Atmospheres of law: senses, affects, lawscapes

In this article, I deal with airs and sounds and scents, while keeping an eye on the law. My field of enquiry is the interstitial area between sensory and affective occurrences, namely sensory experiences that are traditionally thought to be a causal result of external stimuli, and affective experiences that are mostly associated with emotional changes and generally allude to something internal. I am arguing that there is no constructive difference between internal and external origin of occurrences. In its stead, I suggest the concept of atmosphere, namely an attempt at understanding affective occurrences as excessive, collective, spatial and elemental. However, it quickly becomes apparent that an atmosphere is legally determined. The law controls affective occurrences by regulating property of sensory stimulation. At the same time, the law guides bodies into corridors of sensory compulsion – an aspect of which is consumerism in capitalist societies. The law achieves this by allowing certain sensory options to come forth while suppressing others, something which is particularly obvious in cases of intellectual property protection that capture the sensorial. I deal with the law in its material, spatial manifestation and in particular through what I have called the ‘lawscape’, namely the fusion of space and normativity. I employ a broadly Deleuzian methodology with insights from radical geography, affective studies, and urban and critical legal theory in order to develop and link the various parts of the text.

The world without outside

The world is all that there is. In the world, ontology and epistemology coincide. The thing and the perspective are part of it, scale is ingested in its multiplicity, communication stops at the world's edge. By reading together Deleuze and Guattari's plane of immanence and Niklas Luhmann's proto-global concept of Weltgesellschaft (“world society”), I suggest a conceptualisation of the world as the materiality of the multiple spaces of creation in an insular, all-inclusive immanence. Deprived of an outside, the world pushes its own understanding of circumference through, first, the expansion of its own limits through the process of worlding, and, second, the multiplication of modes of material (self-)production through its process of othering. Thus, the world swells up from the inside and expands on both the material and the semantic level, producing a multiplicity of fractal microcosms. Issues of responsibility and justice arise that are intricately linked to the materiality of the world and take place in and between the various bodies and spaces of the world but without an overarching hierarchy or principle. This approach is a way of counteracting the all-pervasive Hegelian understanding of synthesis, arguing instead for a plenitude that brims with positivity and that can never become fully complete. The world remains its own infinite process of worlding.

Critical autopoiesis and the materiality of law

Autopoietic theory is increasingly seen as a candidate for a radical theory of law, both in relation to its theoretical credentials and its relevance in terms of new and emerging forms of law. An aspect of the theory that has remained less developed, however, is its material side, and more concretely the theory’s accommodation of bodies, space, objects and their claim to legal agency. The present article reads Luhmann’s theory of autopoietic systems in a radical and material manner, linking it on the one hand to current post-structural theorisations of law and society, and on the other hand extending its ambit to accommodate the influx of material considerations that have been working their way through various other disciplines. The latter comprises both a materialisation of the theory itself and ways of conceptualising the legal system as material through and through. This I do by further developing what I have called Critical Autopoiesis, namely an acentric, topological, post-ecological and posthuman understanding of Luhmann’s theory, that draws on Deleuzian thought, feminist theory, geography, non-representational theory, and new material and object-oriented ontologies. These are combined with some well-rehearsed autopoietic concepts, such as distinction, environment and boundaries; Luhmann’s earlier work on materiality continuum; more recent work on bodies and space; as well as his work on form and medium in relation to art. The article concludes with five suggestions for an understanding of what critical autopoietic materiality might mean for law.