Translations of the Ottoman constitutional laws: the Wilayet Administrative Law, the Municipal Law and various other laws

Ottoman constitutional law of the 7th Dhil Hujjah, 1293 AH [December 24, 1876 AD] as amended. -- Regulations of the Chamber of deputies. -- Regulations of the Senate. -- Provisional law of administration of wilayets of the 13th March, 1329 AH [March 26, 1913 AD] as amended. -- Municipal law of the 27th Ramadhan, 1294 AH [October 5, 1877 AD] as amended. -- Law regulating chambers of commerce and industry, dated the 31st May, 1326 AH [June 13, 1910 AD]. -- Provisional law of expropriation on behalf of municipalities dated the 21st Kanun Thani, 1329 AH [February 3, 1914 AD]. -- Regulations of expropriation for public purposes, dated the 24th Tashrin Thani, 1295 AH [December 6, 1879 AD] as amended. -- The Press law of the 16th Tamuz, 1325 AH [July 29, 1910 AD] as amended.

Community dynamics of stabilized dune xerophytic shrubs

Tese de doutoramento, Biologia (Ecologia), Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Ciências, 2016

The Member States’ Initiatives: An Inter-Institutional Turf War after the Treaty of Lisbon

With the introduction of the Treaty of Lisbon came the possibility for Member States to launch an initiative under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure. This came into being as the scope of co-decision was expanded to cover the more sensitive issues of the third pillar (such as judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation). It was considered necessary that Member States have a shared right of initiative with the European Commission. One case in which the right of initiative was invoked was the Initiative for a European Protection Order (EPO). This dossier is one of the first and few cases in which the Member States’ Initiative after the Treaty of Lisbon was used. It resulted in a turf war between the Presidency and the Commission regarding the scope of the Member States’ Initiatives. This article looks into the Member States’ Initiative as it was introduced after the Treaty of Lisbon and the debate that took place on the EPO.

Who calls the shots in the committees of the new European Parliament? CEPS Special Report No. 97, 21 November 2014

This CEPS Special Report analyses the composition of the 20 committees in the new European Parliament and how representative they are of the 28 member states, identifying which policy areas or committees are of particular interest to MEPs from certain countries. It also examines the allocation of committee chairs and party coordinator positions to assess whether the country of origin matters and if so, why. The study reveals that in general the countries’ share of representatives in the committees is very similar in most of the cases to their representation in Parliament. Still, some policy areas have a special relevance for some countries and attract their MEPs in larger numbers. Due to the procedure used in the allocation of the committee chairs, which favours the largest political groups and the largest national parties within them, MEPs from larger member states tend to hold most of these coveted positions. The internal process followed by the political groups in appointing their coordinators in the respective committees is predisposed towards MEPs with seniority, experience and good connections. All in all, the strategic relevance that national parties attach to these positions makes a difference.

Germany on Russia. Yes to links, no to rapprochement. OSW Point of View Number 39, March 2014

The German media have been correctly describing the atmosphere between the Chancellor's Office and the Kremlin as the chilliest in years. Various factors have laid bare the fact that the strategic partnership between Germany and Russia is at best currently undergoing a 'technical pause’: the underwhelming outcomes of the German-Russian intergovernmental consultations in the autumn of 2012 and of Chancellor Merkel's meeting with President Putin during the Hanover fair in the spring of 2013, as well as the way in which the EU dealt with the Cyprus debt issue and, finally, the support that Germany has extended to the anti-presidential protests in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the priorities of Germany's foreign and economic policy have changed considerably, not only as a result of the eurozone crisis, but also, even more importantly, because the attention of German business and politics has been shifting to the so-called neue Gestaltungsmächte, or new regional powers. German politicians increasingly believe that Russia should not be offered new methods or mechanisms of co-operation. Firstly, because the existing ones have not been fully utilised, and secondly, because Germany at this stage seems to have no idea of what the long-term strategy of co-operation with Putin's Russia should be.

