Approaches Regarding the Competition in Romanian Sugar Market

This paper proposes an economic instrument designed to assess the competitive nature of the sugar industry in Romania. In the first part of the paper is presented the theoretical background underlying index (HHI) and its calculation methodology. Then comes the results of a first application of this index for a total of 10 plants in the sugar industry, the robustness of these results is discussed. We believe HHI is a proactive tool that may prove useful competition authority, in its pursuit of continuous monitoring of various industries in the economy and in the internal decision-making on resource allocation institution (Peacock, and Prisecaru, 2013).The starting point of our research is to free competition in the European market with competitors much stronger than Romanian plants, plants that produce at a price lower than the domestic ones. In our study we will see if it is a concentration of production in factories around the strongest in Romania, concentration accompanied by the collapse of those who could not resist the market.The market concentration, competition policy, we will follow using the HHI index, for evaluation of impact analysis on existing trade, the number and size of competitors, protecting existing sales structures, avoiding disruptions in the competitive environment, etc.

The effect of innovation on hotel market value

The purpose of this article is to analyze the effect of hotel innovations on firm value. Specifically, this study fills a research gap in the previous literature by examining this effect through market value and by distinguishing the potentially different impacts of distinct innovation types: product, process, organization and marketing. This research contributes to consolidating the empirical evidence of hotel innovation and performance by analyzing whether distinct types of innovation lead to different levels of results. The findings show that innovations are perceived to have a positive impact on the future sales of the company: in a four-day period (0,+3), there is an increase in stock exchange returns of 1.53%. In terms of innovation types, process and marketing innovations are found to have a higher positive effect on hotel market value than product and organization innovations; which is explained by potential cost differences among innovations.

Exploring the research process through the innovation journey of tourism entrepreneurs case study

Presentation for the I International Seminar of Tourism and Hospitality Research, Alicante, April 18th, 2016.

The European Union's promotion of regional economic integration in Southeast Asia: Norms, markets or both? Bruges Political Research Paper No. 25/May 2012

The EU‘s external action includes a preference for regional interlocutors and a tendency to promote regionalism. This work concentrates on the southeast Asian area and it aims at investigating the nature of EU‘s promotion of ASEAN regional integration. The EU‘s ideas and practices of regionalism as well as the single market experience influence the EU‘s international action. The power deriving from the EU‘s institutionalized market is used by the Union in a normative way to diffuse the EU‘s ideas and principles, advance the EU‘s interests and spread its model of economic integration through political dialogue, development cooperation and preferential trade arrangements. This action seems to result in a certain diffusion of the EU‘s ideas and practices in southeast Asia as well as in a subsequent reappropriation and redefinition of external inputs by ASEAN.

The concept of 'economic activity' in the EU treaty: from ideological dead-ends to workable judicial concepts. Research Paper in Law 06/2011

[From the Introduction]. The economic rules, or put more ambitiously, the economic constitution of the Treaty,1 only apply to economic activities. This general principle remains valid, even if some authors strive to demonstrate that certain Treaty rules also apply in the absence of an economic activity,2 and despite the fact that non-economic (horizontal) Treaty provisions (e.g. principle of nondiscrimination, rules on citizenship) are also applicable in the absence of any economic activity.3 Indeed, the exercise of some economic activity transcends the concepts of ‘goods’ (having positive or negative market value),4 workers (even if admitted in an extensive manner),5 and services (offered for remuneration).6 It is also economic activity or ‘the activity of offering goods and services into the market’7 that characterises an ‘undertaking’ thus making the competition rules applicable. Further, it is for regulating economic activity that Article 115 TFEU, Article 106(3) TFEU and most other legal bases in the TFEU provide harmonisation powers in favour of the EU. Last but not least, Article 14 TFEU on the distinction between services of general economic interest (SGEIs) and non-economic services of general interest (NESGIs), as well as Protocol n. 26 on Services of General Interest (SGIs) confirm the constitutional significance of the distinction between economic and non-economic: a means of dividing competences between the EU and the member states. The distinction between economic and non-economic activities is fraught with legal and technical intricacies – the latter being generated by dynamic technological advances and regulatory experimentation. More importantly, however, the distinction is overcharged with political and ideological significations and misunderstandings and, even, terminological confusions.8

Ensuring Energy Security in Europe: The EU between a Market-based and a Geopolitical Approach. EU Diplomacy Paper 03/2013

The question of energy security of the European Union (EU) has come high on the European political agenda since the mid-2000s as developments in the international energy sector have increasingly been perceived as a threat by the EU institutions and by the Member State governments. The externalisation of the EU’s internal energy market has in that context been presented as a means to ensure energy security. This approach, which can be called ‘post-modern’ with reference to Robert Cooper’s division of the world into different ‘ages’,1 however, shows insufficiencies in terms of energy security as a number of EU energy partners belonging to the ‘modern’ world do not accept to play the same rules. This consequently poses the questions of the relevance of the market-based approach and of the need for alternative solutions. This paper therefore argues that the market-based approach, based on the liberalisation of the European energy market, needs to be complemented by a geopolitical approach to ensure the security of the EU’s energy supplies. Such a geopolitical approach, however, still faces important challenges.

