974 resultados para modèle linéaire bayésien hiérarchique
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This paper proposes finite-sample procedures for testing the SURE specification in multi-equation regression models, i.e. whether the disturbances in different equations are contemporaneously uncorrelated or not. We apply the technique of Monte Carlo (MC) tests [Dwass (1957), Barnard (1963)] to obtain exact tests based on standard LR and LM zero correlation tests. We also suggest a MC quasi-LR (QLR) test based on feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). We show that the latter statistics are pivotal under the null, which provides the justification for applying MC tests. Furthermore, we extend the exact independence test proposed by Harvey and Phillips (1982) to the multi-equation framework. Specifically, we introduce several induced tests based on a set of simultaneous Harvey/Phillips-type tests and suggest a simulation-based solution to the associated combination problem. The properties of the proposed tests are studied in a Monte Carlo experiment which shows that standard asymptotic tests exhibit important size distortions, while MC tests achieve complete size control and display good power. Moreover, MC-QLR tests performed best in terms of power, a result of interest from the point of view of simulation-based tests. The power of the MC induced tests improves appreciably in comparison to standard Bonferroni tests and, in certain cases, outperforms the likelihood-based MC tests. The tests are applied to data used by Fischer (1993) to analyze the macroeconomic determinants of growth.
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In this paper, we develop finite-sample inference procedures for stationary and nonstationary autoregressive (AR) models. The method is based on special properties of Markov processes and a split-sample technique. The results on Markovian processes (intercalary independence and truncation) only require the existence of conditional densities. They are proved for possibly nonstationary and/or non-Gaussian multivariate Markov processes. In the context of a linear regression model with AR(1) errors, we show how these results can be used to simplify the distributional properties of the model by conditioning a subset of the data on the remaining observations. This transformation leads to a new model which has the form of a two-sided autoregression to which standard classical linear regression inference techniques can be applied. We show how to derive tests and confidence sets for the mean and/or autoregressive parameters of the model. We also develop a test on the order of an autoregression. We show that a combination of subsample-based inferences can improve the performance of the procedure. An application to U.S. domestic investment data illustrates the method.
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This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied : no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. The paper proposes a theory of innovation and market structure, showing that the relation between innovation and competition depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and cooperative settings. The private incentives for R&D cooperation are addressed. It is found that buyers and sellers have divergent interests regarding the choice of cooperative settings and that spillovers increase the likelihood of the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized equilibrium.
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The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.
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We identify conditions under which preferences over sets of consumption opportunities can be reduced to preferences over bundles of \"commodities\". We distinguish ordinal bundles, whose coordinates are defined up to monotone transformations, from cardinal bundles, whose coordinates are defined up to positive linear transformations only.
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This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to the generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the ones implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function. Econometric results are robust to different forecasting models for the rate of unemployment but not to the use of measures of inflation broader than the one targeted.
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Evidence of falling wages in Catholic cities and rising wages in Protestant cities between 1500 and 1750, during the spread of literacy in the vernacular, is inconsistent with most theoretical models of economic growth. In The Protestant Ethic, Weber suggested an alternative explanation based on culture. Here, a theoretical model confirms that a small change in the subjective cost of cooperating with strangers can generate a profound transformation in trading networks. In explaining urban growth in early-modern Europe, specifications compatible with human-capital versions of the neoclassical model and endogenous-growth theory are rejected in favor of a “small-world” formulation based on the Weber thesis.
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A wide range of tests for heteroskedasticity have been proposed in the econometric and statistics literature. Although a few exact homoskedasticity tests are available, the commonly employed procedures are quite generally based on asymptotic approximations which may not provide good size control in finite samples. There has been a number of recent studies that seek to improve the reliability of common heteroskedasticity tests using Edgeworth, Bartlett, jackknife and bootstrap methods. Yet the latter remain approximate. In this paper, we describe a solution to the problem of controlling the size of homoskedasticity tests in linear regression contexts. We study procedures based on the standard test statistics [e.g., the Goldfeld-Quandt, Glejser, Bartlett, Cochran, Hartley, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey, White and Szroeter criteria] as well as tests for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH-type models). We also suggest several extensions of the existing procedures (sup-type of combined test statistics) to allow for unknown breakpoints in the error variance. We exploit the technique of Monte Carlo tests to obtain provably exact p-values, for both the standard and the new tests suggested. We show that the MC test procedure conveniently solves the intractable null distribution problem, in particular those raised by the sup-type and combined test statistics as well as (when relevant) unidentified nuisance parameter problems under the null hypothesis. The method proposed works in exactly the same way with both Gaussian and non-Gaussian disturbance distributions [such as heavy-tailed or stable distributions]. The performance of the procedures is examined by simulation. The Monte Carlo experiments conducted focus on : (1) ARCH, GARCH, and ARCH-in-mean alternatives; (2) the case where the variance increases monotonically with : (i) one exogenous variable, and (ii) the mean of the dependent variable; (3) grouped heteroskedasticity; (4) breaks in variance at unknown points. We find that the proposed tests achieve perfect size control and have good power.
