The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

The twilight of the oil Eldorado. How the activity of Russian oil companies on the EU market has evolved. OSW Studies 55, April 2016

The European Union has traditionally been the most important outlet for Russian oil exports. At the same time, during the period 2011-2014 a systematic decline was observed in crude oil supplies to the EU, while at the same time the export of petroleum products increased. It is now difficult to say that Russia is following a coherent oil strategy vis-a-vis the EU. The current shape of Russian activity is more the result of the business interests of individual companies, rather than the result of activities coordinated by the state. Although in the short term (up to 2020), the negative trend in crude oil exports to the EU could be halted (as confirmed by the figures for 2015), the long-term prospects for Russia's position on the EU market are pessimistic. This is because the importance of factors unfavourable to Russia is rising, such as the decrease in consumption of oil in the EU, the increased competition among exporters to the EU market, and the deterioration of the climate of Russian/EU cooperation in the context of the anti-Russian sanctions, as well as unclear prospects for the development of the upstream sector in Russia.

The Business Models and Economics of Peer-to-Peer lending. ECRI Research Report No 17, May 2016

This paper reviews peer-to-peer (P2P) lending, its development in the UK and other countries, and assesses the business and economic policy issues surrounding this new form of intermediation. P2P platform technology allows direct matching of borrowers’ and lenders’ diversification over a large number of borrowers without the loans having to be held on an intermediary balance sheet. P2P lending has developed rapidly in both the US and the UK, but it still represents a small fraction, less than 1%, of the stock of bank lending. In the UK – but not elsewhere – it is an important source of loans for smaller companies. We argue that P2P lending is fundamentally complementary to, and not competitive with, conventional banking. We therefore expect banks to adapt to the emergence of P2P lending, either by cooperating closely with third-party P2P lending platforms or offering their own proprietary platforms. We also argue that the full development of the sector requires much further work addressing the risks and business and regulatory issues in P2P lending, including risk communication, orderly resolution of platform failure, control of liquidity risks and minimisation of fraud, security and operational risks. This will depend on developing reliable business processes, the promotion to the full extent possible of transparency and standardisation and appropriate regulation that serves the needs of customers.

The influence of corporate governance characteristics on changes in risk following the global financial crisis evidence from companies listed in the portuguese stock market

Apesar da crescente regulação da atividade empresarial e do estabelecimento de normas e recomendações relativamente ao governo das sociedades verificados desde o início da década passada, as empresas de grande parte dos sectores de atividade económica foram seriamente afetadas durante a crise financeira global. Este estudo permite concluir que houve aumentos significativos no risco total e idiossincrático das empresas não financeiras cotadas na Euronext Lisboa após a falência do banco Lehman Bothers, a 15 de Setembro de 2008. Estes resultados são coerentes com o aumento da incerteza dos investidores verificado durante o período de crise, resultante do colapso de alguns dos maiores bancos do último século, que se traduziu numa falta de confiança generalizada nas instituições financeiras que resultou em maiores dificuldades na obtenção de créditos bancários e num aumentos dos custos de capital, durante este período. Os resultados sugerem que as alterações verificadas nas medidas do risco variaram de acordo com as características de governação e características específicas das empresas, quer num horizonte temporal mais curto, quer num horizonte temporal mais alargado. O mercado de capitais premiou as empresas com um número relativamente maior de administradores não-executivos e com administradores que exercem (em média) cargos de gestão num maior número de empresas ou instituições. Por outro lado, o mercado de capitais penalizou as empresas com um número relativamente maior de administradores independentes, maior concentração de capital, maiores oportunidades de crescimento, maior alavancagem financeira e maior liquidez corrente.

City companies charities. Report of the Educational Endowments Committee. February, 1881.

"The charities described ... are exclusively those under the trust of the guilds or companies of the city of London."

Captains of the three student companies in 1861

Handwritten on verso: civil war volunteer. Printed sticker on verso: W. Nessler

Monetary and banking policy of Chile.

Mode of access: Internet.

Monetary and banking reform in Paraguay.

Mode of access: Internet.

Data pertinent to a review of minimum wage rates established under the Fair labor standards act for newly covered employment in the banking, insurance, and finance industry in Puerto Rico /

Alternate pages blank.

Direct investment in the United States by foreign government-owned companies, 1974-1981.

Mode of access: Internet.

Effects of budget cuts on cities : hearing before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-seventh Congress, first session, December 15, 1981.

Mode of access: Internet.