Greenwashing the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Fossil fuels, the environment, and climate change

There has been much controversy over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) – a plurilateral trade agreement involving a dozen nations from throughout the Pacific Rim – and its impact upon the environment, biodiversity, and climate change. The secretive treaty negotiations involve Australia and New Zealand; countries from South East Asia such as Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, and Japan; the South American nations of Peru and Chile; and the members of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Canada, Mexico and the United States. There was an agreement reached between the parties in October 2015. The participants asserted: ‘We expect this historic agreement to promote economic growth, support higher-paying jobs; enhance innovation, productivity and competitiveness; raise living standards; reduce poverty in our countries; and to promote transparency, good governance, and strong labor and environmental protections.’ The final texts of the agreement were published in November 2015. There has been discussion as to whether other countries – such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea – will join the deal. There has been much debate about the impact of this proposed treaty upon intellectual property, the environment, biodiversity and climate change. There have been similar concerns about the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – a proposed trade agreement between the United States and the European Union. In 2011, the United States Trade Representative developed a Green Paper on trade, conservation, and the environment in the context of the TPP. In its rhetoric, the United States Trade Representative has maintained that it has been pushing for strong, enforceable environmental standards in the TPP. In a key statement in 2014, the United States Trade Representative Mike Froman insisted: ‘The United States’ position on the environment in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations is this: environmental stewardship is a core American value, and we will insist on a robust, fully enforceable environment chapter in the TPP or we will not come to agreement.’ The United States Trade Representative maintained: ‘Our proposals in the TPP are centered around the enforcement of environmental laws, including those implementing multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) in TPP partner countries, and also around trailblazing, first-ever conservation proposals that will raise standards across the region’. Moreover, the United States Trade Representative asserted: ‘Furthermore, our proposals would enhance international cooperation and create new opportunities for public participation in environmental governance and enforcement.’ The United States Trade Representative has provided this public outline of the Environment Chapter of the TPP: A meaningful outcome on environment will ensure that the agreement appropriately addresses important trade and environment challenges and enhances the mutual supportiveness of trade and environment. The Trans-Pacific Partnership countries share the view that the environment text should include effective provisions on trade-related issues that would help to reinforce environmental protection and are discussing an effective institutional arrangement to oversee implementation and a specific cooperation framework for addressing capacity building needs. They also are discussing proposals on new issues, such as marine fisheries and other conservation issues, biodiversity, invasive alien species, climate change, and environmental goods and services. Mark Linscott, an assistant Trade Representative testified: ‘An environment chapter in the TPP should strengthen country commitments to enforce their environmental laws and regulations, including in areas related to ocean and fisheries governance, through the effective enforcement obligation subject to dispute settlement.’ Inside US Trade has commented: ‘While not initially expected to be among the most difficult areas, the environment chapter has emerged as a formidable challenge, partly due to disagreement over the United States proposal to make environmental obligations binding under the TPP dispute settlement mechanism’. Joshua Meltzer from the Brookings Institute contended that the trade agreement could be a boon for the protection of the environment in the Pacific Rim: Whether it is depleting fisheries, declining biodiversity or reduced space in the atmosphere for Greenhouse Gas emissions, the underlying issue is resource scarcity. And in a world where an additional 3 billion people are expected to enter the middle class over the next 15 years, countries need to find new and creative ways to cooperate in order to satisfy the legitimate needs of their population for growth and opportunity while using resources in a manner that is sustainable for current and future generations. The TPP parties already represent a diverse range of developed and developing countries. Should the TPP become a free trade agreement of the Asia-Pacific region, it will include the main developed and developing countries and will be a strong basis for building a global consensus on these trade and environmental issues. The TPP has been promoted by its proponents as a boon to the environment. The United States Trade Representative has maintained that the TPP will protect the environment: ‘The United States’ position on the environment in the TPP negotiations is this: environmental stewardship is a core American value, and we will insist on a robust, fully enforceable environment chapter in the TPP or we will not come to agreement.’ The United States Trade Representative discussed ‘Trade for a Greener World’ on World Environment Day. Andrew Robb, at the time the Australian Trade and Investment Minister, vowed that the TPP will contain safeguards for the protection of the environment. In November 2015, after the release of the TPP text, Rohan Patel, the Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Director of Intergovernmental Affairs, sought to defend the environmental credentials of the TPP. He contended that the deal had been supported by the Nature Conservancy, the International Fund for Animal Welfare, the Joint Ocean Commission Initiative, the World Wildlife Fund, and World Animal Protection. The United States Congress, though, has been conflicted by the United States Trade Representative’s arguments about the TPP and the environment. In 2012, members of the United States Congress - including Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR), Olympia Snowe (R-ME), and John Kerry (D-MA) – wrote a letter, arguing that the trade agreement needs to provide strong protection for the environment: ‘We believe that a '21st century agreement' must have an environment chapter that guarantees ongoing sustainable trade and creates jobs, and this is what American businesses and consumers want and expect also.’ The group stressed that ‘A binding and enforceable TPP environment chapter that stands up for American interests is critical to our support of the TPP’. The Congressional leaders maintained: ‘We believe the 2007 bipartisan congressional consensus on environmental provisions included in recent trade agreements should serve as the framework for the environment chapter of the TPP.’ In 2013, senior members of the Democratic leadership expressed their opposition to granting President Barack Obama a fast-track authority in respect of the TPP House of Representatives Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi said: ‘No on fast-track – Camp-Baucus – out of the question.’ Senator Majority leader Harry Reid commented: ‘I’m against Fast-Track: Everyone would be well-advised to push this right now.’ Senator Elizabeth Warren has been particularly critical of the process and the substance of the negotiations in the TPP: From what I hear, Wall Street, pharmaceuticals, telecom, big polluters and outsourcers are all salivating at the chance to rig the deal in the upcoming trade talks. So the question is, Why are the trade talks secret? You’ll love this answer. Boy, the things you learn on Capitol Hill. I actually have had supporters of the deal say to me ‘They have to be secret, because if the American people knew what was actually in them, they would be opposed. Think about that. Real people, people whose jobs are at stake, small-business owners who don’t want to compete with overseas companies that dump their waste in rivers and hire workers for a dollar a day—those people, people without an army of lobbyists—they would be opposed. I believe if people across this country would be opposed to a particular trade agreement, then maybe that trade agreement should not happen. The Finance Committee in the United States Congress deliberated over the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations in 2014. The new chair Ron Wyden has argued that there needs to be greater transparency in trade. Nonetheless, he has mooted the possibility of a ‘smart-track’ to reconcile the competing demands of the Obama Administration, and United States Congress. Wyden insisted: ‘The new breed of trade challenges spawned over the last generation must be addressed in imaginative new policies and locked into enforceable, ambitious, job-generating trade agreements.’ He emphasized that such agreements ‘must reflect the need for a free and open Internet, strong labor rights and environmental protections.’ Elder Democrat Sander Levin warned that the TPP failed to provide proper protection for the environment: The TPP parties are considering a different structure to protect the environment than the one adopted in the May 10 Agreement, which directly incorporated seven multilateral environmental agreements into the text of past trade agreements. While the form is less important than the substance, the TPP must provide an overall level of environmental protection that upholds and builds upon the May 10 standard, including fully enforceable obligations. But many of our trading partners are actively seeking to weaken the text to the point of falling short of that standard, including on key issues like conservation. Nonetheless, 2015, President Barack Obama was able to secure the overall support of the United States Congress for his ‘fast-track’ authority. This was made possible by the Republicans and dissident Democrats. Notably, Oregon Senator Ron Wyden switched sides, and was transformed from a critic of the TPP to an apologist for the TPP. For their part, green political parties and civil society organisations have been concerned about the secretive nature of the negotiations; and the substantive implications of the treaty for the environment. Environmental groups and climate advocates have been sceptical of the environmental claims made by the White House for the TPP. The Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, the Australian Greens and the Green Party of Canada have released a joint declaration on the TPP observing: ‘More than just another trade agreement, the TPP provisions could hinder access to safe, affordable medicines, weaken local content rules for media, stifle high-tech innovation, and even restrict the ability of future governments to legislate for the good of public health and the environment’. In the United States, civil society groups such as the Sierra Club, Public Citizen, WWF, the Friends of the Earth, the Rainforest Action Network and 350.org have raised concerns about the TPP and the environment. Allison Chin, President of the Sierra Club, complained about the lack of transparency, due process, and public participation in the TPP talks: ‘This is a stealth affront to the principles of our democracy.’ Maude Barlow’s The Council of Canadians has also been concerned about the TPP and environmental justice. New Zealand Sustainability Council executive director Simon Terry said the agreement showed ‘minimal real gains for nature’. A number of organisations have joined a grand coalition of civil society organisations, which are opposed to the grant of a fast-track. On the 15th January 2013, WikiLeaks released the draft Environment Chapter of the TPP - along with a report by the Chairs of the Environmental Working Group. Julian Assange, WikiLeaks' publisher, stated: ‘Today's WikiLeaks release shows that the public sweetener in the TPP is just media sugar water.’ He observed: ‘The fabled TPP environmental chapter turns out to be a toothless public relations exercise with no enforcement mechanism.’ This article provides a critical examination of the draft Environment Chapter of the TPP. The overall argument of the article is that the Environment Chapter of the TPP is an exercise in greenwashing – it is a public relations exercise by the United States Trade Representative, rather than a substantive regime for the protection of the environment in the Pacific Rim. Greenwashing has long been a problem in commerce, in which companies making misleading and deceptive claims about the environment. In his 2012 book, Greenwash: Big Brands and Carbon Scams, Guy Pearse considers the rise of green marketing and greenwashing. Government greenwashing is also a significant issue. In his book Storms of My Grandchildren, the climate scientist James Hansen raises his concerns about government greenwashing. Such a problem is apparent with the TPP – in which there was a gap between the assertions of the United States Government, and the reality of the agreement. This article contends that the TPP fails to meet the expectations created by President Barack Obama, the White House, and the United States Trade Representative about the environmental value of the agreement. First, this piece considers the relationship of the TPP to multilateral environmental treaties. Second, it explores whether the provisions in respect of the environment are enforceable. Third, this article examines the treatment of trade and biodiversity in the TPP. Fourth, this study considers the question of marine capture fisheries. Fifth, there is an evaluation of the cursory text in the TPP on conservation. Sixth, the article considers trade in environmental services under the TPP. Seventh, this article highlights the tensions between the TPP and substantive international climate action. It is submitted that the TPP undermines effective and meaningful government action and regulation in respect of climate change. The conclusion also highlights that a number of other chapters of the TPP will impact upon the protection of the environment – including the Investment Chapter, the Intellectual Property Chapter, the Technical Barriers to Trade Chapter, and the text on public procurement.