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In this paper, we characterize the asymmetries of the smile through multiple leverage effects in a stochastic dynamic asset pricing framework. The dependence between price movements and future volatility is introduced through a set of latent state variables. These latent variables can capture not only the volatility risk and the interest rate risk which potentially affect option prices, but also any kind of correlation risk and jump risk. The standard financial leverage effect is produced by a cross-correlation effect between the state variables which enter into the stochastic volatility process of the stock price and the stock price process itself. However, we provide a more general framework where asymmetric implied volatility curves result from any source of instantaneous correlation between the state variables and either the return on the stock or the stochastic discount factor. In order to draw the shapes of the implied volatility curves generated by a model with latent variables, we specify an equilibrium-based stochastic discount factor with time non-separable preferences. When we calibrate this model to empirically reasonable values of the parameters, we are able to reproduce the various types of implied volatility curves inferred from option market data.
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This paper assesses the empirical performance of an intertemporal option pricing model with latent variables which generalizes the Hull-White stochastic volatility formula. Using this generalized formula in an ad-hoc fashion to extract two implicit parameters and forecast next day S&P 500 option prices, we obtain similar pricing errors than with implied volatility alone as in the Hull-White case. When we specialize this model to an equilibrium recursive utility model, we show through simulations that option prices are more informative than stock prices about the structural parameters of the model. We also show that a simple method of moments with a panel of option prices provides good estimates of the parameters of the model. This lays the ground for an empirical assessment of this equilibrium model with S&P 500 option prices in terms of pricing errors.
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Dans ce texte, nous analysons les développements récents de l’économétrie à la lumière de la théorie des tests statistiques. Nous revoyons d’abord quelques principes fondamentaux de philosophie des sciences et de théorie statistique, en mettant l’accent sur la parcimonie et la falsifiabilité comme critères d’évaluation des modèles, sur le rôle de la théorie des tests comme formalisation du principe de falsification de modèles probabilistes, ainsi que sur la justification logique des notions de base de la théorie des tests (tel le niveau d’un test). Nous montrons ensuite que certaines des méthodes statistiques et économétriques les plus utilisées sont fondamentalement inappropriées pour les problèmes et modèles considérés, tandis que de nombreuses hypothèses, pour lesquelles des procédures de test sont communément proposées, ne sont en fait pas du tout testables. De telles situations conduisent à des problèmes statistiques mal posés. Nous analysons quelques cas particuliers de tels problèmes : (1) la construction d’intervalles de confiance dans le cadre de modèles structurels qui posent des problèmes d’identification; (2) la construction de tests pour des hypothèses non paramétriques, incluant la construction de procédures robustes à l’hétéroscédasticité, à la non-normalité ou à la spécification dynamique. Nous indiquons que ces difficultés proviennent souvent de l’ambition d’affaiblir les conditions de régularité nécessaires à toute analyse statistique ainsi que d’une utilisation inappropriée de résultats de théorie distributionnelle asymptotique. Enfin, nous soulignons l’importance de formuler des hypothèses et modèles testables, et de proposer des techniques économétriques dont les propriétés sont démontrables dans les échantillons finis.
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This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.
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In this paper, we provide both qualitative and quantitative measures of the cost of measuring the integrated volatility by the realized volatility when the frequency of observation is fixed. We start by characterizing for a general diffusion the difference between the realized and the integrated volatilities for a given frequency of observations. Then, we compute the mean and variance of this noise and the correlation between the noise and the integrated volatility in the Eigenfunction Stochastic Volatility model of Meddahi (2001a). This model has, as special examples, log-normal, affine, and GARCH diffusion models. Using some previous empirical works, we show that the standard deviation of the noise is not negligible with respect to the mean and the standard deviation of the integrated volatility, even if one considers returns at five minutes. We also propose a simple approach to capture the information about the integrated volatility contained in the returns through the leverage effect.
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It is often thought that a tariff reduction, by opening up the domestic market to foreign firms, should lessen the need for a policy aimed at discouraging domestic mergers. This implicitly assumes that the tariff in question is sufficiently high to prevent foreign firms from selling in the domestic market. However, not all tariffs are prohibitive, so that foreign firms may be present in the domestic market before it is abolished. Furthermore, even if the tariff is prohibitive, a merger of domestic firms may render it nonprohibitive, thus inviting foreign firms to penetrate the domestic market. In this paper, we show, using a simple example, that in the latter two cases, abolishing the tariff may in fact make the domestic merger more profitable. Hence, trade liberalization will not necessarily reduce the profitability of domestic mergers.
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In this paper, we introduce a new approach for volatility modeling in discrete and continuous time. We follow the stochastic volatility literature by assuming that the variance is a function of a state variable. However, instead of assuming that the loading function is ad hoc (e.g., exponential or affine), we assume that it is a linear combination of the eigenfunctions of the conditional expectation (resp. infinitesimal generator) operator associated to the state variable in discrete (resp. continuous) time. Special examples are the popular log-normal and square-root models where the eigenfunctions are the Hermite and Laguerre polynomials respectively. The eigenfunction approach has at least six advantages: i) it is general since any square integrable function may be written as a linear combination of the eigenfunctions; ii) the orthogonality of the eigenfunctions leads to the traditional interpretations of the linear principal components analysis; iii) the implied dynamics of the variance and squared return processes are ARMA and, hence, simple for forecasting and inference purposes; (iv) more importantly, this generates fat tails for the variance and returns processes; v) in contrast to popular models, the variance of the variance is a flexible function of the variance; vi) these models are closed under temporal aggregation.