966 resultados para VAT revenues
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Introduction. The energy sector, especially with regard to the gas trade, is one of the key areas of co-operation between the EU and Russia. However, the form this co-operation has taken has been giving rise to some concern, both in Brussels and in the EU member states. Questions arise as to whether the EU has not become excessively dependent on Russia for energy, and whether the presence of the Russian gas monopoly in the EU does not enable Russian interference with the development of EU energy policy. The objective of this series of OSW reports (for the previous edition,see Gazprom’s expansion in the EU: co-operation or domination? April 2008 – pdf 1.2 MB) is to provide facts which will permit an accurat answer to these questions to be formulated. Over the course of last year, two new factors strongly affected Gazprom’s capability to operate on the EU market. One was the ongoing global economic crisis, which has depressed demand for gas both in Russia and in Europe. Gazprom has cut both its own production and the quantities of gas it purchases from the Central Asian states, and the decrease in export revenues has forced the company to modify some of its current investment plans. Less demand for gas and the need to reduce production are also having a positive impact – the Russian company is likely to avoid the difficulties in meeting all of its export commitments which, only a year or so ago, it was expected to experience. The other factor affecting Gazprom’s expansion in Europe is the observed radicalisation of the rhetoric and actions of both the company itself and of the Russian authorities with regard to the gas sector as broadly understood. The gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009, which resulted in a two-week interruption of gas supplies from Russia to Europe via Ukraine, was the most prominent example of this radicalisation. The hardening of rhetoric in the ongoing energy talks with the EU and other actors, and increased political and business activities designed to promote Russian gas interests in Europe, in particular the lobbying for the Nord Stream and South Stream projects, are further signs of this shift in tone. These issues raise the question of whether, and to what extent, the current condition of Gazprom’s finance will permit the company to implement the infrastructural projects it has been endorsing and its other investment plans in Europe. Another important question is whether the currently observed changes in how Gazprom operates will take on a more permanent character, and what consequences this will have for the European Union. The first part of this report discusses Gazprom’s production and export potential. The second comprehensively presents the scope and nature of Gazprom’s economic presence in the EU member states. Finally, the third part presents the Russian company’s methods of operation on foreign markets. The data presented in the report come mainly from the statistics of the International Energy Agency, the European Commission and Gazprom, as well as the Central Bank of Russia and the Russian Statistical Office. The figures presented here also include proprietary calculations by the OSW based on figures disclosed by energy companies and reports by professional press and news agencies.
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Big business in Russia: The pace of ownership transfer in the Russian economy has speeded up considerably over the last year. There has been a significant rise in the number of acquisitions of whole enterprises, and large blocks of shares in individual firms and plants. Similarly the number of mergers, bankruptcies and take-overs of failing firms by their strongest competitors has grown. The Russian power industry: This study is an overview of the current condition and principles on which the Russian power sector has been functioning so far. This analysis has been carried out against the background of the changes that have been taking place in the sector since the beginning of the 1990s. This text also contains a description of guidelines and progress made so far in implementing the reform of the Russian power industry, the draft of which was adopted by the government of the Russian Federation in summer 2001. However, the purpose of this study is not an economic analysis of the draft, but an attempt to present the political conditions and possible consequences of the transformations carried out in the Russian power sector. The final part attempts to evaluate the possibilities and threats related to the implementation of the reform in its present shape. Ukrainian metallurgy: The metallurgic sector, like the east-west transit of energy raw materials, is a strategic source of revenue for Ukraine. Over the last ten years, this sector has become Kiev's most important source of foreign currency inflows, accounting for over 40 per cent of its total export revenues. The growth of metallurgic production, which has continued almost without interruption since the mid-1990s, has contributed considerably to the increase in GDP which Ukraine showed in 2000, for the first time in its independent history.
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Oil is a strategic raw material for Russia and one of fundamental significance for the functioning of the state and its future. Taxes on oil production and exports are the most important source of state budget revenues which guarantee Russia maintains its political and economic stability. Russia is building its international position on the basis of its vast raw material and energy potential. While a great number of various publications have been devoted to Russian gas and Gazprom, surprisingly little research has been done into the present condition and possible future developments of the Russian oil sector, despite the fact that oil has and will have a much greater impact than gas on the functioning and the future of Russia. The main objective of this text is to describe the present situation of the Russian oil sector, its problems and the challenges it is posing, as well as the government’s policy towards this key branch of the Russian economy. This will be an introduction to an attempt to answer to the questions about the possible future production and the export levels of Russian oil, also broken down into the European and Asian directions.
