Marilyn Minter in dialague with post-pornography

This paper analyzes post-pornographic practices – an activist and theoretical movement that recognizes pornography as valuable in understanding social, cultural, and political systems that construct and reflect identity – through the work of American artist Marilyn Minter. The analysis contextualizes post-pornography and concludes with an examination of several of Minter’s recent paintings and photographs through a postpornographic lens to assert that these examples of her work explore sexuality and gender by incorporating aesthetic and ideological references to porn and by invoking the postpornographic tenets of collaboration, disruption of public space, and the inversion of heteronormativity. Creating art with Wangechi Mutu, displaying in Times Square high definition videos of lips that slurp green goo, and painting men garbed in lingerie constitute some of Minter’s endeavors, which reenvision pornographic relationships to authorship and agency, public versus private space, and the expression or repression of fantasy.

Between violent and non-violent action strategies: a study on extreme-right organizations in Italy and Spain. IHS Political Science Series No. 130, July 2012

This paper focuses on the different forms of action adopted by extreme right organizations (both political parties and non-party groups) in Italy and Spain during their recent mobilization and links them to the environmental conditions and internal organizational factors which might affect them. With particular attention paid to the actors’ perceptions of reality, the macro-level factors (such as the favourable or unfavourable political opportunities of the context, the availability of allies in power, the degree of repression by authorities, etc.) as well as the meso-level factors (such as the internal characteristics of extreme right groups and their dynamics) will be explored in order to understand the action strategies of extreme right organizations and their recourse to violence. This paper, drawing on a combination of qualitative and quantitative research techniques, will be based on 20 semi-structured interviews with extreme right representatives of the main right wing organizations in Italy and Spain as well as a protest event analysis of newspapers dating from 2005 to 2009.

Belarus 2006. OSW Report, January 2007

The presidential election of 19 March 2006, which Alyaksandr Lukashenka won, played an important role in developing the dictatorial political regime in Belarus. In order to ensure Lukashenka's victory, the authorities employed repressive and undemocratic methods, which since then have become permanent elements of the political system in Belarus. They included legal and administrative measures to limit the citizens' freedom, arbitrary ways of applying these measures, actions by the state security institutions intended to intimidate the public, a large-scale state propaganda campaign, and restrictions on civil liberties and freedom of speech. The presidential election strengthened Alyaksandr Lukashenka's political position, as the president extended his rule by another five years to 2011. It also reinforced the repression apparatus, consolidated the ruling group and ensured that the democrats remained marginalised. This has ensured the stability of the Belarusian regime and preserved the country's specific political and economic system.This report aims to present the situation in Belarus since the presidential election in March 2006. Part I, devoted to the internal situation, is a description of the internal political scene, i.e. the ruling camp and the opposition. It also includes a section on the prevailing moods in Belarusian society. Another section presents the economic situation in Belarus and the government's economic policy.Part II examines the foreign relations of Belarus, and consists of two sections: the first describes the Belarusian government's relations with Russia, its single most important foreign partner, and the second its relations with Western countries, i.e. the EU member states and NATO countries. Finally, the last part contains predictions of future developments in Belarus.

The internet in Russia: the cradle of civil society. OSW Commentary No. 72, 2012-03-21

In the last decade, along with economic and technological growth, Russia has seen a dynamic development of the internet. Today the net is an everyday tool of work, information and entertainment for 40% of Russians – the most educated, active and affluent part of the society. The spread of the internet (known in Russia as the Runet) has, in turn, brought about significant political and social consequences. With the political and social sphere in Russia strictly controlled by the government, most of this activity has moved to cyberspace. The internet has become an alternative to the state-controlled media, a site for the free exchange of views and a home to numerous social initiatives. In this way, it has become a school of citizenship for Russians, and a kind of ‘test tube’ that has spawned social and political activity. This activity went beyond cyberspace in the election period in 2011/2012, and turned into massive street protests. The potential of the internet has also been used by the Russian government, both to shape public opinion (via loyal online media) and to monitor civil initiatives, especially opposition ones. The state has many instruments of technical control and supervision of the internet and its users’ activity. This control was used in the election period 2011/2012, when selected sites were blocked and pressure exerted on independent websites. These actions were a warning sign from the government, aimed at discouraging internet users from any opposition activity. However, it does not seem feasible that any restriction of such activity can be effective. The scale of this activity is now enormous, and attempts to censor the net and resorting to repression against internet users on a wider scale would only fuel resentment towards the government.

