990 resultados para FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE


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Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program, April 2006

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Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs April 2006

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The Food Assistance Monthly Participation Report is a monthly summary of Food Assistance program participation, Statewide and for each Iowa county. Breakouts are reported for participants also in the FIP program, those only receiving Food Assistance, and those that are receiving economic assistance under other programs (primarily Medicaid). This report may also be known as the F-1 Report.

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G-1, Appeal Activity in the Public Assistance Programs, May 2006

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The Food Assistance Monthly Participation Report is a monthly summary of Food Assistance program participation, Statewide and for each Iowa county. Breakouts are reported for participants also in the FIP program, those only receiving Food Assistance, and those that are receiving economic assistance under other programs (primarily Medicaid). This report may also be known as the F-1 Report.

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A-1 May 2006 - Monthly Public Assistance Statistical Report Family Investment Program

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The purpose of this chapter is to implement Iowa Code chapter 316 and sections 6B.42, 6B.45, 6B.54 and 6B.55, as required by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-646, as amended by the Uniform Relocation Act Amendments of 1987, Title IV, Pub. L. No. 100-17 , Sec. 104, Pub. L. 105-117, and federal regulations adopted pursuant thereto.

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We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.