The paradox of social resilience:how cognitive strategies and coping mechanisms attenuate and accentuate resilience

This paper examines two concepts, social vulnerability and social resilience, often used to describe people and their relationship to a disaster. Social vulnerability is the exposure to harm resulting from demographic and socioeconomic factors that heighten the exposure to disaster. Social resilience is the ability to avoid disaster, cope with change and recover from disaster. Vulnerability to a space and social resilience through society is explored through a focus on the elderly, a group sometimes regarded as having low resilience while being particularly vulnerable. Our findings explore the degree to which an elderly group exposed to coastal flood risk exhibits social resilience through both cognitive strategies, such as risk perception and self-perception, as well as through coping mechanisms, such as accepting change and self-organisation. These attenuate and accentuate the resilience of individuals through their own preparations as well as their communities' preparations and also contribute to the delusion of resilience which leads individuals to act as if they are more resilient than they are in reality, which we call negative resilience. Thus, we draw attention to three main areas: the degree to which social vulnerability can disguise its social resilience; the role played by cognitive strategies and coping mechanisms on an individual's social resilience; and the high risk aspects of social resilience. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Crisis communication and social media : the changing environment for natural disaster response

Over the past two years there have been several large-scale disasters (Haitian earthquake, Australian floods, UK riots, and the Japanese earthquake) that have seen wide use of social media for disaster response, often in innovative ways. This paper provides an analysis of the ways in which social media has been used in public-to-public communication and public-to-government organisation communication. It discusses four ways in which disaster response has been changed by social media: 1. Social media appears to be displacing the traditional media as a means of communication with the public during a crisis. In particular social media influences the way traditional media communication is received and distributed. 2. We propose that user-generated content may provide a new source of information for emergency management agencies during a disaster, but there is uncertainty with regards to the reliability and usefulness of this information. 3. There are also indications that social media provides a means for the public to self-organise in ways that were not previously possible. However, the type and usefulness of self-organisation sometimes works against efforts to mitigate the outcome of the disaster. 4. Social media seems to influence information flow during a disaster. In the past most information flowed in a single direction from government organisation to public, but social media negates this model. The public can diffuse information with ease, but also expect interaction with Government Organisations rather than a simple one-way information flow. These changes have implications for the way government organisations communicate with the public during a disaster. The predominant model for explaining this form of communication, the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC), was developed in 2005 before social media achieved widespread popularity. We will present a modified form of the CERC model that integrates social media into the disaster communication cycle, and addresses the ways in which social media has changed communication between the public and government organisations during disasters.

Crisis communication and social media:the changing environment for natural disaster response

Over the past two years there have been several large-scale disasters (Haitian earthquake, Australian floods, UK riots, and the Japanese earthquake) that have seen wide use of social media for disaster response, often in innovative ways. This paper provides an analysis of the ways in which social media has been used in public-to-public communication and public-to-government organisation communication. It discusses four ways in which disaster response has been changed by social media: 1. Social media appears to be displacing the traditional media as a means of communication with the public during a crisis. In particular social media influences the way traditional media communication is received and distributed. 2. We propose that user-generated content may provide a new source of information for emergency management agencies during a disaster, but there is uncertainty with regards to the reliability and usefulness of this information. 3. There are also indications that social media provides a means for the public to self-organise in ways that were not previously possible. However, the type and usefulness of self-organisation sometimes works against efforts to mitigate the outcome of the disaster. 4. Social media seems to influence information flow during a disaster. In the past most information flowed in a single direction from government organisation to public, but social media negates this model. The public can diffuse information with ease, but also expect interaction with Government Organisations rather than a simple one-way information flow. These changes have implications for the way government organisations communicate with the public during a disaster. The predominant model for explaining this form of communication, the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC), was developed in 2005 before social media achieved widespread popularity. We will present a modified form of the CERC model that integrates social media into the disaster communication cycle, and addresses the ways in which social media has changed communication between the public and government organisations during disasters.

The core executive's approach to regulation:from 'better regulation' to 'risk-tolerant deregulation'

This article examines changes in the New Labour core executive’s approach to regulation and its relationship with risk, through analysing documentary, legislative and press sources concerning approaches to regulatory decision-making. It claims that an initial commitment to ‘better regulation’ has gradually been replaced by explicit support for deregulation. A reduction in the scope of regulation was also promoted by the Thatcher and Major governments. The New Labour core executive shares previous (Conservative) administrations’ concern to include business in deregulatory decision-making. However, the article claims that there is one significant difference in the New Labour deregulatory approach: a new toleration of risk. Deregulation is, now, described as a corrective to regulators’ over-reactions to perceived risks, which, it is claimed, are holding back economic and technological progress. However, this new approach excludes competing views concerning how risk should be regulated. In particular, it does not engage with widespread popular views that governments should continue to protect against risk.

Resilience and adaptation of small and medium-sized enterprises to flood risk

Purpose – The UK has experienced a number of flood events in recent years, and the intensity and frequency of such events are forecast to further increase in future due to changing climatic conditions. Accordingly, enhancing the resilience of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – which form an important segment in a society – to flood risk, has emerged as an important issue. However, SMEs often tend to underestimate the risk of flooding which tends to have a low priority in their business agenda. The purpose of this paper is to undertake an investigation of adaptation to the risk of flooding considering community-level measures, individual-level property protection, and business continuity and resilience measures. Design/methodology/approach – A total of four short case studies were conducted among SMEs to identify their response to flood risk, and what measures have been undertaken to manage the risk of flooding. Findings – It was observed that SMEs have implemented different property-level protection measures and generic business continuity/risk management measures, based on their requirements, to achieve a desired level of protection. Practical implications – SMEs are likely to positively respond to property-level adaptation following a post-flood situation. It is important that information such as costs/benefits of such measures and different options available are made accessible to SMEs affected by a flood event. Social implications – Implementation of property-level adaptation measures will contribute towards the long term adaptation of the existing building stock to changing climatic conditions. Originality/value – The paper contributes towards policy making on flood risk adaptation and SME decision making, and informs policy makers and practitioners.

Reporting and managing risk:a look at current practice at Tesco, RBS, local and central government

These case studies from CIMA highlight the need to embed risk management within more easily understood behaviours, consistent with the overall organisational culture. In each case, some form of internal audit team provides either an oversight function or acts as an expert link in that feedback loop. Frontline staff, managers and specialists should be completely aligned on risk, in part just to ensure that there is a consistency of approach. They should understand instinctively that good performance includes good risk management. Tesco has continued to thrive during the recession and remains a robust and efficient group of businesses despite the emergence of potential threats around consumer spending and the supply chain. RBS, by contrast, has suffered catastrophic and very public failures of risk management despite a large in-house function and stiff regulation of risk controls. Birmingham City Council, like all local authorities, is adapting to more commercial modes of operation and is facing diverse threats and opportunities emerging as a result of social change. And DCMS, like many other public sector organisations, has to handle an incredibly complex network of delivery partners within the context of a relatively recent overhaul of central government risk management processes. Key Findings: •Risk management is no longer solely a financial discipline, nor is it simply a concern for the internal control function. •Where organisations retain a discrete risk management cadre – often specialists at monitoring and evaluating a range of risks – their success is dependent on embedding risk awareness in the wider culture of the enterprise. •Risk management is most successful when it is explicitly linked to operational performance. •Clear leadership, specific goals, excellent influencing skills and open-mindedness to potential threats and opportunities are essential for effective risk management. •Bureaucratic processes and systems can hamper good risk management – either as a result of a ‘box-ticking mentality’ or because managers and staff believe they do not need to consider risk themselves.