The press and freedom of speech in Ukraine ahead of parliamentary elections. OSW Commentary No. 90, 2012-09-20

The independence of the mass media has been regularly restricted over the past two years in Ukraine. Following a period of relative freedom in 2005–2010, the scope of direct and indirect government control of the press has increased, cancelling out the achievements of the Orange Revolution in this area. The press in Ukraine is less and less able to perform its role as watchdog on the government and politicians and as a reliable source of information on the situation in the country to the public. This is mainly due to: (1) the concentration of the most important mass media in the hands of Ukraine’s most powerful oligarchs, whose business interests depend on the government; (2) the use of the press as instruments in political and business competition; (3) the ruling class’s subordination of the institutions which supervise the press; (4) repression used against media critical of the government and (5) the lack of an independent public broadcasting corporation. As a consequence, the press has hardly any impact on the political processes taking place ahead of the parliamentary election scheduled for 28 October. This is also an effect of a passiveness present in the Ukrainian public, who are tired of politics and are focused on social issues. Cases of abuse or corruption scandals revealed by the press do not provoke any response from the public and are rarely investigated by the public prosecution authorities. The more popular a given medium is, the more strongly it is controlled by the government. At present, television has to be recognised as the least reliable of the mass media. In turn, Internet news journals are characterised by the greatest pluralism but also have more limited accessibility. The political conditions in which the mass media operate in Ukraine lead to various forms of pathology. The most serious of them are censorship by the owners and self-censorship performed by journalists, and a great share of political advertorials. As the parliamentary election is approaching, the pathologies of the Ukrainian media market have been showing up with greater intensity.

Turbulence ahead: disputes within the Russian ruling elite are gathering force. OSW Commentary No. 91, 2012-09-27

The last month has seen a public confrontation between Igor Sechin, the president of Rosneft, and Arkady Dvorkovich, the deputy prime minister, concerning the consolidation of the energy sector. This is the latest in a series of disputes between the Kremlin & businessmen from Putin’s inner circle on one side, and the government & Prime Minister Medvedev on the other. These disputes have been wide-ranging in nature, concerning economic policy, the scope of competency of individual members of the elite, but also the ‘tough line’ adopted by the Kremlin since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency. The Kremlin, which is still the main decision-making centre in Russia, has been effectively forcing its opinions through in its short-term disputes with the government. However, a new element in the ongoing conflicts, which is unfavourable to President Putin, is their exceptional strength, their much more public nature, and their wide range (which has included criticism of the president himself) and ever-changing context, especially the worsening socio-economic situation. These conflicts have been overlapping with signs of dissent among Putin’s business supporters, and their declining political willingness to support the leader unconditionally. The Kremlin’s response to the unrest consists of intensifying efforts to discipline the elite and weakening those groups in which Vladimir Putin has limited confidence. The elite’s support is crucial to the stability of his government; to maintain this support, the Kremlin is ready to introduce restrictive and repressive actions against both parliamentarians and government officials. In the short term, such a policy will force the Kremlin’s supporters back into obedience, but fears of a further increase in repression are also starting to be expressed on the sidelines.

The prospects for the EU-Ukraine free trade agreement. OSW Commentary No. 94, 2012-10-15

The European Union and Ukraine initialled the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement (DCFTA) on 19 July 2012. The scope of the agreement which the EU and Ukraine reached following their negotiations is much more extensive than that of a typical free trade agreement. It envisages not only the lifting of tariff and extra-tariff barriers but also, more importantly, Kyiv adopting EU legal solutions and standards in this area. Whether the agreement will be signed and implemented is still an open question and depends on the existing political conditions. On the one hand, the repression imposed by the government in Kyiv on its political opponents (including the detention of the former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko) has provoked criticism from the EU, which refuses to sign the agreement if the government in Kyiv continues to violate democratic principles. The manner in which Ukraine’s parliamentary elections are conducted this October will be the key test. On the other hand, Russia is increasingly active in its efforts to involve Ukraine in the integration projects it has initiated (the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Community). It should be noted that Moscow has effective instruments to exert its will, such as the dependence of the Ukrainian economy on supplies of Russian oil and gas and on exports to the Russian market. Besides, Moscow also has political instruments at its disposal. It is impossible to participate in integration projects both with the EU and with Russia. Therefore, Kyiv will have to make a strategic decision and choose the direction of its economic integration. Unless Ukraine takes concrete action to implement its agreements with the EU, primarily including the free trade agreement, its economic dependence on Russia will grow, and it will be more likely to join the Russian integration projects.