Fundamental rights in the EU: three years after Lisbon, the Luxembourg perspective. Research Paper in Law (Cooperative Research Paper) 02/2013

For more than 10 years after the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the question of the protection of human rights had never been in issue. The emphasis was on the creation and consolidation of the common market establishing the free movement of persons, of services, of goods and of capital. Neither the initial Treaties nor the jurisprudence of the Court made any reference to the protection of human rights in the process of the creation of the common market. It all started in 1969 in the Stauder case with this very short sentence: “Interpreted in this way the provision at issue contains nothing capable of prejudicing the fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by the Court”. Forty years later, with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force on 1 December 2009, fundamental rights are part of primary law. The achievement has been remarkable if we consider the very beginning of the process. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Court with its jurisprudence has been the driving force and the source of inspiration for this achievement.

Subsidiarity between Law and Economics. Research Papers in Law, 1/2005

From the Introduction. The present contribution is an attempt to raise awareness between the 'trenches' by juxtaposing the two approaches to subsidiarity. Subsequently, I shall set out why, in economics, subsidiarity is embraced as a key principle in the design and working of the Union and how a functional subsidiarity test can be derived from this thinking. Throughout the paper, a range of illustrations and examples is provided in an attempt to show the practical applicability of a subsidiarity test. This does not mean, of course, that the application of the test can automatically "solve" all debates on whether subsidiarity is (not) violated. What it does mean, however, is that a careful methodology can be a significant help to e.g. national parliaments and the Brussels circuit, in particular, to discourage careless politicisation as much as possible and to render assessments of subsidiarity comparable throughout the Union. The latter virtue should be of interest to national parliaments in cooperating, within just six weeks, about a common stance in the case of a suspected violation of the principle. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a flavour of very different approaches and appreciation of the subsidiarity principle in European law and in the economics of multi-tier government. Section 3 elaborates on the economics of multi-tier government as a special instance of cost / benefit analysis of (de)centralisation in the three public economic functions of any government system. This culminates in a five-steps subsidiarity test and a brief discussion about its proper and improper application. Section 4 applies the test in a non-technical fashion to a range of issues of the "efficiency function" (i.e. allocation and markets) of the EU. After showing that the functional logic of subsidiarity may require liberalisation to be accompanied by various degrees of centralisation, a number of fairly detailed illustrations of how to deal with subsidiarity in the EU is provided. One illustration is about how the subsidiarity logic is misused by protagonists (labour in the internal market). A slightly different but frequently encountered aspect consists in the refusal to recognize that the EU (that is, some form of centralisation) offers a better solution than 25 national ones. A third range of issues, where the functional logic of subsidiarity could be useful, emerges when the boundaries of national competences are shifting due to more intense cross-border flows and developments. Other subsections are devoted to Union public goods and to the question whether the subsidiarity test might trace instances of EU decentralisation: a partial or complete shift of a policy or regulation to Member States. The paper refrains from an analysis of the application of the subsidiarity test to the other two public functions, namely, equity and macro-economic stabilisation.2 Section 5 argues that the use of a well-developed methodology of a functional subsidiarity test would be most useful for the national parliaments and even more so for their cooperation in case of a suspected violation of subsidiarity. Section 6 concludes.

European Criminal Law and General Principles of Union Law. Research Papers in Law, 5/2005

From the Introduction. The European Court of Justice, partly followed in this by the European legislator, has regulated Community law and policy through a set of general principles of law. For the Community legal order in the first pillar, general legal principles have developed from functional policy areas such as the internal market, the customs union, the monetary union, the common agricultural policy, the European competition policy, etc., which are of great importance for the quality and legitimacy of Community law. The principles in question are not so much general legal principles of an institutional character, such as the priority of Community law, direct effect or Community loyalty, but rather principles of law which shape the fundamental rights and basic rights of the citizen. I refer to the principle of legality, of nulla poena, the inviolability of the home, the nemo tenetur principle, due process, the rights of the defence, etc. Many of these legal principles have been elevated to primary Community law status by the European Court of Justice, often as a result of preliminary questions. Nevertheless, a considerable number of them have also been elaborated in the context of contentious proceedings before the Court of Justice, such as in the framework of European competition law and European public servants law.

