The adoption of IPSASs in the Iberian Peninsula: the perspective of the standar-setters

The last decades have been fruitful in reforms in public sector accounting across the world, namely moving from cash-based into accrual-based regimes. In this process of bringing public sector accounting close to business accounting, International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSASs) have been developed and adopted in several countries. In the EU context, public sector harmonization among member-States is currently being considered, namely via the development of European Public Sector Accounting Standards (EPSASs). Both IPSASs and EPSASs are understood as, among other things, important to contribute for a more informative and transparent financial reporting of public sector entities and governments. Moreover they are expected to approximate public sector accounting and the National Accounts, hence allowing for more reliable information to monitor fiscal discipline among EU countries. The Iberian countries, after using accrual accounting in the public sector for more than twenty years (Spain from middle 1980s and Portugal from 1990s), have acknowledged the need to embark in an international harmonization process adopting IPSASs, particularly after the adoption of IFRSs in the business sector, which was creating some difficulties for consolidated accounts. Spain has passed the Chart of Accounts for the Public Sector through the Order EHA/1037/2010, which is adapted to IPSASs; Portugal has just passed Law-decree 192/2015, September 11, and is expecting to start implementation in 2017. In both countries a central role in this reform has been assumed by the national standard-setters for public sector accounting. Based on the “Actor Network Theory” to help understanding how and why organizations interact and how this interaction could have an impact on their choice of accounting policies, this paper aims to analyse, from the Iberian public sector accounting standard-setters perspective, how the adoption/adaptation of IPSASs has been considered and developed in these countries. Research questions to be considered are the following, which will be asked in interviews to the members of the standard-setting committees in both Portugal and Spain: • What were the driving forces leading to the decision to adopt and implement IPSASs? • Which other governmental bodies’ experiences, if any, were considered in the adoption of IPSASs? • What specific steps were/are being undertaken to prepare for the conversion from the existing system to IPSASs? • What were/are the institutional challenges faced/expected to face? • What assistance have been received from IFAC and/or IPSASB, or from other sources, if any, throughout the adoption/implementation? • How can the success of the adoption/implementation be characterised? • What benefits can/have the government derive/derived from the adoption and implementation of IPSASs? The paper is expected to contribute to the understanding of the issues underlying the process of embarking in public sector accounting reforms towards IPSASs.

Saving the Monopsony: Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Power in the Media Sector. Research Papers in Law, 7/2006

From the Introduction. The Media Sector has experienced a technological revolution in the last 15 years. Digital encoding of television signals made possible a more efficient use of the radiospectrum. Digital terrestrial television (hereinafter, “DTT”) allows now for the reception of a significant number of free-to-air channels.1 Moreover, the use of new transmission platforms (hereinafter,“platforms”), namely cable and direct-to-home satellite (hereinafter, “DTH”) paved the way for the arrival in Europe of pay-TV operators, which finance their activities mainly via subscription fees. This changing technological landscape is subject to further evolution in the near future, as incumbent telecommunications operators become increasingly interested in making available broadcasting content2 as part of their broadband offer and 3G mobile handsets can be used for the reception of TV signals....The present paper seeks to ascertain whether the Commission “regulatory approach” towards the exclusive sale of premium content is a sound one, in particular in view of the constant technological evolution outlined above. The assumptions underlying landmark Commission decisions will be compared with recent developments of the media sector in Italy. In the NewsCorp./Telepiù case, decided in 2003, the Commission imposed very strict conditions to allow the merger giving birth to Sky Italia, on the assumption that the operation created a lasting near-monopsony in the different upstream markets for the acquisition of premium intervened against the media conglomerate Mediaset (which controls, inter alia, the main three private free-to-air channels in Italy) for an alleged abuse of dominant position.17 In fact, and contrary to the forecasts made by the Commission, Mediaset was in a position to acquire the broadcasting rights of the main Italian football teams, thereby excluding the incumbent (and near-monopolist) pay-TV operator, Sky Italia. This may go to show that the reality of the sector is more complex and evolves faster than one may infer from the Commission practice, thus putting into question its stance regarding exclusivity. The experience of the evolution of the Italian media sector will be used as the starting point for the evaluation of alternative regulatory options.