Tunisia: Changes and Challenges of Political Transition. MEDPRO Technical Report No. 3/May 2011

For 23 years, a combination of harsh repression and impressive socio-economic development in Tunisia ensured a certain level of stability of Ben Ali’s regime. However, on 14 January 2011, after several weeks of anti-government protests, the President fled the country, revealing the fallacy of the ‘Tunisian model’. While the departure of Ben Ali is an important step towards Tunisia’s political change, the fate of its democratic transition remains uncertain. In light of these changes and challenges, this paper first assesses the factors underpinning the former stability of Ben Ali’s regime; it then investigates the causes of its underlying unsustainability, culminating in the anti-government popular uprising in December 2010-January 2011 and the removal of Ben Ali; finally the paper evaluates the prospects for a real democratic transition in Tunisia, by highlighting the main political and socio-economic challenges that confront the country

Morocco’s illiberal regime and fragmented political society. Arab Citizenship Review No. 10, October 2015

The post-Arab Spring period in Morocco has undergone different stages of changing state-society relations with regard to democracy, citizenship and human rights. The first stage, between February 2011 and the summer of 2013, was characterised by popular protests demanding democracy and freedom. People criticised public policies related to civil, political and social rights (employment, health, education, the status of women, and the issue of Amazigh). This outburst put the state in an awkward, defensive position. If we compare Morocco with the other Arab Spring countries, the Moroccan state’s reaction was moderate in its use of violence and repression, and it was positive, in that it resulted in the implicit, yet official acceptance of the demands for democracy, citizenship and battling corruption. In his speech on 9 March 2011, the king pledged to modify the Constitution and democratise the institutions.

Late Putin. The end of growth, the end of stability. OSW POINT OF VIEW #55, 2015-10-05

Since Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin as President in May 2012, the Russian system of power has become increasingly authoritarian, and has evolved towards a model of extremely personalised rule that derives its legitimacy from aggressive decisions in internal and foreign policy, escalates the use of force, and interferes increasingly assertively in the spheres of politics, history, ideology or even public morals. Putin’s power now rests on charismatic legitimacy to a much greater extent than it did during his first two presidential terms; currently the President is presented not only as an effective leader, but also as the sole guarantor of Russia’s stability and integrity. After 15 years of Putin’s rule, Russia’s economic model based on revenue from energy resources has exhausted its potential, and the country has no new model that could ensure continued growth for the economy. The Putinist system of power is starting to show symptoms of agony – it has been unable to generate new development projects, and has been compensating for its ongoing degradation by escalating repression and the use of force. However, this is not equivalent to its imminent collapse.

EU-Iran Relations after the Nuclear Deal.

The signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and global powers in July 2015 was a major turning point in the emerging strategic landscape of the Middle East. The ‘nuclear deal’ led to the lifting by the EU and the US of nuclear-related sanctions, and is now operational. Other sanctions remain in place, however. Nevertheless, unhindered by US competition, European trade delegations have entered into a latter-day gold rush, led by the promise of the biggest untapped market in the world. As such, the EU has both an opportunity and a responsibility to help Iran reintegrate properly into the international system. But, in the face of an opaque clerical regime that relies on internal repression and military business conglomerates, Europe stands to lose if it continues to pursue its uncalculated and uncoordinated approach towards the Islamic Republic. This report offers recommendations to guide the EU towards a comprehensive EU strategy for relations with Iran. It maintains that there is no other option but to keep universal values and the rule of law at the core of the emerging bilateral relationship. In fact, the protection of the economic rights of European traders and investors allows the EU to push for wider reforms and the normalisation of relations.

ABI1 and PP2CA Phosphatases Are Negative Regulators of Snf1-Related Protein Kinase1 Signaling in Arabidopsis

Plant survival under environmental stress requires the integration of multiple signaling pathways into a coordinated response, but the molecular mechanisms underlying this integration are poorly understood. Stress-derived energy deprivation activates the Snf1-related protein kinases1 (SnRK1s), triggering a vast transcriptional and metabolic reprogramming that restores homeostasis and promotes tolerance to adverse conditions. Here, we show that two clade A type 2C protein phosphatases (PP2Cs), established repressors of the abscisic acid (ABA) hormonal pathway, interact with the SnRK1 catalytic subunit causing its dephosphorylation and inactivation. Accordingly, SnRK1 repression is abrogated in double and quadruple pp2c knockout mutants, provoking, similarly to SnRK1 overexpression, sugar hypersensitivity during early seedling development. Reporter gene assays and SnRK1 target gene expression analyses further demonstrate that PP2C inhibition by ABA results in SnRK1 activation, promoting SnRK1 signaling during stress and once the energy deficit subsides. Consistent with this, SnRK1 and ABA induce largely overlapping transcriptional responses. Hence, the PP2C hub allows the coordinated activation of ABA and energy signaling, strengthening the stress response through the cooperation of two key and complementary pathways.

