Sēfer Aḥarît hay-yāmîm : eine kurtzgefasṭe erklerung iber di tzaiṭ fon bias mašiaḥ ha-goel tzedek fon toire neviim u-ktuvim

ferfast und heroisgegeben fon Binjamin Zeev Ingus

Brain systems underlying encounter expectancy bias in spider phobia.

Spider-phobic individuals are characterized by exaggerated expectancies to be faced with spiders (so-called encounter expectancy bias). Whereas phobic responses have been linked to brain systems mediating fear, little is known about how the recruitment of these systems relates to exaggerated expectancies of threat. We used fMRI to examine spider-phobic and control participants while they imagined visiting different locations in a forest after having received background information about the likelihood of encountering different animals (spiders, snakes, and birds) at these locations. Critically, imagined encounter expectancies modulated brain responses differently in phobics as compared with controls. Phobics displayed stronger negative modulation of activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and visual cortex by encounter expectancies for spiders, relative to snakes or birds (within-participants analysis); these effects were not seen in controls. Between-participants correlation analyses within the phobic group further corroborated the hypothesis that these phobia-specific modulations may underlie irrationality in encounter expectancies (deviations of encounter expectancies from objective background information) in spider phobia; the greater the negative modulation a phobic participant displayed in the lateral prefrontal cortex, precuneus, and visual cortex, the stronger was her bias in encounter expectancies for spiders. Interestingly, irrationality in expectancies reflected in frontal areas relied on right rather than left hemispheric deactivations. Our data accord with the idea that expectancy biases in spider phobia may reflect deficiencies in cognitive control and contextual integration that are mediated by right frontal and parietal areas.

Varying expectancies and attention bias in phobic and non-phobic individuals.

Phobic individuals display an attention bias to phobia-related information and biased expectancies regarding the likelihood of being faced with such stimuli. Notably, although attention and expectancy biases are core features in phobia and anxiety disorders, these biases have mostly been investigated separately and their causal impact has not been examined. We hypothesized that these biases might be causally related. Spider phobic and low spider fearful control participants performed a visual search task in which they specified whether the deviant animal in a search array was a spider or a bird. Shorter reaction times (RTs) for spiders than for birds in this task reflect an attention bias toward spiders. Participants' expectancies regarding the likelihood of these animals being the deviant in the search array were manipulated by presenting verbal cues. Phobics were characterized by a pronounced and persistent attention bias toward spiders; controls displayed slower RTs for birds than for spiders only when spider cues had been presented. More important, we found RTs for spider detections to be virtually unaffected by the expectancy cues in both groups, whereas RTs for bird detections showed a clear influence of the cues. Our results speak to the possibility that evolution has formed attentional systems that are specific to the detection of phylogenetically salient stimuli such as threatening animals; these systems may not be as penetrable to variations in (experimentally induced) expectancies as those systems that are used for the detection of non-threatening stimuli. In sum, our findings highlight the relation between expectancies and attention engagement in general. However, expectancies may play a greater role in attention engagement in safe environments than in threatening environments.

Evidence for an encounter expectancy bias in fear of spiders.

Whereas research has demonstrated that phobic or fearful individuals overestimate the likelihood of incurring aversive consequences from an encounter with feared stimuli, it has not yet been systematically investigated whether these individuals also overestimate the likelihood (i.e., the frequency) of such encounters. In the current study, spider-fearful and control participants were presented with background information that allowed them to estimate the overall likelihood that different kinds of animals (spiders, snakes, or birds) would be encountered. Spider-fearful participants systematically overestimated the likelihood of encountering a spider with respect to the likelihood of encountering a snake or a bird. No such expectancy bias was observed in control participants. The results thus strengthen our idea that there indeed exist two different types of expectancy bias in high fear and phobia that can be related to different components of the fear response. A conscientious distinction and examination of these two types of expectancy bias are of potential interest for therapeutic applications.

