Desenvolupament d’una biblioteca per a la generació de diagrames vectorials basat en l’entorn gràfic de JAVA2D i aplicació d’aquesta biblioteca per a la implementació d’una eina per al desenvolupament de diagrames d’E/R

En aquest projecte es vol implementar una llibreria en Java, que proporcioni leseines necessàries per a crear diagrames i esquemes. Es vol proporcionar a la llibreria unconjunt d’objectes bàsics, també mètodes i funcionalitats suficients per a gestionaraquests objectes. Per altra part, es vol implementar una aplicació per a dissenyar diagrames Entitat-Relació que utilitzi aquesta llibreria

Investigation of County Treasurers' Tax-Sale Registration Fees, June 2007

On January 2, 2007, the Ombudsman received a complaint regarding the fee that county treasurers charge registrants at annual tax sales. The complainant said generally that many of the state’s counties, especially larger ones, appeared to be charging higher fees than was thought to be allowed by law. Investigation The investigation was conducted by Assistant Ombudsman Bert Dalmer. For purposes of this report, all investigative actions are ascribed to the Ombudsman. In early 2007, the Ombudsman surveyed tax-sale registration fees in 10 of the state’s 99 counties. Interviews of 10 county treasurers and/or some of their deputies were conducted. In addition, the Ombudsman researched the Iowa Code and relevant case law. The Ombudsman also consulted with the Iowa State Auditor and the president of the Iowa State County Treasurers Association.

Yhdysvaltain Presidentti Gerald R. Ford 18/11 1975

Kirje 18.11.1975

Le voyage de la France à S. Germain, avec ses plaintes à la Reine, contre le cardinal Mazarin. Et ses prières pour la Paix, & le retour de leurs Majestez à Paris, par L. B. E. S. D. G. M. O. D. R.

[Mazarinade. 1649]

Le voyage de la France à S. Germain, avec ses plaintes à la Reine, contre le cardinal Mazarin. Et ses prières pour la Paix, & le retour de leurs Majestez à Paris, par L. B. E. S. D. G. M. O. D. R.

[Mazarinade. 1649]

Managerial incentives for mergers

We study managerial incentives in a model where managers take notonly product market but also takeover decisions. We show that the optimalcontract includes an incentive to increase the firm's sales, under bothquantity and price competition. This result is in contrast to the previousliterature and hinges on the fact that with a more aggressive manager rivalfirms earn lower profits and are willing to sell out at a lower price. \\However, as a side--effect of such a contract, the manager might take overmore rivals than would be profitable.