Thinking out of the box – skills for work

Since the Dearing Report .1 there has been an increased emphasis on the development of employability and transferable (‘soft’) skills in undergraduate programmes. Within STEM subject areas, recent reports concluded that universities should offer ‘greater and more sustainable variety in modes of study to meet the changing demands of industry and students’.2 At the same time, higher education (HE) institutions are increasingly conscious of the sensitivity of league table positions on employment statistics and graduate destinations. Modules that are either credit or non-credit bearing are finding their way into the core curriculum at HE. While the UK government and other educational bodies argue the way forward over A-level reform, universities must also meet the needs of their first year cohorts in terms of the secondary to tertiary transition and developing independence in learning.

A model intervenes: the many faces of moral hazard

This article builds on advances in social ontology to develop a new understanding of how mainstream economic modelling affects reality. We propose a new framework for analysing and describing how models intervene in the social sphere. This framework allows us to identify and articulate three key epistemic features of models as interventions: specificity, portability and formal precision. The second part of the article uses our framework to demonstrate how specificity, portability and formal precision explain the use of moral hazard models in a variety of different policy contexts, including worker compensation schemes, bank regulation and the euro-sovereign debt crisis.

Only connect: an annotated bibliography reflecting the breadth and diversity of systems thinking

The field of systems thinking is both broad and diverse. This paper tries to provide assistance to outsiders wishing to find out what systems thinking is and also to insiders interested in exploring areas of the systems movement other than their own. A selection of books, papers and articles is given. Each has a full reference and a brief annotation, this being an account of, and a critical comment on, its content. The selection does not aim to be definitive or authoritative and obviously displays the predilections of the authors. However, the hope is that it will convey a sense of the intellectual and practical endeavours that, to the authors, constitute systems thinking and that it may aid the exploration of the range of holistic ideas that people have found useful in thinking about and acting in the world.

Trying to think systematically about 'systems thinking'

I noticed with interest that Peter Checkland has now contributed' to the debate on the use of the term 'systems thinking' in a paper by Eric Wolstenholme2. However, due to the self-confessed lag in his reading schedule, Peter is responding to the original piece and not to any of the subsequent observations on it3'4 (although he is kind enough to reference some of my other work on the matter).

Whole life thinking and engineering the future

Whole-life thinking for engineers working on the built environment has become more important in a fast changing world.Engineers are increasingly concerned with complex systems, in which the parts interact with each other and with the outside world in many ways – the relationships between the parts determine how the system behaves. Systems thinking provides one approach to developing a more robust whole life approach. Systems thinking is a process of understanding how things influence one another within a wider perspective. Complexity, chaos, and risk are endemic in all major projects. New approaches are needed to produce more reliable whole life predictions. Best value, rather than lowest cost can be achieved by using whole-life appraisal as part of the design and delivery strategy.

Expecting moral philosophers to be reliable

Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that philosophers’ experience in philosophy plausibly affects their intuitions. Consequently, the type of argument Ryberg offers fails to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy.

Blending systems thinking approaches for organisational analysis: reviewing child protection in England

This paper concerns the innovative use of a blend of systems thinking ideas in the ‘Munro Review of Child Protection’, a high-profile examination of child protection activities in England, conducted for the Department for Education. We go ‘behind the scenes’ to describe the OR methodologies and processes employed. The circumstances that led to the Review are outlined. Three specific contributions that systems thinking made to the Review are then described. First, the systems-based analysis and visualisation of how a ‘compliance culture’ had grown up. Second the creation of a large, complex systems map of current operations and the effects of past policies on them. Third, how the map gave shape to the range of issues the Review addressed and acted as an organising framework for the systemically coherent set of recommendations made. The paper closes with an outline of the main implementation steps taken so far to create a child protection system with the critically reflective properties of a learning organisation, and methodological reflections on the benefits of systems thinking to support organisational analysis.

Pippi Longstocking, juvenile delinquent? Hachette, self-censorship and the moral reconstruction of postwar France

This paper looks at the blockages to the publication of children’s literature caused by the intellectual climate of the postwar era, through a case study of the editorial policy of Hachette, the largest publisher for children at this time. This period witnessed heightened tensions surrounding the social and humanitarian responsibilities of literature. Writers were blamed for having created a culture of defeatism, and collaborationist authors were punished harshly in the purges. In the case of children’s literature, the discourse on responsibility was made more urgent by the assumption that children were easily influenced by their reading material, and by the centrality of the young to the discourse on the moral reconstruction of France. As the politician and education reformer Gustave Monod put it: “penser l’avenir, c’est penser le sort des enfants et de la jeunesse.” These concerns led to the expansion of associations and publications dedicated to protecting children and promoting “good” reading matter for them, and, famously, to the 1949 law regulating publications for children, which banned the depiction of crime, debauchery and violence that might demoralise young readers. Using the testimonials of former employees, along with readers’ reports and editorial correspondence preserved in the Hachette archives, this paper will examine how individual editorial decisions and self-censorship strategies were shaped by the 1949 law with its attendant discourse of moral panic on children’s reading, and how national concerns for future citizens were balanced with commercial imperatives.

Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the effect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy.