The European Union’s Rule of Law Promotion in its Neighbourhood: A Structural Foreign Policy Analysis. EU Diplomacy Paper 04/2013

The promotion of the rule of law has become an important dimension of the European Union’s relations towards its neighbourhood. The rule of law is, however, a complex and multifaceted notion and the EU’s rule of law promotion policy has often been criticised for being either inefficient or self-interested. This collection of short papers offers an analysis of various case studies using the analytical framework of structural foreign policy (SFP) developed by Stephan Keukeleire. It aims to promote an original analytical perspective on the EU’s foreign policy but also to critically test and further develop the SFP analytical framework. The contributions of this collection consist of the shortened version of students’ Master’s theses written at the College of Europe during the academic year 2011-2012 in the framework of the course “The EU as a Foreign Policy Actor” taught by Stephan Keukeleire, Chairholder of the TOTAL Chair of EU Foreign Policy in the Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies.

A European global "security" strategy: offering seven-league boots to become a global actor. Security Policy Brief No. 45, March 2013

In mid-2012 the Foreign Ministers of Italy, Poland, Spain and Sweden took the initiative to launch the debate on a “European Global Strategy” and invited think tanks to set up a dialogue leading to the delivery of a report by May 2013.

And what will Europe do? The European Council and military strategy. Security Policy Brief No. 46, May 2013

Important decisions on Europe’s military capabilities are expected from the December 2013 European Council. But why? What do Europeans actually want to do with their capabilities? The answer to that question would be the crowning piece of the European Council’s decisions.

Recalibrating CSDP-NATO relations: the real pivot. Security Policy Brief No. 47, June 2013

In an age of major power shifts, which we know from history always to be particularly dangerous, different scenarios are possible; the only promising one is that of more and well-structured international cooperation. Yet, critical voices point at a drifting apart of longstanding allies. Recalibrating CSDPNATO relations has become more important than ever.

The start-up fund - an elegant treaty mechanism for sustaining defence capabilities. Security Policy Brief No. 48, June 2013

When the European Council meets in December, it will face a range of decisions which will lay the foundations for Europe's defence posture and role in the wider world for decades to come, perhaps even beyond the remainder of this century. The Lisbon Treaty has, for the first time, equipped the EU with the range of means to meet that role in practice. The question that remains to be answered is whether Europe's leaders have the political will to implement those means in full.

Memo to Merkel: Post-election Germany and Europe. Bruegel Policy Brief 2013/05, 24 September 2013

Recent economic data points to the seeds of an economic recovery in the European Union. However, significant risks remain and bold policies are still needed. There are three central risks. Competitiveness adjustment is incomplete, casting doubt on the sustainability of public debt. Banking remains unstable and fragmented along national lines, resulting in unfavorable financial conditions, which further erode growth, job creation and competitiveness. Rising unemployment, especially among the young, is inequitable, unjust and politically risky. Germany has a central role to play in addressing these risks. The new German government should work on three priorities: Domestic economic policy should be more supportive of growth and adjustment, with higher public investment, a greater role for high-value added services, and more supportive immigration policy. Germany should support a meaningful banking union with a centralised resolution mechanism requiring a transfer of sovereignty to Europe for all countries including Germany. The establishment of a private investment initiative combined with a European Youth Education Fund and labour market reforms should be promoted. Building on these priorities, a significant deepening of the euro area is needed, with a genuine transfer of sovereignty, stronger institutions and democratically legitimate decision-making structures in areas of common policy.

Industries and Citizens’ Groups Networks in EU Food Policy: The Emergence of ‘Unholy Alliances’ in Multilevel Governance? Brugges Political Research Paper No. 30, September 2013

Food policy is one the most regulated policy fields at the EU level. ‘Unholy alliances’ are collaborative patterns that temporarily bring together antagonistic stakeholders behind a common cause. This paper deals with such ‘transversal’ co-operations between citizens’ groups (NGOs, consumers associations…) and economic stakeholders (food industries, retailers…), focusing on their ambitions and consequences. This paper builds on two case studies that enable a more nuanced view on the perspectives for the development of transversal networks at the EU level. The main findings are that (i) the rationale behind the adoption of collaborative partnerships actually comes from a case-by-case cost/benefit analysis leading to hopes of improved access to institutions; (ii) membership of a collaborative network leads to a learning process closely linked to the network’s performance; and (iii) coalitions can have a better reception — rather than an automatic better access — depending on several factors independent of the stakeholders themselves.

