship. In fact, it becomes a warning for any person immersed in the ocean of language since, while everyone naturally tends to trust speech and writing as the only medium through which one can get closer to the truth, authority never is a synonym of reliability, and language is a system of communication behind which structures of power, misconceptions, lies, and treacherous tides easily hide.

The pragmatics of computer-mediated communication between South African and Mexican drug traffickers

South Africa and Mexico are ripe with drug trafficking. The gangs and syndicates running the drug businesses in these two countries collaborate occasionally. Communication between these international drug business partners takes place on social media. Their main language of communication is English, mixed with some limited use of Spanish and Afrikaans. The key purpose of the interactions between the South African and Mexican parties is the organisation of their business activities. This study aims at examining how the drug traffickers position each other and themselves regarding their common business interest and how their relationship evolves throughout their interactions. Moreover, it is of interest to look at how these people make use of different social media and their affordances. For this a qualitative analysis of the interaction between two drug traffickers (one South African and one Mexican) on Facebook, Threema and PlayStation 4 was performed. Computer-mediated communication between these two main informants was studied at various stages of their relationship. Results show that at first the interaction between the South African and Mexican drug traffickers consists of interpersonal negotiations of power. The high risk of the drug business and gang/syndicate membership paired with intercultural frictions causes the two interlocutors to be extremely cautious and at the same time to mark their position. As their relationship develops and they gain trust in each other a shift to interpersonal negotiations of solidarity takes place. In these discursive practices diverse linguistic strategies are employed for creating relational effects and for positioning the other and the self. The discursive activities of the interactants are also identity practices. Thus, the two drug traffickers construct identities through these social practices, positioning and their interpersonal relationship.

The Impact of Individual-Level Cultural Perceptions on Entrepreneurial Behavior

Entrepreneurial intention scholars have increasingly been investigating the link between entrepreneurial intentions and behaviour. While a solid empirical link has been confirmed, there is still a lack of in-depth theorizing about the underlying conceptual mechanisms. We address this gap by arguing that individual-level perceptions of cultural practices moderate the relationship between entrepreneurial intentions and behaviour. Investigating a longitudinal sample of 1’511 individuals from 13 countries reveals negative moderation effects of perceptions of power distance and collectivism in society and thus confirms our theorizing. This study provides valuable contributions to literatures of entrepreneurship and international business.

The role of the G20 in WTO governance

Report by Professor Sungjoon Cho, Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law (Chair), and Charlotte Sieber-Gasser, Doctoral Research Fellow, World Trade Institute, University of Bern, Session 27, WTO Public Forum 2010: The Forces Shapping World Trade, pp.29-33. In the course of the financial crisis, the global geography of power has shifted from G8 to G20. The latter, although representing roughly two thirds of global trade, consists of relatively a small number of global players and is consequently excluding many others from decision-making at the international stage. Nevertheless, the G20 has been successful in its reaction to the financial crisis and became therewith an important new player within the international community. When highlighting how the G20 might interfere with the WTO, the panel voiced concerns over the political legitimacy of the G20, given the limited number of members and the global impact of its decisions. It agreed on the impression that although the G20 intends to extend its debates from the financial sector to world economy in general, it has so far little achieved in this direction, particularly when it comes to moving the Doha agenda forward. It remains, thus, open how the G20 will evolve in the coming few years, and what mandates it will shed or adopt. So far, the G20 has complemented the WTO and international financial institutions in handling the financial crisis. Yet, even if there is little evidence pointing towards a less cooperative role in the future, the desirability of a G20 commitment in WTO trade negotiations has yet to be debated. The panel concluded by providing ideas on how the potential of the G20 might be used to serve global interests even better in the future. In their concluding remarks, the panellists agreed that it remains to be seen whether or not the G20 will further broaden its agenda. Given the ebbing away of the financial crisis there is even the question whether the G20 will remain an important international forum for financial collaboration, or whether it has already served its cause and will eventually disappear from the international stage. The Chair concluded the well attended and lively panel with voicing the hope that the two international bodies – the G20 and the WTO – will work in a positive way together in the future and face the challenges and opportunities in their collaboration to the benefit of everyone.