A consistent combination of GNSS and SLR with minimum constraints

In this article, the realization of a global terrestrial reference system (TRS) based on a consistent combination of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and Satellite Laser Ranging (SLR) is studied. Our input data consists of normal equation systems from 17 years (1994– 2010) of homogeneously reprocessed GPS, GLONASS and SLR data. This effort used common state of the art reduction models and the same processing software (Bernese GNSS Software) to ensure the highest consistency when combining GNSS and SLR. Residual surface load deformations are modeled with a spherical harmonic approach. The estimated degree-1 surface load coefficients have a strong annual signal for which the GNSS- and SLR-only solutions show very similar results. A combination including these coefficients reduces systematic uncertainties in comparison to the singletechnique solution. In particular, uncertainties due to solar radiation pressure modeling in the coefficient time series can be reduced up to 50 % in the GNSS+SLR solution compared to the GNSS-only solution. In contrast to the ITRF2008 realization, no local ties are used to combine the different geodetic techniques.We combine the pole coordinates as global ties and apply minimum constraints to define the geodetic datum. We show that a common origin, scale and orientation can be reliably realized from our combination strategy in comparison to the ITRF2008.

Controlling for culture-specific response bias using ipsatization and response style indicators: Family orientation in seventeen cultures and two generations

Within-subject standardization (ipsatization) has been advocated as a possible means to control for culture-specific responding (e.g., Fisher, 2004). However, the consequences of different kinds of ipsatization procedures for the interpretation of mean differences remain unclear. The current study compared several ipsatization procedures with ANCOVA-style procedures using response style indicators for the construct of family orientation with data from 14 cultures and two generations from the Value-of-Children-(VOC)-Study (4135 dyads). Results showed that within-subject centering/standardizing across all Likert-scale items of the comprehensive VOC-questionnaire removed most of the original cross-cultural variation in family orientation and lead to a non-interpretable pattern of means in both generations. Within-subject centering/standardizing using a subset of 19 unrelated items lead to a decrease to about half of the original effect size and produced a theoretically meaningful pattern of means. A similar effect size and similar mean differences were obtained when using a measure of acquiescent responding based on the same set of items in an ANCOVA-style analysis. Additional models controlling for extremity and modesty performed worse, and combinations did not differ from the acquiescence-only model. The usefulness of different approaches to control for uniform response styles (scalar equivalence not given) in cross- cultural comparisons is discussed.

Neuroanatomy of intergroup bias: A white matter microstructure study of individual differences

Intergroup bias - the tendency to behave more positively towards an ingroup member than an outgroup member - is a powerful social force, for good and ill. And though it is widely demonstrated, intergroup bias is not universal, as it is characterized by significant individual differences. Recently, attention has begun to turn to whether neuroanatomy might explain these individual differences in intergroup bias. However, no research to date has examined whether white matter microstructure could help determine differences in behavior towards ingroup and outgroup members. In the current research, we examine intergroup bias with the third-party punishment paradigm and white matter integrity and connectivity strength as determined by diffusion tensor imaging (DTI). We found that both increased white matter integrity at the right temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) and connectivity strength between the right TPJ and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) were associated with increased impartiality in the third-party punishment paradigm, i.e., reduced intergroup bias. Further, consistent with the role that these brain regions play in the mentalizing network, we found that these effects were mediated by mentalizing processes. Participants with greater white matter integrity at the right TPJ and connectivity strength between the right TPJ and the DMPFC employed mentalizing processes more equally for ingroup and outgroup members, and this non-biased use of mentalizing was associated with increased impartiality. The current results help shed light on the mechanisms of bias and, potentially, on interventions that promote impartiality over intergroup bias.

Minimum count sums for charcoalconcentration estimates in pollen slides: accuracy and potential errors

Charcoal particles in pollen slides are often abundant, and thus analysts are faced with the problem of setting the minimum counting sum as small as possible in order to save time. We analysed the reliability of charcoal-concentration estimates based on different counting sums, using simulated low-to high-count samples. Bootstrap simulations indicate that the variability of inferred charcoal concentrations increases progressively with decreasing sums. Below 200 items (i.e., the sum of charcoal particles and exotic marker grains), reconstructed fire incidence is either too high or too low. Statistical comparisons show that the means of bootstrap simulations stabilize after 200 counts. Moreover, a count of 200-300 items is sufficient to produce a charcoal-concentration estimate with less than+5% error if compared with high-count samples of 1000 items for charcoal/marker grain ratios 0.1-0.91. If, however, this ratio is extremely high or low (> 0.91 or < 0.1) and if such samples are frequent, we suggest that marker grains are reduced or added prior to new sample processing.

