Daily variation of zooplankton abundance and evenness in the Rosana reservoir, Brazil: biotic and abiotic inferences

The zooplankton community presents stochastic temporal fluctuation and heterogeneous spatial variation determined by the relationships among the organisms and environmental conditions. We predicted that the temporal and spatial zooplankton distribution is heterogeneous and discrete, respectively, and that the daily variation of most abundant species is related to environmental conditions, specifically the availability of resources. Zooplankton samples were collected daily at three sampling stations in a lateral arm of the Rosana Reservoir (SP/PR). The zooplankton did not present significant differences in abundance and evenness among sampling stations, but the temporal variation of these attributes was significant. Abiotic variables and algal resource availability have significantly explained the daily variation of the most abundant species (p<0.001), however, the species distribution makes inferences on biotic relationships between them. Thus, not only the food resource availability is influential on the abundance of principal zooplankton species, but rather a set of factors (abiotic variables and biotic relationships).

Competition and well-being

We study the effects of competition in a context in which people's actions can not be contractually fixed. We find that in such an environment the very presence of competition does neither increase efficiency nor does it yield any payoff gains for the short side of the market. We also find that competition has a strong negative impact on social well-being, the disposition towards others, and individually experienced well-being, the emotional state, of those on the long side of the market. We conjecture that this limits the possibilities of satisfactory interaction in the future and, hence, has negative implications for efficiency in the longer-run

Imperfect competition and market liquidity with a supply informed trader

We develop a model of insider trading where agents have private information either about liquidation value or about supply and behave strategically to maximize their profits. The supply informed trader plays a dual role in market making and in information revelation. This trader not only reveals a part of the information he owns, but he also induces the other traders to reveal more of their private information. The presence of different types of information decreases market liquidity and induces non-monotonicity of the market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Replacing the noise introduced by liquidity traders with a random supply also allows us to study the effect the shocks on different components of supply have on prices and quantities.

Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Price competition under cost uncertainty: A laboratory analysis

We study the relation between the number of firms and price-cost margins under price competition with uncertainty about competitors' costs. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. In line with the theoretical prediction, market prices decrease with the number of firms, but on average stay above marginal costs. Pricing is less aggressive in duopolies than in triopolies and tetrapolies. However, independently from the number of firms, pricing is more aggressive than in the theoretical equilibrium. Both the absolute and the relative surpluses increase with the number of firms. Total surplus is close to the equilibrium level, since enhanced consumer surplus through lower prices is counteracted by occasional displacements of the most efficient firm in production.

Can competition in the credit market be excessive?

We study how market power affects investment and welfare when banks choose between restricting loan sizes and monitoring, in order to alleviate an underlying moral hazard problem. The impact of market power on aggregate welfare is the result of two countervailing effects. An increase in banks' market power results in: (i) higher lending rates, which worsens the borrower's incentive problem and reduces investment by unmonitored firms, (ii) higher monitoring effort, which reduces the proportion of credit-constrained firms. Whenever the second effect dominates, it is optimal to provide banks with some degree of market power.

Airline competition and network structure

This paper characterizes the equilibria in airline networks and their welfare implications in an unregulated environment. Competing airlines may adopt either fully-connected (FC) or hub-and-spoke (HS) network structures; and passengers exhibiting low brand loyalty to their preferred carrier choose an outside option to travel so that markets are partially served by airlines. In this context, carriers adopt hubbing strategies when costs are sufficiently low, and asymmetric equilibria where one carrier chooses a FC strategy and the other chooses a HS strategy may arise. Quite interestingly, flight frequency can become excessive under HS network configurations.

Cost Factors in Digital Projects: A Model Useful in Other Applications

Description of a costing model developed by digital production librarian to determine the cost to put an item into the Claremont Colleges Digital Library at the Claremont University Consortium. This case study includes variables such as material types and funding sources, data collection methods, and formulas and calculations for analysis. This model is useful for grant applications, cost allocations, and budgeting for digital project coordinators and digital library projects.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

The Impact of prevention measures and organisational factors on occupational injuries

This paper analyses the impact of a series of managerial and organisational factors on occupational injuries. These consist of occupational safety measures, as regards both the intensity and the orientation of risk prevention in companies, and the adoption of certain work organisation practices, quality management and the use of flexible production technologies. We estimate a negative binomial regression based on a sample of 213 Spanish industrial establishments, defining a constant random parameter to take account of non-observable heterogeneity. Our results show that occupational safety measures, the intensive use of quality management tools and the empowerment of workers all help to reduce the number of injuries. We have also confirmed the presence of synergies between the organisational factors analysed and the development of an occupational safety strategy featuring participation and the extension of prevention to all levels of the organisation.

Entry and market selection of firms: a laboratory study

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases. When all firms' costs are the same entry always leads consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer surplus to equilibrium. However, total profits remain below equilibrium, due to the fact that the inefficient incumbents produce too much and efficient entrants produce too little. Market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers' standpoint, but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. These results are not affected by whether entry is simultaneous or sequential. The length of the incumbency phase does have some subtle effects.

Host factors influencing outcome of Leishmania mexicana infection in mice

Studies were undertaken to determine the influence of several host-related parameters on the course of Leishmania mexicana mexicana infection in inbred C57B1/10 (C57) and outbred albino (OA) mice. An important influence of the following variables was demonstrated: Host strain: lesions in C57s were significantly less variable in size and outcome than those of OAs under the conditions studied and even when persistent developed at a slower rate. Host age: Subcutanous injection of 2 x 10 [raised to the power of 4] to 2 x 10 [raised to the power of 6] amastigotes into the dorsum of the rear paw produced significantly larger lesions which healed more slowly in 2 mo. old C57s than in 4 mo. old mice. Reduced healing ability was observed in older (8 mo. old) female C57s, and low mortality occurred after 15 months of age in infected mice of both sexes. Lesion site: Following amastigote infection, lesions in paws of most C57s regress within 15 - 25 wks. In contrast, perinasal legions produced with the same number of parasites tend to persist for the life of the animal as slowly spreading irregular nodules. In animals infected in both locations, each lesion site behaves similarly to that in singly infected animals of the same age, i.e. regression in the two sites is independent. Our results indicate that while host strain may strongly influence infection outcoem, such variables as lesion site and host age play important roles and may explain, in part, reported inter- and intraexperimental variability in responses of murine hosts to a given leishmanial parasite.