Optimal water use: is anyone getting the right incentives in California?

This paper discusses ~he widespread inefficiency in water pricing today and uses the State of California as an example. After solving the Planner' s Problem I conclude that water for irrigation should cost more than for domestic use. The optimal price leveI can be calculated from a correct measure of the true marginal cost of supply.

Optimal provision of implicit and explicit incentives in asset management contracts

This paper investigates the importance of the fiow of funds as an implicit incetive provided by investors to portfolio managers in a two-period relationship. We show that the fiow of funds is a powerful incentive in an asset management contract. We build a binomial moral hazard model to explain the main trade-ofIs in the relationship between fiow, fees and performance. The main assumption is that efIort depend" on the combination of implicit and explicit incentives while the probability distrioutioll function of returns depends on efIort. In the case of full commitment, the investor's relevant trade-ofI is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce efIort in the first período The more concerned the investor is with today's payoff. the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the following periods. That is. in the second period, the investor penalizes observed low returns by withdrawing resources from non-performing portfolio managers. Besides, he pays performance fee when the observed excess return is positive. When commitment is not a plausible hypothesis, we consider that the investor also learns some symmetríc and imperfect information about the ability of the manager to generate positive excess returno In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as efIort choices exerted by the portfolio manager. We show that implicit incentives can explain the fiow-performance relationship and, conversely, endogenous expected return determines incentives provision and define their optimal leveIs. We provide a numerical solution in Matlab that characterize these results.

Demand expectations and the timing of stimulus policies

This paper proposes a simple macroeconomic model with staggered investment decisions. The model captures the dynamic coordination problem arising from demand externalities and fixed costs of investment. In times of low economic activity, a firm faces low demand and hence has less incentives for investing, which reinforces firms’ expectations of low demand. In the unique equilibrium of the model, demand expectations are pinned down by fundamentals and history. Owing to the beliefs that arise in equilibrium, there is no special reason for stimulus at times of low economic activity.

Optimal two-sided tests for instrumental variables regression with heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors

This paper considers two-sided tests for the parameter of an endogenous variable in an instrumental variable (IV) model with heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors. We develop the nite-sample theory of weighted-average power (WAP) tests with normal errors and a known long-run variance. We introduce two weights which are invariant to orthogonal transformations of the instruments; e.g., changing the order in which the instruments appear. While tests using the MM1 weight can be severely biased, optimal tests based on the MM2 weight are naturally two-sided when errors are homoskedastic. We propose two boundary conditions that yield two-sided tests whether errors are homoskedastic or not. The locally unbiased (LU) condition is related to the power around the null hypothesis and is a weaker requirement than unbiasedness. The strongly unbiased (SU) condition is more restrictive than LU, but the associated WAP tests are easier to implement. Several tests are SU in nite samples or asymptotically, including tests robust to weak IV (such as the Anderson-Rubin, score, conditional quasi-likelihood ratio, and I. Andrews' (2015) PI-CLC tests) and two-sided tests which are optimal when the sample size is large and instruments are strong. We refer to the WAP-SU tests based on our weights as MM1-SU and MM2-SU tests. Dropping the restrictive assumptions of normality and known variance, the theory is shown to remain valid at the cost of asymptotic approximations. The MM2-SU test is optimal under the strong IV asymptotics, and outperforms other existing tests under the weak IV asymptotics.

Optimal unemployment insurance for couples

This work analyzes the optimal design of an unemployment insurance program for couples, whose joint search problem in the labor market differ significantly from the problem faced by single agents. We use a version of the sequential search model of the labor market adapted to married agents to compare optimal constant policies for single and married agents, as well as characterize the optimal constant policy when the agency faces single and married agents simultaneously. Our main result is that an agency that gives equal weights to single and married agents will want to give equal utility promises to both types of agents and spend more on the single agent.

Optimal monetary policy under administered prices

This work aims to analyze the interaction and the effects of administered prices in the economy, through a DSGE model and the derivation of optimal monetary policies. The model used is a standard New Keynesian DSGE model of a closed economy with two sectors companies. In the first sector, free prices, there is a continuum of firms, and in the second sector of administered prices, there is a single firm. In addition, the model has positive trend inflation in the steady state. The model results suggest that price movements in any sector will impact on both sectors, for two reasons. Firstly, the price dispersion causes productivity to be lower. As the dispersion of prices is a change in the relative price of any sector, relative to general prices in the economy, when a movement in the price of a sector is not followed by another, their relative weights will change, leading to an impact on productivity in both sectors. Second, the path followed by the administered price sector is considered in future inflation expectations, which is used by companies in the free sector to adjust its optimal price. When this path leads to an expectation of higher inflation, the free sector companies will choose a higher mark-up to accommodate this expectation, thus leading to higher inflation trend when there is imperfect competition in the free sector. Finally, the analysis of optimal policies proved inconclusive, certainly indicating that there is influence of the adjustment model of administered prices in the definition of optimal monetary policy, but a quantitative study is needed to define the degree of impact.

Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets

We study optimal labor income taxation in non-competitive labor markets. Firms offer screening contracts to workers who have private information about their productivity. A planner endowed with a Paretian social welfare function tries to induce allocations that maximize its objective. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for implementation of constrained efficient allocations using tax schedules. All allocations that are implementable by a tax schedule display negative marginal tax rates for almost all workers. Not all allocations that are implementable in a competitive setting are implementable in this noncompetitive environment.