Hindsight bias in gustatory judgments

Being in hindsight, people tend to overestimate what they had known in foresight. This phenomenon has been studied for a wide variety of knowledge domains (e.g., episodes with uncertain outcomes, or solutions to almanac questions). As a result of these studies, hindsight bias turned out to be a robust phenomenon. In this paper, we present two experiments that successfully extended the domain of hindsight bias to gustatory judgments. Participants tasted different food items and were asked to estimate the quantity of a certain ingredient, for example, the residual sugar in a white wine. Judgments in both experiments were systematically biased towards previously presented low or high values that were labeled as the true quantities. Thus, hindsight bias can be considered a phenomenon that extends well beyond the judgment domains studied so far.

Denying the foreseeability of an event as a means of self-protection. The Impact of Self-Threatening Outcome Information on the Strength of the Hindsight Bias

The hindsight bias represents the tendency of people to falsely believe that they would have predicted the outcome of an event, once the outcome is known. Two experiments will be presented that show a reduction or even reversal of the hindsight bias when the outcome information is self-threatening for the participants. Participants read a report of an interaction between a man and a woman that ended with different outcomes: The woman was raped vs. the woman was not raped vs. no outcome information was given. Results of the first experiment indicated that especially female participants, who did not accept rape myths, showed a reversed hindsight bias, when they received the rape outcome information. The more threatening the rape outcome had been, the lower was their estimated likelihood of rape. Results of the second experiment confirmed those of the first. Female participants, who did not accept rape myths and perceived themselves highly similar to the victim, showed a strong reversed hindsight bias, when threatened by the rape outcome, whereas female participants, who did believe in rape myth and were not similar to the victim, showed a classical hindsight bias. These effects were interpreted in terms of self-serving or in-group serving functions of the hindsight bias: Participants deny the foreseeability of a self-threatening outcome as a means of self-protection even if they are not personally affected by the negative information, but a member of their group.

Exculpating victims and the reversal of hindsight bias

This experiment examines the role of the hindsight bias and of motivational forces such as the motive to believe in a just world as possible causes of the derogation of victims effect in the context of rape. The hindsight bias is the tendency of people to falsely believe that they would have predicted the outcome of an event once the outcome is known. Participants read descriptions of an interaction between a man and a woman that ended with one of four possible outcomes: The woman was raped with very severe consequences for her future life vs. rape with only minor consequences for her future life vs. no rape (assailant was forced to retreat by the strong defense of the victim) vs. no outcome information. To test motivational predictions the hindsight bias and the derogation effect were analyzed as a consequence of the sex of participants, the seriousness of the consequences of the rape, the belief in a just world and the acceptance of rape myths. Results supported the assumption that derogation effects are at least partly driven by hindsight bias and that motivational processes work via the hindsight bias. However, in this study we did not find a classical hindsight bias but a reversed hindsight bias: Especially female participants in the severe consequences of rape condition and those participants who did not accept rape myths rated the likelihood of rape in the rape outcome condition as smaller than participants in the no outcome information control group. They also derogated the victim less than participants in the no information control group. These effects were interpreted in terms of self-serving or in-group serving functions of the hindsight bias. Finally no support was found for the assumption that derogation effects are driven by the motive to believe in a just world.

Prior knowledge of the clinical picture does not introduce bias in the histopathologic diagnosis of melanocytic skin lesions

A common debate among dermatopathologists is that prior knowledge of the clinical picture of melanocytic skin neoplasms may introduce a potential bias in the histopathologic examination. Histologic slides from 99 melanocytic skin neoplasms were circulated among 10 clinical dermatologists, all of them formally trained and board-certified dermatopathologists: 5 dermatopathologists had clinical images available after a 'blind' examination (Group 1); the other 5 had clinical images available before microscopic examination (Group 2). Data from the two groups were compared regarding 'consensus' (a diagnosis in agreement by ≥4 dermatopathologists/group), chance-corrected interobserver agreement (Fleiss' k) and level of diagnostic confidence (LDC: a 1-5 arbitrary scale indicating 'increasing reliability' of any given diagnosis). Compared with Group 1 dermatopathologists, Group 2 achieved a lower number of consensus (84 vs. 90) but a higher k value (0.74 vs. 0.69) and a greater mean LDC value (4.57 vs. 4.32). The same consensus was achieved by the two groups in 81/99 cases. Spitzoid neoplasms were most frequently controversial for both groups. The histopathologic interpretation of melanocytic neoplasms seems to be not biased by the knowledge of the clinical picture before histopathologic examination.