Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2003

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2003

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2004

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2004

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2005

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2005

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2006

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2006

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2008

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2008

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2011

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2011

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2012

Report on the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System (IPERS) for the year ended June 30, 2012

Waste Authority of Jackson County (formerly known as the Jackson County Sanitary Disposal Agency) independent auditor's reports, basic financial statements, required supplementary information, schedule of findings, June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Waste Authority of Jackson County (formerly known as the Jackson County Sanitary Disposal Agency) for the year ended June 30, 2012

Ringgold County Early Childhood Iowa Area independent auditor's reports, basic financial statements, schedule of findings, June 30, 2012

Audit report on the Ringgold County Early Childhood Iowa Area for the year ended June 30, 2012

City of Villisca independent auditor's reports, basic financial statements, supplementary and other information, schedule of findings, June 30

Audit report on the City of Villisca, Iowa for the year ended June 30, 2012

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2010

Comprehensive annual financial report of the Iowa Public Employees’ Retirement System for the Fiscal Year ended June 30, 2010

City Of Mechanicsville Independent Auditor’s Reports Basic Financial Statements And Supplementary Information Schedule Of Findings June 30, 2008.

Annual audit report for Mechanicsville, Iowa.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

The INTERNORM Project: Bridging Two Worlds of Expert- and Lay-Knowledge in Standardization

This paper presents a pilot project to reinforce participatory practices in standardization. The INTERNORM project creates an interactive knowledge center based on the sharing of academic skills and experiences accumulated by the civil society, especially consumer associations, environmental associations and trade unions to strengthen the participatory process of standardization. The first objective of the project is action-oriented: INTERNORM provides a common knowledge pool supporting the participation of civil society actors to international standard-setting activities by bringing them together with academic experts in working groups and providing logistic and financial support to their participation in meetings of national and international technical committees. The second objective is analytical: the standardization action provides a research field for a better understanding of the participatory dynamics underpinning international standardization. This paper presents three incentives that explain civil society (non-)involvement in standardization that overcome conventional resource-based hypotheses: an operational incentive related to the use of standards in the selective goods provided by associations to their membership; a thematic incentive provided by the setting of priorities by strategic committees created in some standardization organization; and a rhetorical incentive related to the discursive resource that civil society concerns offers to the different stakeholders.