The EU essential facilities doctrine. Research Papers in Law, 6/2006

Introduction. The essential facilities doctrine may be seen as the ‘extra weight’ which is put onto the balance, in order to give precedence to the maintenance of competition over the complete contractual freedom of undertakings controlling an important and unique facility. The main purpose of the doctrine is to impose upon such ‘dominant’ undertakings the duty to negotiate and/or give access to the facility, against a reasonable fee, to other undertakings, which cannot pursue their own activity (and therefore will perish) without access to such a facility. This very simple description of the content of the doctrine underlines its limitations: through the imposition of a duty to negotiate or contractual obligations, the rule tends to compensate for the weaknesses of the competitive structure of a market, which are due to the existence of some essential facility. In other words, the doctrine does not by itself provide a definitive solution to the lack of competition, but tends to contractually maintain or even create some competition.1 The doctrine of essential facilities originates in the US antitrust case law of the Circuit and District Courts, but has never been officially acknowledged by the Supreme Court. It has been further developed and hotly debated by scholars in the US, both from a legal and from an economic viewpoint. In the EU, the essential facilities doctrine was openly introduced by the Commission during the early 1990s, but has received only limited and indirect support by the Court of First Instance (the CFI) and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ). It also indirectly inspired the legislation concerning the deregulation of traditional ‘natural’ monopolies. The judicial origin of the doctrine, combined with the hesitant application by the appeal courts, both in the US and the EU, cast uncertainty not only on the precise scope of the doctrine, but also on the issue of its very existence. These questions receive a particular light within the EU context, where the doctrine is called upon to play a different role from its US counterpart. In order to address the above issues, we will first pretend that an EU essential facility doctrine does indeed exist and we shall try to identify the scope and content thereof, through its main applications (Section 1). Subsequently, we will try to answer the question whether such a doctrine should exist at all in the EU (Section 2).

The AstraZeneca Case. Research Papers in Law, 4/2007

Introduction. On June 2005, after a five year investigation, the Commission imposed a 60 millions euros fine on AstraZeneca (hereinafter AZ) for having abused its dominant position in several Member States in the market for proton-pump inhibitors (PPI)2. It was alleged that AZ misused the patent system and procedures for marketing pharmaceuticals to block or delay the entry of generic competitors and parallel traders to its ulcer drug Losec3. This decision is a seminal one. The political and legal importance of the CFI judgment that will review the case (and the ECJ appeal that is likely to follow) cannot be understated. On the one hand the incentive to innovate and to undertake R&D is at stake, on the other, the uncertain boundaries between competition and intellectual property law should once again be explored. In contrast to the US, where many cases concerning the abuse of regulatory and governmental procedures have already been dealt with competition authorities and courts, it is the first time in Europe that such conduct is subject to scrutiny through an anti-trust lens. Moreover, following the appeal brought by AZ against the Commission decision, the CFI will be confronted for the first time with an abuse of a dominant position in the pharmaceutical sector, which explains why this judgment is eagerly anticipated4.

Current Problems of Social Europe. Research Papers in Law, 7/2007

From the Introduction. The main difficulty of Theology lies in the fact that the very existence of its subject-matter, God, may be put into question. Talking about Social Europe has something of a theological dimension. The aim of this article is to contribute into the debate, by putting into perspective some of the latest manifestations of social Europe. The need for the pursuance of social policies at the European level is now more pressing than ever (para 2). The EU, however, as it now stands, is the direct evolutionary result of the predominantly economic entity created back in 1957. This explains that the social policies pursued at the European level are piecemeal and often impregnated with market concerns (para. 3). From an instrumental point of view, EU social policy is being pursued concomitantly by secondary legislation (hard law) in the fields where the EU does have the relevant competences and by softer means of cooperation (soft law) in several other fields. Hard law has given the occasion to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in a series of recent judgments, of putting to the fore the concept of a ‘social market’ (para. 4). Soft cooperation has been formalised into the infamous Lisbon Strategy and has been the main object of experimentation with the open method of coordination (OMC) (para. 5). The advances achieved in the above ways, however, do not offer firm answers to basic questions concerning the future development of the European social identity (para. 6)

Patenting Strategies of the EU Pharmaceutical Industry -Crossroad between Patent Law and Competition Policy. Research Papers in Law, 1/2011

From the Introduction. The pharmaceutical sector inquiry carried out by the European Commission in 2008 provides a useful framework for assessing the relationship between the patent system on the one hand and competition policy and law on the other hand. The pharmaceutical market is not only specifically regulated. It is also influenced by the special characteristics of the patent system which enables pharmaceutical companies engaged in research activities to enter into additional arrangements to cope with the competitive pressures of early patent application and the delays in drug approval. Patents appear difficult to reconcile with the need for sufficient and adequate access to medicines, which is why competition expectations imposed on the pharmaceutical sector are very high. The patent system and competition law are interacting components of the market, into which they must both be integrated. This can result in competition law taking a very strict view on the pharmaceutical industry by establishing strict functional performance standards for the reliance on intellectual property rights protection granted by patent law. This is in particular because in this sector the potential welfare losses are not likely to be of only monetary nature. In brief, the more inefficiencies the patent system produces, the greater the risk of an expansive application of competition law in this field. The aim of the present study is to offer a critical and objective view on the use or abuse of patents and defensive strategies in the pharmaceutical industry. It shall also seek to establish whether patents as presently regulated offer an appropriate degree of protection of intellectual property held by the economic operators in the pharmaceutical sector and whether there is a need or, for that matter, scope for improvement. A useful starting point for the present study is provided by the pharmaceutical sector competition inquiry (hereafter “the sector inquiry”) carried out by the European Commission during the first half of 2008. On 8 July 2008, the Commission adopted its Final Report pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC, revealing a series of “antitrust shortcomings” that would require further investigation1.