More Competitive, More Efficient? The 2013 European Commission Defence Communication. Security Policy Brief No. 49, September 2013

The European Commission has now released its 2013 Communication on defence-industrial policy. But does the latest set of policy ideas offer European defence-industrial cooperation any new impetus? This Brief argues that while the majority of the Commission’s initiatives are not new, some much needed ideas have made their way into the latest Communication.

Defence: the European Council matters. Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 51, December 2013

Defence matters. This is the opening sentence (probably the shortest ever) of the conclusions of the December 2013 European Council. And that matters too.

Ending uncertainty: recapitalisation under European Central Bank supervision. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/18, 17 December 2013

Estimates of the recapitalisation needs of the euro-area banking system vary between €50 and €600 billion. The range shows the considerable uncertainty about the quality of banks’ balance sheets and about the parameters of the forthcoming European Central Bank stress tests, including the treatment of sovereign debt and systemic risk. Uncertainty also prevails about the rules and discretion that will applyto bank recapitalisation, bank restructuring and bank resolution in 2014 and beyond. The ECB should communicate the relevant parameters of its exercise early and in detail to give time to the private sector to find solutions. The ECB should establish itself as a tough supervisor and force non-viable banks into restructuring. This could lead to short-term financial volatility, but it should be weighed against the cost of a durably weak banking system and the credibility risk to the ECB. The ECB may need to provide large amounts of liquidity to the financial system. Governments should support the ECB, accept cross-border bank mergers and substantial creditor involvement under clear bail-in rules and should be prepared to recapitalise banks. Governments should agree on the eventual creation of a single resolution mechanism with efficient and fast decision-making procedures, and which can exercise discretion where necessary. A resolution fund, even when fully built-up, needs to have a common fiscal backstop to be credible.

The Governance Gap in European Security and Defence. CEPS Policy Brief No. 310, 19 December 2013

The true causes of the EU’s inertia as a security actor in its neighbourhood and beyond are not a lack of capability or even austerity measures, but the absence of a core group of states committed to driving integration forward, argues Giovanni Faleg. Member states are reluctant to set clear common strategic priorities and struggle to agree on a revision of the institutional rules. Their strategic cultures and interests differ significantly; they hold different visions of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and are unwilling to use the CSDP instruments at their disposal.

Will the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership be a game-changer? EU Centre Singapore Policy Brief No. 5, April 2013

In February 2013, US President Barrack Obama, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso announced the decision to go for an ambitious and comprehensive trade and investment agreement between the US and the EU. To be called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), this agreement would lead to a new stage in the transatlantic relationship and be a much needed boost to the lacklustre economic recovery so far. Some analysts have even argued that TTIP would be a “game changer” – besides the economic gains, it would serve a bigger strategic purpose of promoting EU-US common objective to set higher standards of trade liberalisation, and thereby level the playing field in China and other key emerging markets. This policy brief examines the reasons behind the current push towards TTIP and the possible contents of such an agreement. It also discusses the possible obstacles to the realisation of TTIP, and at the same time, looks into what a successful conclusion of TTIP would mean for Asia and beyond.