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In the third quarter of 2012, Ukraine’s economy recorded negative growth (-1.3%) for the first time since its 2009 economic crisis. Q4 GDP is projected to suffer a further decline, bringing Ukraine into formal recession. In addition to the worsening macroeconomic indicators, Ukraine is also facing a series of concomitant economic problems: a growing trade deficit, industrial decline, shrinking foreign exchange reserves, and the weakening of the hryvnia. Poor economic growth is expected to result in lower than projected budget revenues, which in turn could lead to the sequestration of the budget in December. The decline evident across the key economic indicators in the second half of 2012 brings to a close a period of relative economic stability and two years of economic growth, which had been seen as a significant personal achievement of President Viktor Yanukovych and the ruling Party of Regions. The health of the Ukrainian economy largely depends on the state of the country’s export- -oriented industries. The current economic forecasts for foreign markets are not very optimistic. It is impossible to determine whether the current economic downturn is likely to be merely temporary or whether it heralds the onset of a prolonged economic crisis. The limited capacity to deal with the growing economic problems may mean that Kiev will need to seek financial support from abroad. This is particularly significant with regard to external debt servicing, since in 2013 Ukraine will need to pay back around 9 billion USD, including over 5.5 billion USD to the International Monetary Fund. In order to overcome the recession and stabilise public finances, the government may be forced to take a series of unpopular measures, including raising the price of natural gas and utilities. These measures have been stipulated by the IMF as a condition of further financial assistance and the disbursement of the 12 billion USD stabilisation loan granted to Ukraine in July 2010. The only alternative for Western loans and economic reforms appears to be financial support from Russia. The price for Moscow’s help might however turn out to be very high, and precipitate a turn in Kiev’s foreign policy towards a gradual re-integration of former Soviet republics under Moscow-led geopolitical projects.
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This Factor Markets Working Paper describes and highlights the key issues of farm capital structures, the dynamics of investments and accumulation of farm capital, and the financial leverage and borrowing rates on farms in selected European countries. Data collected from the Farm Account Data Network (FADN) suggest that the European farming sector uses quite different farm business strategies, capabilities to generate capital revenues, and segmented agricultural loan market regimes. Such diverse business strategies have substantial, and perhaps more substantial than expected, implications for the financial leverage and performance of farms. Different countries adopt different approaches to evaluating agricultural assets, or the agricultural asset markets simply differ substantially depending on the country in question. This has implications for most of the financial indicators. In those countries that have seen rapidly increasing asset prices at the margin, which were revised accordingly in the accounting systems for the whole stock of assets, firm values increased significantly, even though the firms had been disinvesting. If there is an asset price bubble and it bursts, there may be serious knock-on effects for some countries.
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This paper first provides a short history of the European budget, focusing on the development of the EU’s “own resources”. It then elaborates on the fundamental changes to the financial system and the budgetary procedure that the Treaty of Lisbon introduced. It is posited that with the amendments the budgetary process has lost clarity. Whilst the multiannual framework may provide for long-term stability, it stands in contradiction to a central principle of parliamentary democracy: annual budgets. The EU’s search for a fair and transparent budgetary system has not yet come to full fruition. Europe needs a fairer and more transparent system. Since the Luxembourg agreement of 1970, the Union has not done anything with the VAT as own resources. The VAT is related to the welfare standards and developments in the Member States. A fixed share of this indirect tax could form the base of a long term financing plan for the general EU budget.
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The currency crisis that started in Russia and Ukraine during 2014 has spread to neighbouring countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The collapse of the Russian ruble, expected recession in Russia, the stronger US dollar and lower commodity prices have negatively affected the entire region, with the consequence that the European Union's entire eastern neighbourhood faces serious economic, social and political challenges because of weaker currencies, higher inflation, decreasing export revenues and labour remittances, net capital outflows and stagnating or declining GDP. •The crisis requires a proper policy response from CIS governments, the International Monetary Fund and the EU. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Donbass requires rapid resolution, as the first step to return Russia to the mainstream of global economic and political cooperation. Beyond that, both Russia and Ukraine need deep structural and institutional reforms. The EU should deepen economic ties with those CIS countries that are interested in a closer relationship with Europe. The IMF should provide additional assistance to those CIS countries that have become victims of a new regional contagion, while preparing for the possibility of more emerging-market crises arising from slower growth, the stronger dollar and lower commodity prices.