Non-asymptotic confidence bounds for the optimal value of a stochastic program

We discuss a general approach to building non-asymptotic confidence bounds for stochastic optimization problems. Our principal contribution is the observation that a Sample Average Approximation of a problem supplies upper and lower bounds for the optimal value of the problem which are essentially better than the quality of the corresponding optimal solutions. At the same time, such bounds are more reliable than “standard” confidence bounds obtained through the asymptotic approach. We also discuss bounding the optimal value of MinMax Stochastic Optimization and stochastically constrained problems. We conclude with a small simulation study illustrating the numerical behavior of the proposed bounds.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

Effect of timing of estradiol benzoate administration upon synchronization of ovulation in suckling Nelore cows (Bos indicus) treated with a progesterone-releasing intravaginal device

The present study investigated how the timing of the administration of estradiol benzoate (EB) impacted the synchronization of ovulation in fixed-time artificial insemination protocols of cattle. To accomplish this, two experiments were conducted, with EB injection occurring at different times: at withdrawal of the progesterone-releasing (N) intravaginal device or 24 h later. The effectiveness of these times was compared by examining ovarian follicular dynamics (Experiment 1, n = 30) and conception rates (Experiment 2, n = 504). In Experiment 1, follicular dynamics was performed in 30 Nelore cows (Bos indicus) allocated into two groups. on a random day of the estrous cycle (Day 0), both groups received 2 mg of EB i.m. and a P4-releasing intravaginal device, which was removed on Day 8, when 400 IU of eCG and 150 mu g of PGF were administered. The control group (G-EB9; n = 15) received 1 mg of EB on Day 9, while Group EB8 (G-EB8; n = 15) received the same dose a day earlier. Ovarian ultrasonographic evaluations were performed every 8 h after device removal until ovulation. The timing of EB administration (Day 8 compared with Day 9) did affect the interval between P4 device removal to ovulation (59.4 +/- 2.0 h compared with 69.3 +/- 1.7 h) and maximum diameter of dominant (1.54 +/- 0.06 a cm compared with 1.71 +/- 0.05 b cm, P = 0.03) and ovulatory (1.46 +/- 0.05 a cm compared with 1.58 +/- 0.04 b cm, P < 0.01) follicles. In Experiment 2,504 suckling cows received the same treatment described in Experiment 1, but insemination was performed as follows: Group EB8-AI48h (G-EB8-AI48h; n = 119) and Group EB8-AI54h (G-EB8-AI54h; n = 134) received 1 mg of EB on Day 8 and FrAI was performed, respectively, 48 or 54 h after P4 device removal. Group EB9-AI48h (G-EB9-AI48h; n = 126) and Group EB9-AI54h (G-EB9-AI54h n = 125) received the same treatments and underwent the same FTAI protocols as G-EB8-AI48h and G-EB8-AI54h, respectively; however, EB was administered on Day 9. Conception rates were greater (P < 0.05) in G-EB9-AI54h 163.2% (79/125) a], G-EB9-AI48h [58.7% (74/126) a] and G-EB8-AI48h [58.8% (70/119) a] than in G-EB8-AI54h [34.3% (46/134) b]. We concluded that when EB administration occurred at device withdrawal (D8), the interval to ovulation shortened and dominant and ovulatory follicle diameters decreased. Furthermore, when EB treatment was performed 24 h after device removal, FTAI conducted at either 48 or 54 h resulted in similar conception rates. However, EB treatment on the same day as device withdrawal resulted in a lesser conception rate when FTAI was conducted 54 h after device removal. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Cover crops and herbicide timing management on soybean yield under no-tillage system

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Different timing of whitefly control and soybean yield

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

Optimal Conditions for Biomass and Recombinant Glycerol Kinase Production Using the Yeast Pichia pastoris

The extracellular glycerol kinase gene from Saccharomyces cerevisiae (GUT]) was cloned into the expression vector pPICZ alpha. A and integrated into the genome of the methylotrophic yeast Pichia pastoris X-33. The presence of the GUT1 insert was confirmed by PCR analysis. Four clones were selected and the functionality of the recombinant enzyme was assayed. Among the tested clones, one exhibited glycerol kinase activity of 0.32 U/mL, with specific activity of 0.025 U/mg of protein. A medium optimized for maximum biomass production by recombinant Pichia pastoris in shaker cultures was initially explored, using 2.31 % (by volume) glycerol as the carbon source. Optimization was carried out by response surface methodology (RSM). In preliminary experiments, following a Plackett-Burman design, glycerol volume fraction (phi(Gly)) and growth time (t) were selected as the most important factors in biomass production. Therefore, subsequent experiments, carried out to optimize biomass production, followed a central composite rotatable design as a function of phi(Gly) and time. Glycerol volume fraction proved to have a significant positive linear effect on biomass production. Also, time was a significant factor (at linear positive and quadratic levels) in biomass production. Experimental data were well fitted by a convex surface representing a second order polynomial model, in which biomass is a function of both factors (R(2)=0.946). Yield and specific activity of glycerol kinase were mainly affected by the additions of glycerol and methanol to the medium. The optimized medium composition for enzyme production was: 1 % yeast extract, 1 % peptone, 100 mM potassium phosphate buffer, pH=6.0, 1.34 % yeast nitrogen base (YNB), 4.10(-5) % biotin, 1 %, methanol and 1 %, glycerol, reaching 0.89 U/mL of glycerol kinase activity and 14.55 g/L of total protein in the medium after 48 h of growth.