The finance-welfare state nexus. ACES Cases No. 2013.1

At the height of the financial crisis, the Western welfare state prevented a repeat of the Great Depression. But there were also suggestions that social policy had contributed to the crisis, particularly by promoting households’ access to credit in pursuit of welfare goals. Others claim that it was the withdrawal of state welfare that led to the disaster. Against this background that motivated our interest, we propose a systematic way of assessing the relationship between financial market and public welfare provisions. We use structural vector auto-regression to establish the causal link and its direction. Two hypotheses about this relationship can be inferred from the literature. First, the notion that welfare states ‘decommodify’ livelihoods or that there is an equity-efficiency tradeoff would suggest that welfare states substitute to varying degrees for financial market offers of insurance and savings. By contrast, welfare states may support private interests selectively and/or help markets for households to function better; thus the nexus would be one of complementarity. Our empirical strategy is to spell out the causal mechanisms that can account for a substitutive or complementary relationship and then to see whether advanced econometric techniques find evidence for the existence of either of these mechanisms in six OECD countries. We find complementarity between public welfare (spending and tax subsidies) and life insurance markets for four out of our six countries, notably even for the United States. Substitution between welfare and finance is the more plausible interpretation for France and the Netherlands, which is surprising. Data availability constrains us from testing the implications for the welfare state contribution to the crisis directly but our findings suggest that the welfare state cannot generally be blamed for the financial crisis.

Focal points and fiscal discipline. ACES Cases No. 2013.2

Many studies suggest that balanced budget rules can restrain sovereign debt and lower sovereign borrowing costs, even if those rules are never enforced in court. Typically, this is explained as a result of a legal deterrence logic, in which the threat of judicial enforcement deters sovereigns from violating the rules. By contrast, we argue that balanced budget rules work by coordinating decentralized punishment of sovereigns by bond markets, rather than by posing a credible threat of judicial enforcement. Therefore, the clarity of the focal point provided by the rule, rather than the strength of its judicial enforcement mechanisms, determines its effectiveness. We develop a formal model that captures the logic of our argument, and we assess this model using data on US states. We then consider implications of our argument for the impact of the balanced budget rules recently imposed on eurozone states in the Fiscal Compact Treaty.

Germany and the Eurocrisis: The timing of politics and the politics of timing. ACES Cases No. 2014.3

This paper speculates on the future of the euro. It uses Germany as a prism for the discussion about what might be done next to bolster the Euro. Researching the future—always a challenging task—is made harder when multiple state actors contend for prominence on the basis of shifting coalitions at home, all while interacting at an international level. That said, almost everyone accepts that German choices will play the central role in the path ultimately chosen. This paper thus foregrounds Germany’s role in shaping the way ahead, and it does so through an explicitly political framework focused primarily on the electoral implausibility of an alternative German policy course.

Banking Sector Soundness, Innovation, and Development: Emerging Europe and South Asia. ACES Working Papers, 2012

While most academic and practitioner researchers agree that a country’s commercial banking sector’s soundness is a very significant indicator of a country’s financial market health, there is considerably less agreement and substantial confusion surrounding what constitutes a healthy bank in the aftermath of 2007+ financial crisis. Global banks’ balance sheets, corporate governance, management compensation and bonuses, toxic assets, and risky behavior are all under scrutiny as academics and regulators alike are trying to quantify what are “healthy, safe and good practices” for these various elements of banking. The current need to quantify, measure, evaluate, and compare is driven by the desire to spot troubled banks, “bad and risky” behavior, and prevent real damage and contagion in the financial markets, investors, and tax payers as it did in the recent crisis. Moreover, future financial crisis has taken on a new urgency as vast amounts of capital flows (over $1 trillion) are being redirected to emerging markets. This study differs from existing methods in the literature as it entail designing, constructing, and validating a critical dimension of financial innovation in respect to the eight developing countries in the South Asia region as well as eight countries in emerging Europe at the country level for the period 2001 – 2008, with regional and systemic differentials taken into account. Preliminary findings reveal that higher stages of payment systems development have generated efficiency gains by reducing the settlement risk and improving financial intermediation; such efficiency gains are viewed as positive financial innovations and positively impact the banking soundness. Potential EU candidate countries: Albania; Montenegro; Serbia

Grexit 2015: A primer. CEPS Commentary, 22 January 2015

In the run-up to the Greek elections on January 25th and the subsequent renegotiation of the country's economic adjustment programme with the troika, Daniel Gros writes in this Commentary that "nobody officially wants Grexit": not Syriza, which wants Greece to stay in the euro. It is ‘only’ asking for a reduction in Greece’s official debt and an end to austerity. The German government also does not favour Grexit because European unification remains the central project for German policy-makers across all mainstream parties. Only some protest parties and vocal economists think Greece (and Germany) would better off with a new Drachma. In his view, the substantive issues are thus the demands for a reduction of the official debt of Greece and an end to austerity, both of which he describes as eminently fudgeable. In any event, change in policy will be minor if a Syriza government is as successful in fulfilling its promise to spend as the previous government was in promising not to spend.

The New EU Criminal Law Competence in Action: The Proposal for a Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2013

The aim of this paper is to analyse the proposed Directive on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation (COM(2011)654 final), which represents the first exercise of the European Union competence provided for by Article 83(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The proposal aims at harmonising the sanctioning regimes provided by the Member States for market abuse, imposing the introduction of criminal sanctions and providing an opportunity to critically reflect on the position taken by the Commission towards the use of criminal law. The paper will discuss briefly the evolution of the EU’s criminal law competence, focusing on the Lisbon Treaty. It will analyse the ‘essentiality standard’ for the harmonisation of criminal law included in Article 83(2) TFEU, concluding that this standard encompasses both the subsidiarity and the ultima ratio principles and implies important practical consequences for the Union’s legislator. The research will then focus on the proposed Directive, trying to assess if the Union’s legislator, notwithstanding the ‘symbolic’ function of this proposal in the financial crisis, provides consistent arguments on the respect of the ‘essentiality standard’. The paper will note that the proposal raises some concerns, because of the lack of a clear reliance on empirical data regarding the essential need for the introduction of criminal law provisions. It will be stressed that only the assessment of the essential need of an EU action, according to the standard set in Article 83(2) TFEU, can guarantee a coherent choice of the areas interested by the harmonisation process, preventing the legislator to choose on the basis of other grounds.

Flashlight Europe No° 1 – January 2015. Tsipras Will Have to Put His Cards on the Table

Alexis Tsipras, the new Greek prime minister, has announced that he intends to terminate the policy of austerity and that “subservience is over.” How will this affect policymaking in the euro-zone? Is the troika going to reconsider its positions? Will the other crisis-ridden states join in the rebellion? And what has all this got to do with the European Central Bank and “quantitative easing?” Henrik Enderlein, who is Professor of Political Economy at the Hertie School of Governance and Director of Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin, provides some answers to these questions.

The Cost of Servicing Greece’s Debt: A Sisyphean task? CEPS Commentary, 4 February 2015

Following the victory of Syriza in the Greek elections on January 25th, policy-makers, economists and concerned EU citizens are scrambling to understand the causes, modalities and consequences of a possible Greek default in order to anticipate and prepare for what is likely to unfold in the coming weeks and months. The debate on the sustainability of Greek public finances has often been characterised by a lack of clarity and even a certain degree of confusion. This brief note focuses first on the cost that Greece faces in servicing its debt and then asks whether this is a manageable or a Sisyphean task. It concludes by reflecting on the political implications of the new government’s announced intentions and whether these are being taken into account in the current debate over debt restructuring.

A Greek way out? CEPS Commentary, 5 February 2015

In his analysis of the basic compromise that is emerging between the new left-wing government of Greece and its European partners, Daniel Gros emphasises that the key element will be how the real problem, namely liquidity, is dealt with.

The Greek Austerity Myth. CEPS Commentary, 10 February 2015

Since Syriza’s victory in Greece’s recent general election, some fear a return to the uncertainty of 2012, when many thought that a Greek default and exit from the eurozone were imminent and that a Greek debt crisis could destabilise – and perhaps even bring down – Europe’s monetary union. CEPS Director Daniel Gros explains in this CEPS Commentary how this time really is different.