Dissection of miRNA Pathways Using Arabidopsis Mesophyll Protoplasts

MicroRNAs (miRNAs) control gene expression mostly post-transcriptionally by guiding transcript cleavage and/or translational repression of complementary mRNA targets, thereby regulating developmental processes and stress responses. Despite the remarkable expansion of the field, the mechanisms underlying miRNA activity are not fully understood. In this article, we describe a transient expression system in Arabidopsis mesophyll protoplasts, which is highly amenable for the dissection of miRNA pathways. We show that by transiently overexpressing primary miRNAs and target mimics, we can manipulate miRNA levels and consequently impact on their targets. Furthermore, we developed a set of luciferase-based sensors for quantifying miRNA activity that respond specifically to both endogenous and overexpressed miRNAs and target mimics. We demonstrate that these miRNA sensors can be used to test the impact of putative components of the miRNA pathway on miRNA activity, as well as the impact of specific mutations, by either overexpression or the use of protoplasts from the corresponding mutants. We further show that our miRNA sensors can be used for investigating the effect of chemicals on miRNA activity. Our cell-based transient expression system is fast and easy to set up, and generates quantitative results, being a powerful tool for assaying miRNA activity in vivo.

Complex genetic findings in a female patient with pyruvate dehydrogenase complex deficiency: Null mutations in the PDHX gene associated with unusual expression of the testis-specific PDHA2 gene in her somatic cells

Human pyruvate dehydrogenase complex (PDC) catalyzes a key step in the generation of cellular energy and is composed by three catalytic elements (E1, E2, E3), one structural subunit (E3-binding protein), and specific regulatory elements, phosphatases and kinases (PDKs, PDPs). The E1α subunit exists as two isoforms encoded by different genes: PDHA1 located on Xp22.1 and expressed in somatic tissues, and the intronless PDHA2 located on chromosome 4 and only detected in human spermatocytes and spermatids. We report on a young adult female patient who has PDC deficiency associated with a compound heterozygosity in PDHX encoding the E3-binding protein. Additionally, in the patient and in all members of her immediate family, a full-length testis-specific PDHA2 mRNA and a 5′UTR-truncated PDHA1 mRNA were detected in circulating lymphocytes and cultured fibroblasts, being bothmRNAs translated into full-length PDHA2 and PDHA1 proteins, resulting in the co-existence of both PDHA isoforms in somatic cells.Moreover, we observed that DNA hypomethylation of a CpG island in the coding region of PDHA2 gene is associatedwith the somatic activation of this gene transcription in these individuals. This study represents the first natural model of the de-repression of the testis-specific PDHA2 gene in human somatic cells, and raises some questions related to the somatic activation of this gene as a potential therapeutic approach for most forms of PDC deficiency.

Violencia e invisibilidad indígena : La cuestión de los pueblos originarios durante el primer peronismo

El presente trabajo busca profundizar en el análisis de los vínculos existentes entre el primer gobierno peronista y la cuestión indígena, centrándose en las políticas gubernamentales desarrolladas por el gobierno de Perón frente a dos fuertes conflictos violentos que tuvieron lugar entre 1946 y 1947: el "Malón de la paz", la movilización indígena llevada a cabo entre mayo y agosto de 1947, cuando 174 kollas caminaron 2000 kilómetros desde la Puna y el valle de Orán hasta la Capital Federal para reclamar por la titularidad de sus tierras, en manos de terratenientes y en denuncia de las condiciones de explotación en las que trabajaban; y "Masacre de Rincón Bomba", el conflicto desarrollado en una pequeña localidad de Formosa, cuando indígenas de comunidades wichi, tobas y principalmente pilagás fueron masacradas por la Gendarmería Nacional en un confuso episodio, que sale a la luz hace pocos años. El objetivo en ambos puntos es doble: por un lado analizar la relación entre los intereses e intenciones del gobierno de Juan Domingo Perón para con las comunidades originarias, visibilizando su existencia y sus condiciones de vida en tanto sujetos de derechos históricamente vulnerados. Por otro, abrir el debate historiográfico sobre el quehacer de los historiadores respecto de una temática que ha sido silenciada durante décadas, negando la existencia y la identidad de los pueblos originarios