Eastern Policy of the EU: the Visegrad Countries' Perspective. OSW Point of View, February 2003

1. After its enlargement, scheduled for 2004, the European Union will face a completely new situation at its eastern borders. This new situation calls for a new concept of the EU eastern activities, i.e. for development of the new Eastern Policy of the EU. 2. Due to a number of specific features such as geographical location, closeness of ties, direct risk factors etc., the Visegrad countries will and should be particularly interested in the process of formulating the new EU Eastern Policy. Consequently, they should be the co-makers of this policy. 3. The new EU Eastern Policy should differ fundamentally from the Union's traditional eastern relations. Firstly, its scope should not cover the entire CIS area: instead, the policy should focus on some of the European successor states of the former Soviet Union, namely Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, as well as Moldova, following the accession of Romania. It does not seem advisable to exclude the Russian Federation from this policy and to develop and implement a separate policy towards it. The new Eastern Policy should be an autonomous component and one of the most important elements in the overall foreign policy of the EU. 4. Secondly, the new Eastern Policy should be founded on the following two pillars: a region-oriented strategy, which could be called the Eastern Dimension, and reshaped strategies for individual countries. The Eastern Dimension should set up a universal framework of co-operation, defining its basic mechanisms and objectives. These should include: the adaptation assistance programme, JHA, transborder co-operation, social dialogue and transport infrastructures. The approach, however, should be kept flexible, taking into account the specific situation of each country. This purpose should be served by keeping in place the existing bilateral institutional contacts between the EU and each of its eastern neighbours, and by developing a national strategy for each neighbour.

Gazprom's expansion in the EU - co-operation or domination? OSW Report, April 2008

The energy sector, especially with regard to natural gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the character of this co-operation has given rise to increasing doubts both in Brussels and among the EU member states. The questions have emerged whether this co-operation does not make the EU excessively dependent on Russian energy supplies, and whether Gazprom's presence in the EU will not allow Moscow to interfere in the proces of devising the EU energy policy. This report is intended to present the factual base and data necessary to provide accurate answers to the foregoing questions. The first part of the report presents the scope and character of Gazprom's economic presence in the EU member states. The second part shows the presence of the EU investors in Russia. The data presented has been provided by the International Energy Agency, European Commission, the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Federal State Statistics Service. Some of the data is the result of calculations made by the Centre for Eastern Studies' experts who were basing on the data provided by energy companies, the specialist press and news agencies.

Gazprom's expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? OSW Report, October 2009

The energy sector, especially with regard to the gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the form this co-operation has taken has been giving rise to some concern, both in Brussels and in the EU member states. Questions arise as to whether the EU has not become excessively dependent on Russia for energy, and whether the presence of the Russian gas monopoly in the EU does not enable Russian interference with the development of EU energy policy. The objective of this series of OSW reports (for the previous edition,see Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? April 2008 – pdf 1.2 MB) is to provide facts which will permit an accurat answer to these questions to be formulated.

Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? OSW Report, October 2009. Second edition, revised