Gendering and racialising self-determination: Indigenous women and patriarchal whiteness

Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination, in accordance with international law by virtue of which tehy may freely determine their political status and institutions and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. an integral part of this is the right to autonomy and self-government. The essential feature of racism is not hostility or misperception, but rather the defense [sic] of a system from which advantage is derived on the basis of race. The manner in which the defense [sic] is articulated - either as hostility or subtlety - is not nearly as important as the fact that it insures the continuation of a privileged relationship.

Women's health and a framework convention on global health

This paper considers the role for a Framework Convention on Global Health in addressing key challenges in women’s health at a global level. Part I analyses the conceptualization of health in terms of human rights and the linking of women’s rights and human rights. Part II seeks to identify pressing issues for women’s health, articulating 10 key challenges for women’s health. Part III considers the proposal for a Framework Convention on Global Health to meet global health needs. Finally, Part IV asks whether international law can provide a valuable platform to support recognition and achievement of women’s health rights and identifies key elements for supporting and promoting women’s health.

Internet privatization, WikiLeaks, and free expression

In late 2010, the online nonprofit media organization WikiLeaks published classified documents detailing correspondence between the U.S. State Department and its diplomatic missions around the world, numbering around 250,000 cables. These diplomatic cables contained classified information with comments on world leaders, foreign states, and various international and domestic issues. Negative reactions to the publication of these cables came from both the U.S. political class (which was generally condemnatory of WikiLeaks, invoking national security concerns and the jeopardizing of U.S. interests abroad) and the corporate world, with various companies ceasing to continue to provide services to WikiLeaks despite no legal measure (e.g., a court injunction) forcing them to do so. This article focuses on the legal remedies available to WikiLeaks against this corporate suppression of its speech in the U.S. and Europe since these are the two principle arenas in which the actors concerned are operating. The transatlantic legal protection of free expression will be considered, yet, as will be explained in greater detail, the legal conception of this constitutional and fundamental right comes from a time when the state posed the greater threat to freedom. As a result, it is not generally enforceable against private, non-state entities interfering with speech and expression which is the case here. Other areas of law, namely antitrust/competition, contract and tort will then be examined to determine whether WikiLeaks and its partners can attempt to enforce their right indirectly through these other means. Finally, there will be some concluding thoughts about the implications of the corporate response to the WikiLeaks embassy cables leak for freedom of expression online.

Investing in the future: Norway, climate change, and fossil fuel divestment

The fossil fuel divestment movement has undergone explosive growth over the last few years - expanding from encouraging educational institutions to adopt ethical investment policies to focusing upon cities, pension funds and philanthropic charities. The fossil fuel divestment movement has attained global ambitions - challenging sovereign wealth funds and national governments to engage in fossil fuel divestment, and pushing for fossil fuel divestment at international climate talks - such as the Paris Climate Summit in 2015. By exploring and analysing a key campaign to 'Divest Norway', this chapter considers the efforts to globalise and internationalise the fossil fuel divestment campaign. Part 1 explores the origins of the fossil fuel divestment movement, and the application of such strategies in a variety of contexts. Part 2 looks at the campaign to divest Norway's sovereign wealth fund of fossil fuel investments. There has been much discussion as to whether the bold decision of Norway to engage in coal divestment will encourage and inspire other sovereign wealth funds to engage in fossil fuel divestment. The conclusion considers the efforts to introduce fossil fuel divestment as a policy initiative for nation states as a policy option in international climate law.

Trade wars in the TRIPS Council: Intellectual property, technology transfer, and climate change

This Chapter considers the geopolitical conflicts in respect of intellectual property, trade, and climate change in the TRIPS Agreement 1994 under the World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular, it focuses upon debates in the TRIPS Council on the topic of patent law and clean energy in 2013 and 2014. The chapter highlights the development agenda of a number of developing countries who are keen for access to clean energy to combat climate change and global warming. It also considers the mixed contributions of members of the BRICS/ BASIC group – including Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. This chapter highlights the intellectual property maximalist position of a number of developed countries on intellectual property, climate change, and trade. Seeking to overcome this conflict and stalemate, this Chapter puts forward both procedural and substantial reform options in respect of intellectual property, trade, and climate change in the TRIPS Council and the WTO. It also flags that the TRIPS Agreement 1994 could well be displaced by the rise of mega-regional trade agreements – such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).

Impact of a new mandatory reporting law on reporting and identification of child sexual abuse: A seven year time trend analysis

Child sexual abuse is widespread and difficult to detect. To enhance case identification, many societies have enacted mandatory reporting laws requiring designated professionals, most often police, teachers, doctors and nurses, to report suspected cases to government child welfare agencies. Little research has explored the effects of introducing a reporting law on the number of reports made, and the outcomes of those reports. This study explored the impact of a new legislative mandatory reporting duty for child sexual abuse in the State of Western Australia over seven years. We analysed data about numbers and outcomes of reports by mandated reporters, for periods before the law (2006-08) and after the law (2009-12). Results indicate that the number of reports by mandated reporters of suspected child sexual abuse increased by a factor of 3.7, from an annual mean of 662 in the three year pre-law period to 2448 in the four year post-law period. The increase in the first two post-law years was contextually and statistically significant. Report numbers stabilised in 2010-12, at one report per 210 children. The number of investigated reports increased threefold, from an annual mean of 451 in the pre-law period to 1363 in the post-law period. Significant decline in the proportion of mandated reports that were investigated in the first two post-law years suggested the new level of reporting and investigative need exceeded what was anticipated. However, a subsequent significant increase restored the pre-law proportion, suggesting systemic adaptive capacity. The number of substantiated investigations doubled, from an annual mean of 160 in the pre-law period to 327 in the post-law period, indicating twice as many sexually abused children were being identified.

(Failed) voluntary euthanasia law reform in Australia: Two decades of trends, models and politics

Within Australia, there have been many attempts to pass voluntary euthanasia (VE) or physician-assisted suicide (PAS) legislation. From 16 June 1993 until the date of writing, 51 Bills have been introduced into Australian parliaments dealing with legalising VE or PAS. Despite these numerous attempts, the only successful Bill was the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 (NT), which was enacted in the Northern Territory, but a short time later overturned by the controversial Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth). Yet, in stark contrast to the significant political opposition, for decades Australian public opinion has overwhelmingly supported law reform legalising VE or PAS. While there is ongoing debate in Australia, both through public discourse and scholarly publications, about the merits and dangers of reform in this field, there has been remarkably little analysis of the numerous legislative attempts to reform the law, and the context in which those reform attempts occurred. The aim of this article is to better understand the reform landscape in Australia over the past two decades. The information provided in this article will better equip Australians, both politicians and the general public, to have a more nuanced understanding of the political context in which the euthanasia debate has been and is occurring. It will also facilitate a more informed debate in the future.