The EU’s comprehensive approach towards security: the Lisbon Treaty and “smart power”. EU Centre Singpore Policy Brief No. 6, May 2013

The European Union (EU) has increasingly become a comprehensive security actor. With the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as a reaction to the failure of the EU to act during the wars in Yugoslavia/Western Balkans in the 1990s, the EU has a wide range of instruments for crisis prevention, crisis management as well as post-crisis intervention at its disposal. Observers typically agree that “hard power” is no longer sufficient to address the complex security challenges of today’s world while the EU, often criticised for only utilising “soft power”, is now able to exercise “smart power”. Through a comprehensive approach, facilitated by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU can now use the various instruments at its disposal, such as diplomacy, development aid, humanitarian assistance, trade, sanctions, international cooperation and crisis management capabilities in a joined-up manner. This mix of tools and instruments is helping the EU to achieve the aim set out in its European Security Strategy: “a secure Europe in a better world”.

The Judicial Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. EU Diplomacy Paper 08/2013, November 2013

In this paper, the expression “neighbourhood policy” of the European Union (EU) is understood in a broad way which includes the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) contracting parties to the European Economic Area (EEA), the EFTA State Switzerland, candidate states, the countries of the European Neighbour-hood Policy (ENP), and Russia. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the centre of gravity in the judicial dimension of this policy. The innermost circle of integration after the EU itself comprises the EFTA States who are party to the European Economic Area. With the EFTA Court, they have their own common court. The existence of two courts – the ECJ and the EFTA Court – raises the question of homogeneity of the case law. The EEA homogeneity rules resemble the ones of the Lugano Convention. The EFTA Court is basically obliged to follow or take into account relevant ECJ case law. But even if the ECJ has gone first, there may be constellations where the EFTA Court comes to the conclusion that it must go its own way. Such constellations may be given if there is new scientific evidence, if the ECJ has left certain questions open, where there is relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights or where, in light of the specific circumstances of the case, there is room for “creative homogeneity”. However, in the majority of its cases the EFTA Court is faced with novel legal questions. In such cases, the ECJ, its Advocates General and the Court of First Instance make reference to the EFTA Court’s case law. The question may be posed whether the EEA could serve as a model for other regional associations. For the ENP states, candidate States and Russia this is hard to imagine. Their courts will to varying degrees look to the ECJ when giving interpretation to the relevant agreements. The Swiss Government is – at least for the time being – unwilling to make a second attempt to join the EEA. The European Commission has therefore proposed to the Swiss to dock their sectoral agreements with the EU to the institutions of the EFTA pillar, the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and the EFTA Court. Switzerland would then negotiate the right to nominate a member of the ESA College and of the EFTA Court. The Swiss Government has, however, opted for another model. Swiss courts would continue to look to the ECJ, as they did in the past, and conflicts should also in the future be resolved by diplomatic means. But the ECJ would play a decisive role in dispute settlement. It would, upon unilateral request of one side, give an “authoritative” interpretation of EU law as incorporated into the relevant bilateral agreement. In a “Non-Paper” which was drafted by the chief negotiators, the interpretations of the ECJ are even characterised as binding. The decision-making power would, however, remain with the Joint Committees where Switzerland could say no. The Swiss Government assumes that after a negative decision by the ECJ it would be able to negotiate a compromise solution with the Commission without the ECJ being able to express itself on the outcome. The Government has therefore not tried to emphasise that the ECJ would not be a foreign court. Whether the ECJ would accept its intended role, is an open question. And if it would, the Swiss Government would have to explain to its voters that Switzerland retains the freedom to disregard such a binding decision and that for this reason the ECJ is not only no foreign court, but no adjudicating court at all.

The New EU Foreign Policy Architecture: Reviewing the first two years of the EEAS. CEPS Paperbacks. February 2013

This CEPS book examines two interrelated questions: 1) How has the European External Action Service (EEAS) functioned in the EU institutional architecture in the first two years of its existence? 2) What improvements can be made through the 2013 review and the 2014 revision of the EEAS’ mandate? The study contributes to the current debate through an in-depth examination of the EEAS’ relations with the EU member states, the European Commission, the European Parliament and its Delegations. The analysis is complemented by in-depth interviews conducted with senior officials from the relevant institutions. The authors put forward specific recommendations, organised around three basic roles that the EEAS plays in the EU’s external relations: a) leader, b) coordinator and c) information hub.