Introduction. The energy sector, especially with regard to the gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the form this co-operation has taken has been giving rise to some concern, both in Brussels and in the EU member states. Questions arise as to whether the EU has not become excessively dependent on Russia for energy, and whether the presence of the Russian gas monopoly in the EU does not enable Russian interference with the development of EU energy policy. The objective of this series of OSW reports (for the previous edition,see Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? April 2008 – pdf 1.2 MB) is to provide facts which will permit an accurat answer to these questions to be formulated. Over the course of last year, two new factors strongly affected Gazprom’s capability to operate on the EU market. One was the ongoing global economic crisis, which has depressed demand for gas both in Russia and in Europe. Gazprom has cut both its own production and the quantities of gas it purchases from the Central Asian states, and the decrease in export revenues has forced the company to modify some of its current investment plans. Less demand for gas and the need to reduce production are also having a positive impact – the Russian company is likely to avoid the difficulties in meeting all of its export commitments which, only a year or so ago, it was expected to experience. The other factor affecting Gazprom’s expansion in Europe is the observed radicalisation of the rhetoric and actions of both the company itself and of the Russian authorities with regard to the gas sector as broadly understood. The gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009, which resulted in a two-week interruption of gas supplies from Russia to Europe via Ukraine, was the most prominent example of this radicalisation. The hardening of rhetoric in the ongoing energy talks with the EU and other actors, and increased political and business activities designed to promote Russian gas interests in Europe, in particular the lobbying for the Nord Stream and South Stream projects, are further signs of this shift in tone. These issues raise the question of whether, and to what extent, the current condition of Gazprom’s finance will permit the company to implement the infrastructural projects it has been endorsing and its other investment plans in Europe. Another important question is whether the currently observed changes in how Gazprom operates will take on a more permanent character, and what consequences this will have for the European Union. The first part of this report discusses Gazprom’s production and export potential. The second comprehensively presents the scope and nature of Gazprom’s economic presence in the EU member states. Finally, the third part presents the Russian company’s methods of operation on foreign markets. The data presented in the report come mainly from the statistics of the International Energy Agency, the European Commission and Gazprom, as well as the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Statistical Office. The figures presented here also include proprietary calculations by the OSW based on figures disclosed by energy companies and reports by professional press and news agencies.

Foreign policy at the service of modernisation: old wine in a new wineskin. OSW Commentary No. 39, 2010-08-31

Russia’s contacts with the external world over the past year have been characterised by a gradual improvement in its relations with the West, as well as the use of non-confrontational rhetoric, the most far-reaching example of which was the address President Dmitri Medvedev gave to Russian ambassadors this July. In an attempt to harmonise foreign policy with the widely propagated programme for the modernisation of Russia1 President Medvedev presented a vision of the Russian Federation as a responsible global power which is open to co-operation. According to this vision, Russian foreign policy would help to attract foreign investments and technologies. The West was presented as a partner, not a rival. Both this rhetoric and the atmosphere of co-operation in relations with the USA and the EU contrast with the assertive and aggressive Russian policy which was symbolised by and culminated in the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008. The changes observed in Russian foreign policy are quite limited, and are not constructing a new external strategy. Those changes are rather an attempt to find more efficient ways to implement old strategic goals. The new image of a responsible global power is inconsistent, and Russian policy is still assertive and geopolitically motivated. Although a new rhetoric is really in place, the Russian political elite’s perception of their country’s place and role in the contemporary international order remains unchanged. Moscow’s readiness to become engaged in genuine co-operation with the West has not increased significantly; it is still to a great extent declarative in nature.

The oligarchic democracy: The influence of business groups on Ukrainian politics. OSW Study 42/2012

The Ukrainian oligarchic system, which developed into its ultimate shape during Leonid Kuchma’s second presidency, turned out to be very durable. The nature of close relations between the government and the oligarchs has not undergone any major changes either as a consequence of the Orange Revolution or following Victor Yanukovych’s victory in the presidential election of 2010. Although reshuffles have taken place inside the political and business elites, nothing seems to be able to change this system, at least in the medium term. This text is aimed at presenting the network of connections existing between big business and politics in Ukraine and at pointing to the key oligarchic groups and the political forces they support. A definite majority of papers concerning contemporary Ukrainian politics as a rule disregard or deal with this subject very superficially, while it is impossible to understand modern Ukraine without understanding a number of dependencies existing between the political and business elites there.

After the Euro Crisis: The President of Europe, A new paradigm for increasing legitimacy and effectiveness in the EU. EuropEos Commentary No. 12, 1 June 2012

The crisis in the eurozone– which became worse in Europe at the same time that the Lisbon Treaty entered in force at the end of 2009 – has presented the first test of the crisis management capabilities of the intergovernmental approach. As provided under the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council has been the true decision-making centre for the policies adopted in response to the financial crisis, with the Commission playing a technical role. This commentary finds, however, that this institutional set-up has been unsatisfactory and unable to overcome the three fundamental dilemmas of the integration process: the dilemma of veto power, the dilemma of enforcement of the agreements and the dilemma of decision-making legitimacy. While it remains to be seen whether the election of François Hollande as President of France signals the beginning of a new political cycle characterised by new ideas on the institutional future of the EU, if that were to materialise, this paper aims to contribute to the debate on those new ideas.