The Relevance of International Spillovers and Asymmetric Effects in the Taylor Rule. CEPS Working Document No. 403, February 2015

Deviations of policy interest rates from the levels implied by the Taylor rule have been persistent before the financial crisis and increased especially after the turn of the century. Compared to the Taylor benchmark, policy rates were often too low. This paper provides evidence that both international spillovers, for instance international dependencies in the interest rate-setting of central banks, and nonlinear reaction patterns can offer a more realistic specification of the Taylor rule in the main industrial countries. The inclusion of international spillovers and, even more, nonlinear dynamics improves the explanatory power of standard Taylor reaction functions. Deviations from Taylor rates tend to be smaller and their negative trend can be eliminated.

The end of fiscal waterboarding? CEPS Commentary, 23 February 2015

In this Commentary, Daniel Gros argues that linking the primary surplus demanded of the new Greek government to the state of the economy is a sound approach. Some flexibility is warranted on this account, but the concept should be used to distribute the effort better over time, not to wriggle out of it.

Labour Mobility in Europe: An untapped resource? CEPS Policy Brief No. 327, March 2015

Despite public perceptions, labour mobility is low in the EU, particularly within the euro area. The authors of this Policy Brief make four main points: first, that the economic and financial crisis has affected mobility patterns by redirecting flows away from the periphery, thus showing the limits of labour mobility potential within the current eurozone - largely due to the negligible mobility of nationals from large countries hit by the crisis. Second, east-west mobility has not been fundamentally affected by the crisis, and ten years after the eastern enlargement the number of East Europeans living in EU15 should be of no overall concern. Third, the long-term economic effects of mobility are uncertain, but potential negative effects are more likely to show up in sending countries than in receiving ones. Finally, in view of the lessons learned from the economic crisis, the Commission and member states should adopt a longer-term view on labour mobility. The authors recommend a further upgrade of job-matching tools, namely the EURES system, and should foster better recognition of qualifications and the exchange of best practices among mobility networks. In order to improve mobility in the longer term, the Commission and member states should improve the mobility of third-country nationals – starting with those completing tertiary education at an EU institution and able to find employment. The aim of improving mobility gives new impetus to the ‘mother tongue + two foreign languages’ objective and the European Benchmark of Language Competences Initiative, in particular competence in the first foreign language taught at school.

Will this time be different for Greece? How to assess its ability to deliver on the reform agenda. CEPS Commentary, 13 March 2015

Taking its inspiration from the ongoing debate on whether this time will be different for Greece and whether Syriza will deliver on its reform promises to the European partners, this Commentary expresses bemusement that the public debate on such an important issue as well as internal discussions among senior policy-makers frequently resort to ‘gut feelings’ or simple stereotypes. To counteract this tendency, the author presents a simple analytical framework that can be used to assess the likelihood that a government will deliver on its reform agenda. Its purpose is not to allow for a precise probabilistic calculation, but to enable better structuring of the knowledge we have. It emphasises that the change depends NOT only on the capacity of the state to design and deliver policies, but even more crucially on state autonomy from both illegitimate and legitimate interests and cognitive models used by policy-makers to make sense of the world.

Money, Finance and the Real Economy: What went wrong? CEPS Paperback, 17 March 2015

The functions of the financial system of a developed economy are often badly understood. This can largely be attributed to free-market ideology, which has spread the belief that leaving finance to its own devices would provide the best possible mechanism for allocating savings. The latest financial crisis has sparked the beginnings of a new awareness on this point, but it is far from having led to an improved understanding of the role of the financial institutions. For many people, finance remains more an enemy to be resisted than an instrument to be intelligently exploited. Its institutions, which issue and circulate money, play an important role in the working of the real economy that it would be imprudent to neglect. The allocation of savings, but also the level of activity and the growth rate depend on it. In this book, the authors carefully analyse the close links between money, finance and the real economy. In the process, they show why today the existence of a substantial potential of saving, instead of being an opportunity for the world economy, could threaten it with ‘secular stagnation’.