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The paper deals with Europe's effort to proceed to the thud stage of EMU and establish a common currency. It is argued that the success of the common currency experiment will greatly depend on the fulfillment of the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criteria, on the adoption of the proper adjustment policies as well as on the political desirability of the project. The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 deals briefly with the index of criteria that define an OCA. Section 2 examines the extent to which Europe experiences common demand disturbances, while sections 3 and 4 focus on evidence about the mobility of factors of production across Europe, namely labor and capital. Section 5 examines the possibility of an increase in trade volume across the EU under fixed exchange rates or a common currency regime. Section 6 sheds light on the possibility of the EURO (the ex-ECU} to become a vehicle currency in the international financial system, and Section 7 is concerned with the benefits and costs of the establishment of a European Central Bank (ECB), paying special attention to seigniorage revenues. Section 8 deals with the necessity of establishing an EU federal mechanism facilitating adjustment. Section 9 sketches out a proper role for a hegemonic power in a common currency regime. Finally, section 10 examines EMU prospects during the transitional period. The paper closes with some concluding remarks, where the role of politics and coordination of economic policies are particularly emphasized as of cardinal importance on the road to the third stage of EMU.
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In this CEPS Commentary, Daniel Gros turns his attention to the main outstanding problem facing Greece today, namely capital flight. Fearful that the country will leave the euro, depositors are withdrawing cash from their bank accounts – thereby making this event more likely. He outlines a proposal in which outgoing payments from Greek banks in the form of cash or via the TARGET system would be limited to the amount of incoming payments, i.e. revenues from exports or tourism, via an auction system. Greece could remain formally a member of the euro area, but the price for cash withdrawals would encourage depositors to wait and stimulate exports.
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The drop in Ukraine’s GDP by nearly 18% in the first three months of 2015 (versus the corresponding period in 2014) has confirmed the decline of the country’s economy. Over the last 14 months, the Ukrainian currency was subject to an almost threefold devaluation against the US dollar, and in April 2015 the inflation rate was 61% (year-on-year), which exacerbated the impoverishment of the general public and weakened domestic demand. The main reason behind the crisis has been the destruction of heavy industry and infrastructure in the war-torn Donbas region, over which Kyiv no longer has control, as well as a sharp decline in foreign trade (by 24% in 2014 and by 34% in the first quarter of 2015), recorded primarily in trading volume with Ukraine’s major trade partner, i.e. Russia (a drop of 43%). The conflict has also had a negative impact on the production figures for the two key sectors of the Ukrainian economy: agriculture and metallurgy, which account for approximately 50% of Ukrainian exports. The government’s response to the crisis has primarily been a reduction in the costs of financing the Donbas and an increase in the financial burden placed on the citizens and companies of Ukraine. No radical reforms which would encompass the entire system, including anti-corruption reforms, have been carried out to stop the embezzlement of state funds and to facilitate business activity. The reasons for not initiating reforms have included the lack of will to launch them, Ukraine’s traditionally slow pace of bureaucratic action and growing dissonance among the parties making up the parliamentary coalition. The few positive changes, including marketisation of energy prices and sustaining budgetary discipline (in the first quarter of 2015, budgetary revenues grew by 25%, though partly as a result of currency devaluation), are being carried out under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which is making the payment of further loan instalments to the tune of US$ 17.5 billion conditional upon reforms. Despite assistance granted by Western institutional donors and by individual states, the risk of Ukraine going bankrupt remains real. The issue of restructuring foreign debt worth US$ 15 billion has not been resolved, as foreign creditors who hold Ukrainian bonds have not consented to any partial cancellation of the debt. Whether Ukraine’s public finances can be stabilised will depend mainly on the situation in the east of the country and on the possible renewal of military action. It seems that the only way to rescue Ukraine’s public finances from deteriorating further is to continue to ‘freeze’ the conflict, to gradually implement wide-ranging reforms and to reach a consensus in negotiations with lenders.
