Some features of the law and order model in Spain

This research is based on the hypothesis that law and order model is displacing the procedura justice system in Spain. After a thorough review of the international literature, one can observe that the traditional structure of the penal system does not seem to be capable of containing the new forms of crime. The new penal model assumes that public opinion is alarmed and unwilling to understand rational approaches to crime, so it will be likely to accept measures aimed at calming the fear of crime, through extensive control policies and penal tools to manage uncivil behavior. Objectives and methodology A measuring instrument has been developed to confirm this hypothesis, consisting of ten features that characterize the law and order model. This instrument has been used to identify examples of its ten features in the rules and practices developed at each phase of the Spanish criminal justice system. The analysis has focused specifically on public discourse about delinquency, criminal policy decisions, legislative processes, police routines, judicial dynamics, and prison system practices. Main results The investigation has shown that there are many processes and practices indicating that the law and order model is consolidating itself in the Spanish penal system. Nevertheless this process has a different intensity at each phase, being stronger at the legislative stage and softer in the penitentiary enforcement phase. One of the main conclusions is, therefore, that the designed instrument is ideal for measuring the degree of penetration of the model throughout the system. Some of the most striking results of the reasearch will be presented at the conference. Finally, proposals arise that could prevent the new model is fully seated in our criminal justice system, finding that the trend toward more severe penalties shown already unsustainable.

Excessive criminal punishment amounts to punishing the innocent : an argument for taking the parsimony principle seriously

Punishing the innocent is incontestably repugnant. Punishing offenders more harshly than is justified is a form of punishing the innocent, yet this practice is commonplace in the United States. This Article sets out a normative argument in favor of less severe penalties for many forms of offenses. There is already an established principle, which limits punishment to the minimum amount of hardship that is required to achieve the objectives of sentencing. The principle is termed “parsimony” and is widely endorsed. Yet, in reality, it is illusory. It has no firm content and in its current form is logically and jurisprudentially incapable of grounding a persuasive argument for more lenient sentences. This Article gives content to the principle of parsimony. It is argued that application of the principle will result in a considerable reduction in the number of offenders who are sentenced to imprisonment and shorter sentences for many offenders who are jailed. The recommendations in this Article will enhance the fairness and transparency of the sentencing system. The argument is especially important at this point in history. The United States is experiencing an incarceration crisis. The principle of parsimony, properly applied, is an important key to ameliorating the incarceration problem. The Article also examines the operation of the parsimony principle in Australia. Unlike sentencing courts in the United States, Australian judges enjoy considerable discretion in sentencing offenders. Despite the vastly different approach to sentencing in Australia, it too is experiencing a considerable increase in the incarceration rate. It emerges that the courts in a tightly regimented sentencing regime (the United States) and a mainly discretionary system (Australia) effectively ignored the parsimony principle. It is not the strictures in the United States that curtail the imposition of parsimonious sentences; rather, it is the absence of a forceful rationale underpinning the principle and a lack of clarity regarding the attainable objectives of sentencing. This Article addresses these shortcomings. In doing so, it paves the way for fundamentally fairer sentencing outcomes in the United States and Australia.

The naming of child homicide offenders in England and Wales: the need for a change in law and practice

Judicial decisions about whether or not to publicly name child homicide offenders have long ani- mated debate in the United Kingdom and internationally. This article draws on case law and in- depth interviews conducted with members of the English criminal justice system to critically analyse the viability of current domestic legislation in the context of the UK’s international human rights obligations. The article identifies ambiguities surrounding the definition of ‘public interest’ in law; the merits of equating the naming of child offenders with open justice, accountability and transpar- ency; and the increasing sabotage of the principle of rehabilitation. By identifying the complexities of this contentious area of judicial discretion, this article highlights the need for a rights-based approach to decisions about publicly naming children in conflict with the law.