Proceso del desarrollo exportador de la PYME colombiana

[ES] Las Pymes colombianas, al igual que las de América Latina, afrontan una serie de barreras para la exportación asociadas a la carencia de recursos y capacidades organizacionales y directivas, las cuales hacen que su permanencia en los mercados internacionales sea cuestionable. Al no superar tales barreras y mostrar una posición competitiva más fuerte difícilmente éstas podrán penetrar y sobrevivir en los mercados internacionales y aprovechar las grandes oportunidades que ofrece el mercado mundial. Especialmente, aquéllas que surgen como resultado de los acuerdos de integración y de los sistemas de preferencia suscritos y otorgados a Colombia.

Approximate knowledge of rationality and correlated equilibria

We extend Aumann's [3] theorem deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker notion, joint p-belief of rationality, where agents believe the other agents are rational with probabilities p = (pi)i2I or more. We show that behavior in this case constitutes a constrained correlated equilibrium of a doubled game satisfying certain p-belief constraints and characterize the topological structure of the resulting set of p-rational outcomes. We establish continuity in the parameters p and show that, for p su ciently close to one, the p-rational outcomes are close to the correlated equilibria and, with high probability, supported on strategies that survive the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we extend Aumann and Dreze's [4] theorem on rational expectations of interim types to the broader p-rational belief systems, and also discuss the case of non-common priors.