Three essays in dynamic corporate finance

Summary Throughout my thesis, I elaborate on how real and financing frictions affect corporate decision making under uncertainty, and I explore how firms time their investment and financing decisions given such frictions. While the macroeconomics literature has focused on the impact of real frictions on investment decisions assuming all equity financed firms, the financial economics literature has mainly focused on the study of financing frictions. My thesis therefore assesses the join interaction of real and financing frictions in firms' dynamic investment and financing decisions. My work provides a rationale for the documented poor empirical performance of neoclassical investment models based on the joint effect of real and financing frictions on investment. A major observation relies in how the infrequency of corporate decisions may affect standard empirical tests. My thesis suggests that the book to market sorts commonly used in the empirical asset pricing literature have economic content, as they control for the lumpiness in firms' optimal investment policies. My work also elaborates on the effects of asymmetric information and strategic interaction on firms' investment and financing decisions. I study how firms time their decision to raise public equity when outside investors lack information about their future investment prospects. I derive areal-options model that predicts either cold or hot markets for new stock issues conditional on adverse selection, and I provide a rational approach to study jointly the market timing of corporate decisions and announcement effects in stock returns. My doctoral dissertation therefore contributes to our understanding of how under real and financing frictions may bias standard empirical tests, elaborates on how adverse selection may induce hot and cold markets in new issues' markets, and suggests how the underlying economic behaviour of firms may induce alternative patterns in stock prices.

Speculation, risk premia and expectations in the yield curve

An affine asset pricing model in which traders have rational but heterogeneous expectations aboutfuture asset prices is developed. We use the framework to analyze the term structure of interestrates and to perform a novel three-way decomposition of bond yields into (i) average expectationsabout short rates (ii) common risk premia and (iii) a speculative component due to heterogeneousexpectations about the resale value of a bond. The speculative term is orthogonal to public informationin real time and therefore statistically distinct from common risk premia. Empirically wefind that the speculative component is quantitatively important accounting for up to a percentagepoint of yields, even in the low yield environment of the last decade. Furthermore, allowing for aspeculative component in bond yields results in estimates of historical risk premia that are morevolatile than suggested by standard Affine Gaussian term structure models which our frameworknests.

Fiscal policy, pricing frictions and monetary accommodation

We investigate the theoretical conditions for effectiveness of government consumptionexpenditure expansions using US, Euro area and UK data. Fiscal expansions taking placewhen monetary policy is accommodative lead to large output multipliers in normal times.The 2009-2010 packages need not produce significant output multipliers, may havemoderate debt effects, and only generate temporary inflation. Expenditure expansionsaccompanied by deficit/debt consolidations schemes may lead to short run output gains buttheir success depends on how monetary policy and expectations behave. Trade opennessand the cyclicality of the labor wedge explain cross-country differences in the magnitude ofthe multipliers.

Two-sided learning in New Keynesian models: Dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank(two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economyhave asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. Weassume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct fordifferent sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model ofthe economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs througha statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study theshort-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularlywith respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learningcan generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behaviorof the variables in the model in a significant way. Our simulations do not convergeto a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source thatinvalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identifya novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communicationcan be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified.

Selective hiring and welfare analysis in labor market models

Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in standardsearch models of the labor market, all workers have the same probability of being hired.We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. Our model is isomorphicto a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selectivehiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but the welfare costsof unemployment are much larger because unemployment risk is distributed unequallyacross workers. As a result, optimal unemployment insurance may be higher and welfareis lower if hiring is selective.

Bridging DSGE models and the raw data

A method to estimate DSGE models using the raw data is proposed. The approachlinks the observables to the model counterparts via a flexible specification which doesnot require the model-based component to be solely located at business cycle frequencies,allows the non model-based component to take various time series patterns, andpermits model misspecification. Applying standard data transformations induce biasesin structural estimates and distortions in the policy conclusions. The proposed approachrecovers important model-based features in selected experimental designs. Twowidely discussed issues are used to illustrate its practical use.

Calibration of stochastic volatility models via second order approximation: the Heston model case

Using a suitable Hull and White type formula we develop a methodology to obtain asecond order approximation to the implied volatility for very short maturities. Using thisapproximation we accurately calibrate the full set of parameters of the Heston model. Oneof the reasons that makes our calibration for short maturities so accurate is that we alsotake into account the term-structure for large maturities. We may say that calibration isnot "memoryless", in the sense that the option's behavior far away from maturity doesinfluence calibration when the option gets close to expiration. Our results provide a wayto perform a quick calibration of a closed-form approximation to vanilla options that canthen be used to price exotic derivatives. The methodology is simple, accurate, fast, andit requires a minimal computational cost.

On the term structure of Interbank interest rates: Jump-diffusion processes and option pricing

In this paper we study the dynamic behavior of the term structureof Interbank interest rates and the pricing of options on interest ratesensitive securities. We posit a generalized single factor model withjumps to take into account external influences in the market. Daily datais used to test for jump effects. Qualitative examination of the linkagebetween Monetary Authorities' interventions and jumps are studied. Pricingresults suggests a systematic underpricing in bonds and call options ifthe jumps component is not included. However, the pricing of put optionson bonds presents indeterminacies.

Fair pricing of deposit insurance. Is it possible? Yes. Is it desirable? No

This note elaborates on a recent article by Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor(1992) who contend that fairly priced deposit insurance is incompatiblewithfree competition in the banking sector, in the presence of adverseselection.We show here that at soon as one introduces a real economic motivationfromprivate banks to manage the deposits from the public, then fairly priceddeposit insurance becomes possible. However, we also show that sucha fairlypriced insurance is never desirable, precisely because of adverseselection.We compute the characteristics of the optimal premium schedule, whichtradesoff between the cost of adverse selection and the cost of ``unfaircompetition ''.