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The EU, and the Eurozone in particular, has been going through a period of prolonged economic difficulty. While there are some signs of recovery, growth rates remain too low, only returning to the already modest growth rates of the pre-crisis period. This not only affects the creation of jobs, but also, through lower tax revenues and stagnant GDP levels, the consolidation of public finances.
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Although they are not the deciding factor, the Western financial sanctions are nevertheless an important factor affecting the deteriorating economic situation in Russia. They have significantly undermined the opportunities which Russian companies have to attract foreign capital, thus contributing to the deterioration of their financial condition (which is particularly prominent in the case of energy firms subject to sanctions). Therefore, Russian businesses need more support from the state. However, this support is becoming more difficult due to the dramatic fall in oil prices – revenues from oil exports are the main source of budget revenue.
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Based on existing research in the interface of emissions trading schemes (ETSs) and WTO law, the paper looks more closely at the design elements of an ETS that are most vulnerable to a WTO challenge, including border adjustment on importation and exportation, recycling of revenues and cross-border linking. The analysis of WTO consistency of various ETS regulatory components reveals significant legal uncertainty. One explanation is that an ETS is not yet fully established as a regulatory tool. It does not have a fixed design and its design elements vary significantly with a scheme. Moreover, ETS-related issues have never been raised in WTO disputes. This makes it hard to predict with confidence the outcome of scrutiny of an ETS by a WTO adjudicative body. In this respect, the availability of environmental and/or health exceptions for justification of ETS-related measures is of great importance.
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A tese estuda e analisa as Tecnologias da Informação e Comunicação (TIC) disponíveis em hospitais no Brasil, associados à ANAHP – Associação Nacional de Hospitais Privados que patrocinou a coleta de dados e apoiou a pesquisa com dois temas centrais: uso e custo; integração e interoperabilidade das TIC. A Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico (OECD), em estudo sobre TIC em saúde, afirmou que, se implantadas de maneira eficiente, as TIC podem resultar em melhoria da qualidade na prestação de serviços de saúde, aumento da segurança no atendimento ao paciente e custos menores. Para permitir a comparação de resultados e o uso de modelos de pesquisa confiáveis, este estudo adaptou o Modelo de Pesquisa de Uso de TI utilizado pelo GVcia - Centro de Tecnologia da Informação Aplicada da FGV – EAESP e realizou uma complementação dos instrumentos de pesquisa para levantar dados específicos da integração das TIC em hospitais utilizando com referência uma pesquisa aplicada a hospitais norte-americanos. A coleta de dados foi realizada para o período 2009 a 2015 em duas etapas. Na primeira, foi enviado o questionário eletrônico, validado por executivos de hospitais e apresentado no apêndice A. Na segunda etapa, os dados enviados foram validados e aspectos da integração foram esclarecidos por meio de entrevistas. O estudo de custo e uso das TIC resultou no cálculo de diversos indicadores. Gastos e investimentos com TIC em hospitais privados atingiu a 3,5% do faturamento anual dos hospitais da amostra enquanto que o setor da saúde, por sua vez, gastou e investiu 6,4% do faturamento anual com as TIC que implementou. Outro indicador inédito e importante para futuros estudos no setor é o custo anual das TIC por leito hospitalar que permaneceu estável em torno de US$ 39.000 entre 2010 e 2014 e caiu para US$ 36.000 em 2015, valor equivalente a R$ 120.000 de dezembro de 2015. Outras estatísticas e indicadores apresentados no estudo ajudam a entender a evolução e o desempenho das TIC na prestação de serviços de saúde e poderão ser úteis para decidir se as TIC ajudarão a melhorar a segurança e atenção ao paciente, aos profissionais de saúde no acesso a dados do paciente, e a necessária sintonia com o Modelo da Saúde Digital (e-Saúde), a custos adequados. Os resultados do presente estudo são comparáveis aos americanos semelhantes e permitem inferir que o parque tecnológico em uso nos hospitais privados brasileiros poderá alavancar a integração de sistemas existentes, permitindo a sintonia com Modelos de Saúde Digital, com a melhoria de desempenho da cadeia estendida da saúde na atenção ao cidadão que poderá ser assistido onde estiver, a qualquer momento, com segurança. Ação gerencial e investimentos são os tópicos centrais que envolvem a integração.
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Urban Mass Transportation Administration, Washington, D.C.