A submission to the Tasmanian Department of Health and Human Services consultation “Healthy Tasmania Five Year Strategic Plan”

This submission will address a number of questions raised in section 5.2, “Potential Future Initiatives to target smoking”, of the Healthy Tasmania Five Year Strategic Plan – Community Consultation Draft. Each question has been answered within this submission. This submission will also address the possibility of legal challenges to these proposed changes, a pivotal consideration when implementing any tobacco control laws. This is due to the aggressive nature of the tobacco industry, as illustrated by their attempts to challenge plain packaging laws in the country and through international treaties. The evidence provided in my submission illustrates that prevention of initiation of smoking during adolescence has various benefits in terms of reduction of negative smoking behaviors in later life. I argue that increasing the minimum legal age of purchasing for tobacco to 21 will benefit both the levels of underage smoking as well as the age of onset of initiation of smoking, due to the greater difficulties that those who are underage would experience in accessing tobacco products. I will also address the question of whether the minimum smoking age should be increased to 25.

Medicalising Prohibition : Harm reduction in Finnish and International Drug Policy

The increase in drug use and related harms in the late 1990s in Finland has come to be referred to as the second drug wave. In addition to using criminal justice as a basis of drug policy, new kinds of drug regulation were introduced. Some of the new regulation strategies were referred to as "harm reduction". The most widely known practices of harm reduction include needle and syringe exchange programmes for intravenous drug users and medicinal substitution and maintenance treatment programmes for opiate users. The purpose of the study is to examine the change of drug policy in Finland and particularly the political struggle surrounding harm reduction in the context of this change. The aim is, first, to analyse the content of harm reduction policy and the dynamics of its emergence and, second, to assess to what extent harm reduction undermines or threatens traditional drug policy. The concept of harm reduction is typically associated with a drug policy strategy that employs the public health approach and where the principal focus of regulation is on drug-related health harms and risks. On the other hand, harm reduction policy has also been given other interpretations, relating, in particular, to human rights and social equality. In Finland, harm reduction can also be seen to have its roots in criminal policy. The general conclusion of the study is that rather than posing a threat to a prohibitionist drug policy, harm reduction has come to form part of it. The implementation of harm reduction by setting up health counselling centres for drug users with the main focus on needle exchange and by extending substitution treatment has implied the creation of specialised services based on medical expertise and an increasing involvement of the medical profession in addressing drug problems. At the same time the criminal justice control of drug use has been intensified. Accordingly, harm reduction has not entailed a shift to a more liberal drug policy nor has it undermined the traditional policy with its emphasis on total drug prohibition. Instead, harm reduction in combination with a prohibitionist penal policy constitutes a new dual-track drug policy paradigm. The study draws on the constructionist tradition of research on social problems and movements, where the analysis centres on claims made about social problems, claim-makers, ways of making claims and related social mobilisation. The research material mainly consists of administrative documents and interviews with key stakeholders. The doctoral study consists of five original articles and a summary article. The first article gives an overview of the strained process of change of drug policy and policy trends around the turn of the millennium. The second article focuses on the concept of harm reduction and the international organisations and groupings involved in defining it. The third article describes the process that in 1996 97 led to the creation of the first Finnish national drug policy strategy by reconciling mutually contradictory views of addressing the drug problem, at the same as the way was paved for harm reduction measures. The fourth article seeks to explain the relatively rapid diffusion of needle exchange programmes after 1996. The fifth article assesses substitution treatment as a harm reduction measure from the viewpoint of the associations of opioid users and their family members.

Chronopotentiometry with power-law perturbation functions at an expanding plane electrode with and without a preceding blank period for systems with a coupled first-order homogeneous chemical reaction

The systems formalism is used to obtain the interfacial concentration transients for power-law current input at an expanding plane electrode. The explicit results for the concentration transients obtained here pertain to arbitrary homogeneous reaction schemes coupled to the oxidant and reductant of a single charge-transfer step and the power-law form without and with a preceding blank period (for two types of power-law current profile, say, (i) I(t) = I0(t−t0)q for t greater-or-equal, slanted t0, I(t) = 0 for t < t0; and (ii) I(t) = I0tq for t greater-or-equal, slanted t0, I(t) = 0 for t < t0). Finally the potential transients are obtained using Padé approximants. The results of Galvez et al. (for E, CE, EC, aC) (J. Electroanal. Chem., 132 (1982) 15; 146 (1983) 221, 233, 243), Molina et al. (for E) (J. Electroanal. Chem., 227 (1987) 1 and Kies (for E) (J. Electroanal. Chem., 45 (1973) 71) are obtained as special cases.