Corrigendum to "On randomized matching mechanisms" [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381]

Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''

Una estimación del coste marginal en bienestar del sistema impositivo en España

Actual tax systems do not follow the normative recommendations of yhe theory of optimal taxation. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the informational difficulties of knowing or estimating all relevant elasticities and parameters. Secondly, the political complexities that would arise if a new tax implementation would depart too much from current systems that are perceived as somewhat egalitarians. Hence an ex-novo overhaul of the tax system might just be non-viable. In contrast, a small marginal tax reform could be politically more palatable to accept and economically more simple to implement. The goal of this paper is to evaluate, as a step previous to any tax reform, the marginal welfare cost of the current tax system in Spain. We do this by using a computational general equilibrium model calibrated to a point-in-time micro database. The simulations results show that the Spanish tax system gives rise to a considerable marginal excess burden. Its order of magnitude is of about 0.50 money units for each additional money unit collected through taxes.

Convergence across countries and regions: theory and empirics

This paper surveys the recent literature on convergence across countries and regions. I discuss the main convergence and divergence mechanisms identified in the literature and develop a simple model that illustrates their implications for income dynamics. I then review the existing empirical evidence and discuss its theoretical implications. Early optimism concerning the ability of a human capital-augmented neoclassical model to explain productivity differences across economies has been questioned on the basis of more recent contributions that make use of panel data techniques and obtain theoretically implausible results. Some recent research in this area tries to reconcile these findings with sensible theoretical models by exploring the role of alternative convergence mechanisms and the possible shortcomings of panel data techniques for convergence analysis.

Venture capital meets contract theory: risky claims or formal control?

This paper develops a theory of the joint allocation of formal control and cash-flow rights in venture capital deals. We argue that when the need for investor support calls for very high-powered outside claims, entrepreneurs should optimally retain formal control in order to avoid excessive interference. Hence, we predict that risky claims should be be negatively correlated to control rights, both along the life of a start-up and across deals. This challenges the idea that risky claims should a ways be associated to more formal control, and is in line with contractual terms increasingly used in venture capital, in corporate venturing and in partnership deals between biotech start-ups and large drug companies. The paper provides a theoretical explanation to some puzzling evidence documented in Gompers (1997) and Kaplan and Stromberg (2000), namely the inclusion in venture capital contracts of contingencies that trigger both a reduction in VC control and the conversion! of her preferred stocks into common stocks.

Political institutions and the development of telecommunications

It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries' political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and offer policy implications for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development. Keywords: Political constraints, telecommunications, GMM, economic development. JEL codes: O1, O3.

Where Has the Old Debate Gone? Realism, Institutionalism, and IR Theory

This paper resorts to the contribution of the science philosopher Gerald Holton to map some of the IR arguments and debates in an unconventional and more insightful way. From this starting point, it is sustained that the formerly all-pervading neorealism-neoinstitutionalism debate has lost its appeal and is attracting less and less interest among scholars. It does not structure the approach of the theoretically-oriented authors any more; at least, not with the habitual intensity. More specifically, we defend that the neo-neo rapprochement, even if it could have demonstrated that international cooperation is possible and relevant in a Realist world, it has also impoverished theoretical debate by hiding some of the most significant issues that preoccupied classical transnationalists. Hence, some authors appear to be trying to rescue some of these arguments in an analytical and systematic fashion, opening up a theoretical querelle that may be the next one to pay attention to.