One money with several cycles? Evaluation of European business cycles using cluster analysis. ACES Cases No. 2009.3

Optimal currency area theory suggests that business cycle comovement is a sufficient condition for monetary union, particularly if there are low levels of labour mobility between potential members of the monetary union. Previous studies of co-movement of business cycle variables (mainly authored by Artis and Zhang in the late 1990s) found that there was a core of member states in the EU that could be grouped together as having similar business cycle comovements, but these studies always used Germany as the country against which to compare. In this study, the analysis of Artis and Zhang is extended and updated but correlating against both German and euro area macroeconomic aggregates and using more recent techniques in cluster analysis, namely model-based clustering techniques.

How to reconcile the EU border paradox? The concurrence of refugee reception and deterrence. IES Policy Brief 2015/4, November 2015

The refugee crisis that unfolded in Europe in the summer of 2015 questions the effectiveness of European border and refugee policies. The breakdown of the Dublin and Schengen rules due to chaotic situations at the borders in the Balkans marks a critical juncture for the EU. We consider this breakdown as a consequence of a long-lasting co-operation crisis among EU Member States. The most recent Council decision responds to this co-operation crisis (Council Decision 12098/15). This Policy Brief analyses EU policy and politics and argues that plans for refugee relocation and reception centres as well as the use of qualified majority voting in the Council can unfold a dynamic that helps to solve the co-operation crisis. However, underlying the problems of co-operation and effectiveness is the EU’s border paradox: while EU border policy works towards refugee deterrence, EU asylum policy aims at refugee protection. The EU’s approach in regulating borders and asylum can be understood in terms of ‘organised hypocrisy’ (Brunsson, 1993). Reconciling the paradox calls for overcoming such hypocrisy.

Continuous CO2/CH4/CO measurements (2012–2014) at Beromünster tall tower station in Switzerland

The understanding of the continental carbon budget is essential to predict future climate change. In order to quantify CO₂ and CH₄ fluxes at the regional scale, a measurement system was installed at the former radio tower in Beromünster as part of the Swiss greenhouse gas monitoring network (CarboCount CH). We have been measuring the mixing ratios of CO₂, CH₄ and CO on this tower with sample inlets at 12.5, 44.6, 71.5, 131.6 and 212.5 m above ground level using a cavity ring down spectroscopy (CRDS) analyzer. The first 2-year (December 2012–December 2014) continuous atmospheric record was analyzed for seasonal and diurnal variations and interspecies correlations. In addition, storage fluxes were calculated from the hourly profiles along the tower. The atmospheric growth rates from 2013 to 2014 determined from this 2-year data set were 1.78 ppm yr⁻¹, 9.66 ppb yr⁻¹ and and -1.27 ppb yr⁻¹ for CO₂, CH₄ and CO, respectively. After detrending, clear seasonal cycles were detected for CO₂ and CO, whereas CH₄ showed a stable baseline suggesting a net balance between sources and sinks over the course of the year. CO and CO₂ were strongly correlated (r² > 0.75) in winter (DJF), but almost uncorrelated in summer. In winter, anthropogenic emissions dominate the biospheric CO₂ fluxes and the variations in mixing ratios are large due to reduced vertical mixing. The diurnal variations of all species showed distinct cycles in spring and summer, with the lowest sampling level showing the most pronounced diurnal amplitudes. The storage flux estimates exhibited reasonable diurnal shapes for CO₂, but underestimated the strength of the surface sinks during daytime. This seems plausible, keeping in mind that we were only able to calculate the storage fluxes along the profile of the tower but not the flux into or out of this profile, since no Eddy covariance flux measurements were taken at the top of the tower.